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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the disparity between how states define asylum seekers and who 
identifies him or herself to be an asylum seeker.  Using interpretive methodologies I examine 
how states construct asylum seekers in security discourses, and the role of international 
geopolitics in solidifying state-based identities in state discourses.  Narrative interviews with 
asylum seekers offer insight into how state security discourses act upon asylum seekers as 
individuals.  I juxtapose narratives addressing the experience of being an asylum seeker with the 
state based analysis.  I use the theory of ontological security as an analytical took capable of 
furthering a comprehension of the contention between state-based security discourses and 
decentered security that reveals the power of state-based identities and how the dominance of 
state-based identities in the international system actively detracts from other identities.  The 
theory of ontological security can offer an explanation as to how and why state discourse 
positions asylum seekers as a threat.  The biographical identity narrative within the state and the 
way the state acts amongst its international peers offers insight into the ways migrants contest 
state identity and state security.  By intersecting the security literature that assumes the state and 
the migration literature that problematizes the state I make an intervention.  This intervention is 
situated within the human security paradigm, in which I offer a decentered human security that 
incorporates the logic of ontological security without the state, whereby human security does not 
have to rely on state based identities. 
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Introduction 
 
Looking around Viktoria Square in the centre of Athens one can clearly see the realities 
of international migration, to be specific, irregular and forced migration happening outside of 
visa and immigration programmes.  Viktoria square is in North Central Athens, a space of about 
250 square feet, with a kiosk selling newspapers, a metro station, a few benches dotted around, 
and the surrounding streets lined with cafes and bars.  The apartment and office buildings that 
rise around Viktoria Square are tall with flat roofs, with white peeling paint and large verandahs.  
Graffiti and the remains of posters adorn walls and lampposts.  Viktoria Square has become 
known as the centre of immigrant-Athens.  Looking around, there are people sleeping on 
benches, men from Africa and Asia with goods for sale spread on large blankets, clusters of 
people sitting, chatting, standing, waiting.  The people are not going anywhere because they do 
not have anywhere to go.  They are not at home because presently they do not have homes to go 
to.  Athens is one of the first ports of call for migrants seeking to enter Europe.  While the 
migrants often consider themselves to be asylum seekers, state and European Union laws seldom 
agree with them.  National discourses posit them as economic migrants, or more frequently 
―bogus asylum seekers,‖ ―welfare tourists,‖ and ―illegal immigrants.‖  In this study I investigate 
the disparity between the self-conceptions of asylum seekers and national discourses 
constructing perceptions of asylum seekers. 
Millions of displaced persons seek to migrate because they cannot afford to live in their 
home country.  This has led to a growing underground economy in human trafficking, with 
vulnerable persons incorporated into slavery and sex work, in addition to disenfranchised female 
workers in an ―offshore proletariat‖ (Sassen 1999). Despite their vulnerability, international law 
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and domestic immigration law of liberal democracies continue to separate economic migrants 
from forced migrants. While those economic migrants who move through the visa programmes 
are certainly separate from subjects of forced migration, the current distinction leaves one of the 
biggest motivations for migration, which is poverty, absent in the global community. Due to the 
absence of forced economic migration in legislation pertaining to forced migration, and due to 
the difference between asylum seekers self-identification and state identifications of asylum 
seekers, it is necessary to problematize the category of asylum seeker that is used by states at 
state borders, which implements the very specific criteria of the refugee definition. 
Asylum seekers acquire the title when seeking admission to a state, either at the border or 
once inside.  By this nature, they are often travelling without documents and tend to come in 
trickles, such as small family groups or as individuals.  In immigration policy ―genuine‖ asylum 
seekers are distinguished from categories such as ―economic migrants‖, ―bogus‖ asylum seekers 
and ―illegal immigrants.‖  The asylum seekers considered to be genuine meet the individualistic 
criteria of the Refugee Protocol.
1
  The Protocol definition was written in the context of the 
aftermath of WWII and reflects Eurocentric concerns of the Cold War political environment 
(Hathaway 1991, Frelick 1992). The ―non-genuine‖ categories are those people who do not fall 
within the bounds of this definition, and serve as the basis for the construction of asylum seekers 
as a threat.  Throughout this study I use the term asylum seeker to cover more broadly those 
persons who seek protection, including protection from poverty.  I maintain the position that 
reasons to migrate are a result of complex circumstances that cannot be narrowed down to a 
                                                   
1 The Refugee Protocol definition of a refugee is as follows: As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 
and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it.  
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single cause.  I challenge the economic emphasis in state discourse constructing those they 
consider ―bogus,‖ while I am mindful of the subjective complexity in individual migrant issues.  
My broad use of asylum seeker is founded in studies by Anastassia Tsoukala, among others, who 
points to ―the weakening of any distinction between migrants and asylum seekers granted a 
refugee status … the authorities considering in general that most asylum seekers are ‗false‘ ones‖ 
(Tsoukala 2005:13-14, citing Butterwegge 1996 and den Boer 1998).
 
 I define asylum seekers as 
all those who enter an advanced industrialized state seeking protection, prior to it being 
established that they meet the relevant criteria.  Many of those seeking asylum are unaware of 
the official definition and can be considered genuine seekers of asylum despite official 
ineligibility.  All those who enter a state to seek protection, whether under the Refugee 
Convention Definition, with an established nexus reason or without, are included in my 
definition of asylum seeker.  Thus, I include those seeking to escape poverty, civil war, or natural 
disaster.  None of these categories is covered by the current official definition.   
 This work is situated in the broad field of international relations (IR).  IR scholarship has 
been dominated by a narrative generated by the North West, specifically the U.S. but also North 
Western Europe (Nayak and Selbin 2010, Agathangelou and Ling 2004).  IR as a field has 
conventionally focused on the study of conflict.  The ―debates‖ that characterize the 
historiography of the field reiterate the importance of Realism and Liberalism and their 
subsequent ―neos.‖ These dominant paradigms concern themselves with the behaviour of states 
(Wilson 1998; Schmidt 2002).  The security literature in particular has been dominated by 
realism and state security concerns (Agathangelou and Ling 2004, Fierke 2007).  The principle 
assumptions that have reinforced the paradigms of realism and liberalism are that of states as 
unitary, rational actors within an anarchic international environment.  This largely disregards the 
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actions of people, other than in the context of decision-making elites (Allison 1969; Hagan 
2001).    Particularly over the last two decades, schools of critical security have offered 
challenges and a rethinking of security studies (Waever 2004; Booth 2005).  I draw on these 
critical schools of thought, challenging the state dominated paradigm.  I engage a thick 
understanding of the state, incorporating societal security in the vein of the Copenhagen school 
(Buzan 1991; Waever 1993) as this allows for analysis of threat construction and perception at 
the elite level and at the social and cultural levels.  
The human rights literature similarly has been dominated by state-focused concerns.  
Human rights is often associated with Enlightenment liberalism and natural rights found in 
Locke and Rousseau (Schmitz and Sikkink 2001), declaring the idea that states should respect 
the rights of citizens.  Natural rights see all humans as having rights but this interacts with 
governance in order for those rights to be realized.  Schmitz and Sikkink document the shift in 
human rights literature from the study of domestic politics to include foreign policy concerns in 
the 1970s; and the incorporation of human rights in IR fully in the 1990s, with human rights 
atrocities in the Balkans and Rwanda bringing to the forefront studies regarding international 
intervention.  However, human rights still rested on the assumptions of states as the primary 
actors in IR and inherently advanced the values of Enlightenment liberalism privileging the 
concept of human as citizen.  Nayak and Selbin recognize this as inherent to the constructed 
discourses of ―evil perpetrator, innocent victim‖ (Nayak and Selbin 2010) that serve to justify 
international interventions reproducing the hierarchy of Western ideas.  Human rights within 
Western liberal democracies tend not to be considered, furthering the idea that Western liberal 
democracy represents the ―good.‖  There are some exceptions to this; for example, with regard to 
the Bush administration and torture (Nayak and Selbin 2010; Forsythe 2006; Neal 2006).  Here, 
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―human rights can be used to challenge whether racially unequal liberal democracies are 
‗civilized,‘ thus disrupting assumptions about what kinds of processes lead to human rights‖ 
(Nayak and Selbin 2010:64). My focus is not on race, but on citizenship and immigration status.  
I complicate the human rights scholarship though examining what is missing in terms of access 
to human rights within the geographic boundaries of Western democracies. 
 Reconceptualizing how we understand borders can function as a tool to decenter IR away 
from the emphasis on the state as primary privileged actor (Nayak and Selbin 2010).  The shift to 
focus on the experiences and perceptions of the migrants themselves aims to do this by looking 
at the experience of borders in circumstances where they function as a blockage to realizing 
social and political participation.  Additionally, drawing on scholarship that points to the 
neglected consideration of the body in IR, individual migrants can be understood as a physical 
manifestation of the border itself (Doty 2004, Doty 2007, Biswas and Nair 2009).  For example, 
there is no territorial border visible in Athens proper.  However, people must confront the reality 
of the border every day as it is made visible by the bodies in Viktoria Square, in Omonia Square, 
sleeping in the National Gardens, and protesting outside the internationally renowned museum of 
archeology. 
   
Research Questions 
In this study I look at the collision between subjects of forced migration and the dominance 
of state interests in global politics in general and in the field of IR.  I examine the resulting irony 
that the threatened come to be perceived as a threat.  In doing this I develop a notion of 
ontological security that reflects an individual‘s normative judgments about the aspects of his or 
her life that contribute to a sense of individual or personal insecurity. I develop my use of 
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ontological security from Anthony Giddens‘ structuration theory, which is based upon ―human 
wants (that) are hierarchically ordered, involving a core ‗basic security system‘ largely 
inaccessible to the consciousness of the actor‖ (Giddens 1993:124). Ontological security is 
determined by security in the individual‘s daily life and societal participation. The acquisition of 
ontological security is characterized by identification of the needs most immediate to the 
particular individual.  I use this framework to offer insight into self-conceived understandings of 
security and human rights, shifting the focus to the aspect of security an individual is most 
immediately lacking. My core research questions address the emphasis currently placed on the 
state even in areas such as human rights that pertain to the individual, and subsequently 
investigate how this can be shifted to the individual outside of the state, and what this offers to 
human rights.  Specifically, my core research questions are as follows: 
1. What are the mechanisms in place in international and domestic politics that lead asylum 
seekers to be constructed as a threat? 
2. What are the characteristics of international human rights that lead migrants to be 
excluded? 
3. In what ways does the individual rights-seeker perceive his or her ontological security? 
4. How can human rights be reconceived in order to empower the individual rights-seeker? 
 
Interpretivsim, reflexivity and theory as a verb 
The subject matter of my study focuses on individuals who remain marginal in 
international relations and critically exposes the unequal power dynamics between these 
individuals and the discourses constructing them in Western perspectives.  Positivism has long 
been held in IR as ―the implicit ‗gold standard‘ against which all approaches are evaluated‖ 
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(Smith, 1996:13).  I adopt interpretive methods that diverge from the assumptions of objectivism 
and empiricism at the core of positivist methodologies in preference of an hermeneutic approach 
―whereby we can only understand the world by our being caught up in a web of significance‖ 
(Smith 1996: 26), considering the linguistic historical tradition to inform our understanding and 
appropriation of the world (Gadamer 1989, Gibbons 2006).  My interpretive and constructivist 
approach examines discourse as the primary mechanism of the constitution of social phenomena, 
assuming language as constitutive of the world, rather than reflective of the world (Kratochwil 
2001).  My epistemological preferences are reflected in the nature of the questions I ask, which 
are generated by a pragmatist ontology that rejects the possibility for a standard of static 
objective truth that can be empirically observed.  Rather, I seek to understand how the categories 
of legitimacy and illegitimacy are constructed for asylum seekers and to understand the disparity 
between the state‘s experience of asylum seekers and the individual migrant‘s experiences of 
being an asylum seeker.   
Recent debates in IR have seen a movement of the field towards post positivist 
approaches, which reject the objectivist empiricism of positivism (Smith et al 1996, Schmidt 
2002, Wight 2002, Gibbons 2006).  The causal explanations based on objective observation that 
are the aim of positivist approaches in IR are not appropriate to the interpretive analytic, which 
rejects the notion of objective truth and is aligned with a pragmatist ontology.  Thus, the move 
towards post positivism has had a fundamental effect on the types of questions being asked and 
the types of information being sought (Fearon and Wendt 2002).  The purpose of theory for the 
interpretivist is not to predict in the context of causal claims but is to develop contextual 
understanding and practical knowledge (Krause and Williams 1996).  My research questions call 
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for interpretive methods, are generated by interpretive scholarship in IR, and contribute to that 
body of scholarship.   
   With regard to the state‘s experience of asylum seekers I examine the dialectic 
constitution of categories of ―genuine‖ and ―bogus‖ asylum seekers.  I understand these as 
performative concepts that are produced by state narratives, which normatively reinforce state 
identity and legitimacy.  I adopt subjective hermeneutics, which Adler terms ―radical 
constructivist‖ in the vein of James Der Derian, Roxanne Doty, and Stephen Gill among others 
(Adler 2002), allowing me then to shift the emphasis to self-definitions of asylum seekers rather 
than the definitions advanced and reproduced in state discourses.  This reinforces my expanded 
definition of asylum seeker to those who self-identify as asylum seekers and exposes the 
disconnect between state conceptions of asylum seekers and self conceptions of asylum seekers.   
The approach I use to answer these questions is founded in a critical ―decentering‖ of 
international relations that attempts to make space within the narratives of international relations 
scholarship for, not just the voices of a group of people without access to rights, but the 
incorporation of these voices in the conceptualization of human rights.  I engage the ―radical 
constructivist‖ approaches that look to expose and understand power dynamics and allow for 
dissident understandings of power relations (Der Derian 2009, Campbell 2007, Adler 2002).  
However, there are two additional motivations that inform the questions I ask and consequently 
my epistemology and methodology.  The first refers back to the description of interpretivism that 
Krause and Williams provide (1996), that interpretivism aims to gain contextual understanding 
and practical knowledge.  Observing the preference for practical knowledge I take influence 
from theorists such as Marysia Zalewski (1996) and Cynthia Enloe (2004) that connect theory 
with the everyday, and with practice.  Zalewski (1996) critiques post positivist approaches as 
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competing for a moral highground, and advocates thinking of theory as a verb: we theorize IR in 
our daily practice. I emphasize the notion of the everyday encounters that form the stuff of IR for 
most people, and I account for the political in the everyday.   The particular encounters I engage 
are everyday experiences that construct the idea of migrants in society incorporating analyses of 
popular culture as well as political narratives.  I juxtapose this with the everyday experiences of 
migrants themselves in order to understand their self-perception and varying positions of 
insecurity.   
Further to Zalewski‘s point is my second concern: that of reflexivity in IR.  Adoptng an 
understanding of the hermeneutic reproduction of social meanings, I take a position of reflexivity 
which rather than claiming objectivity is careful to acknowledge my presence in my research.  
Further to this, I take an ethical stance with regard to the supposition that the scholarship of IR 
contributes to the hermeneutic reproduction of the world (Smith 1996, Campbell 1998).  IR 
scholarship is not a separate world but is implicit in international politics (even if distantly) thus 
it is an ethical obligation for IR theory to be reflexively self-aware in its own production of 
international political phenomena.  Linking this to Zalewski‘s ―theory as practice‖ and my 
hermeneutic epistemology I understand that the questions I ask in this dissertation are a product 
of my wider experience and my involvement in migrant advocacy organizations.   
I understand individual migrants as manifest representations of the borders of Europe in 
everyday life.  Shifting to a self-defined understanding of human rights and security in order for 
forced migrants to determine the needs most immediate to them then attempts to actively break 
down the borders that determine citizenship.  My focus is on the people who fall outside of the 
established boundaries of citizenship and who do not have access to what is considered a 
legitimate immigration status.  I characterize these people as forced economic migrants, although 
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in many cases economic reasons only comprise a small part of the overall decision to migrate.   
Collectively, any person who is forced to migrate but cannot access a ―legal‖ route can be 
included.  Forced economic migrants in liberal democracies are physical manifestations of the 
border between deserving and undeserving.  The border is not the territorial border but that of 
political belonging.  Here I juxtapose the migrant‘s self-conception of rights with the state efforts 
to ―protect‖ this visible border through constructing the individuals as a threat to the national 
wellbeing.  The boundaries of legitimacy are constructed and reproduced by these state 
narratives and I posit that the space within the borders has contracted as a result of discourses 
that continuously construct the identity of ―bogus asylum seeker,‖ ―illegal immigrant,‖ and 
―welfare tourist.‖  The reproduction of these categories within daily life constantly delimits and 
contracts the space within the boundary of legitimacy in popular perceptions of those on the 
―inside‖, making it more difficult for an individual migrant to access that space, or for forced 
economic migrants as a collective category to access a legitimate space.  
In terms of defining and delimiting the boundaries that inform this study I look to the 
migrants for an understanding of what is security and insecurity.  This shift is informed by 
critical studies that point to the dominance of Western given definitions in IR scholarship (Nayak 
and Selbin 2010, Barkawi and Laffey 2006, Agathangelou and Ling 2004).  In shifting the 
emphasis to migrant self-identifications as seekers of rights I examine where boundaries to 
subjectivity in terms of defining rights ought to lie.  In doing so I challenge the underlying 
assumption in given understandings of human rights that there is a teleological framework of 
rights that is completed at a given point, manifested in what are considered basic needs.  To limit 
human rights as basic needs represents an exogenously determined limitation on what can be 
considered a right.  For example, subsistence rights provide access to shelter and food.  Civil and 
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political rights provide access to social and political participation.  Social and economic rights in 
Europe for European citizens protect things like the limited hours permitted in the working week, 
the right to a certain number of breaks in a working day, the right to a minimum of 28 days 
annual leave (Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament).  Thus, the suggestion that the 
individuals seeking rights at the borders of Europe do not have the right to request the above 
advantages establishes the hierarchy that is already implicit it the fact that there exist declarations 
of citizens‘ rights, or European Human Rights, in addition to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (Guild 2005).  The suggested problem with subjective determinations of rights 
that is adopted by the thesis recognizing limited basic needs is that rights become things like a 
foreign holiday every year and an amount of flexible disposable income to guarantee access to 
desirable consumer goods.  My intention is not to defend the elaborate system of rights that 
citizens of Europe claim as the ultimate goal: this is inherently problematic not least due to 
scarce resources (Myers 1989, Young 2001, Laferierre and Stoett 2006).  Instead, I posit that 
decentralizing the question of insecurity and human rights to focus on the self-defined rights of 
forced economic migrants who represent the borders of Europe means that the limitations on 
subjective determinations of rights must themselves be subjectively determined.  The purpose of 
this is not to define what rights ought to be, but rather to interrogate the reality of inequality 
within the Western-generated accepted understanding of human rights.  For example, if an 
individual migrant requests a foreign holiday and disposable income as his right, the framework 
that has generated that request is one where these things are established for a privileged group of 
people.  Reflexive conceptions of equality, dignity or humaneness on the part of the individual 
rights-seeker can feasibly reside in having equal access to the things that people in the West 
perceive as their rights, because this is symbolic of equality. Shifting the conceptualization of 
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rights to one self-defined by the migrant is not opening up human rights to be exploited by greed 
in the place of dignity, but it is aimed at exposing and challenging the greed already inherent in 
the restrictive policies that determine deserving and undeserving people.  Therefore, as a 
theoretical starting point, the boundaries on what can be considered rights must be subjectively 
determined by the rights-seeker, as to otherwise set these limitations would be to acknowledge 
and reinforce a hierarchy of rights.   
 
Methodology 
This study is divided into two separate and complementary parts: the state level constructions 
that function to limit legitimacy to a particular group of people, and the shifted and decentered 
level that looks at the part of the rights seeker.  I use interpretive methods that are best suited to 
answering the questions I ask.  At the state level I look at the hermeneutic reproduction of 
meaning through discourse.  Theories of critical discourse analysis understand discourse to be 
language and practice that produces meaning in life (Laclau and Mouffe 1990 [1987], Fairclough 
1992, Locke 2004).  I examine the meanings produced around the presence of asylum seekers via 
policy, practice, and public rhetoric to understand how the assumptions that position asylum 
seekers as a threat and recreate the norms of state sovereignty operate in this context.  In the 
decentered study I look to the narratives of people who understand themselves to be asylum 
seekers.  I treat the narratives as events from which I can gain an interpretivist understanding of 
asylum seeker identities and an understanding of the production and maintenance of ontological 
(in)security.      
The fabric of my analysis will focus on the experiences of rights-seekers in Greece and 
Britain juxtaposed with the perceived view of these individuals in society-at-large in these two 
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states.  These two states taken together represent different extremes regarding immigration 
towards Europe.  Thus my analysis provides an understanding that both rests on specificities to 
the individual states yet can be considered emblematic of issues that appear across the EU and 
other liberal democracies that implement immigration restrictions. 
 Case selection 
Britain has been established as a country of immigration for several decades.  In some 
regards Britain can be considered exceptional in Europe; for example, Britain is not a Schengen 
state and still requires all international arrivals pass through passport control.  However, in terms 
of asylum policy the measures in Britain reflect those imposed in the rest of Europe with Britain 
and Germany having pioneered harsher controls, higher standards of proof, and expedited appeal 
and deportation procedures (Schuster 2003, Hayter 2004, Stevens 1998, Stevens 2001).  My 
concern is more pervasive than an analysis of policy and legal documents: I intend to look at the 
production and reproduction of undocumented migrants across the social fabric of Britain.  
Britain can be understood as an example of a state where moderate parties have adopted the 
ideologies of the far right in terms of immigration (Geddes 2003).  This has limited the capacity 
for success of the British National Party, yet an accepted view emerges that sees immigration, 
particularly undocumented or forced economic migrants, as negative and even dangerous to 
Britain.  Thus I intend to look at how this discourse is produced nationally though looking at the 
political positions of the three major parties, in addition to the popular voices apparent in the 
tabloid media and in popular culture.    
 In the past Greece was conventionally characterized as a country of emigration as a result 
of low levels of economic development, with the shift to a country of immigration pinpointed 
around the mid to late 1990s.  However, Greece also experienced large numbers of ethnic Greeks 
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immigrating with particular influxes in the 1920s following the Greco-Turkish War (also known 
as the Asia Minor Disaster), and the 1960s following the Istanbul Pogroms.   While Greece does 
not have a notable far right, nationalism has been a part of the reflexive Greek identity since the 
Greek War of Independence and so political slogans such as «Διιάδα γηα ηνπο έιιελνπο» 
(Greece for the Greeks) are an accepted part of national rhetoric (Hainsworth 1992, Dimitras 
1992).  The assertion of Greek identity and the reflexive conception of Greeks as an oppressed 
nation over millennia has been reproduced in the concern with the connection of a Greek 
historical narrative uniting Modern Greece with the Byzantine Empire and more notably with 
Classical and Ancient Greece (Clogg 2002, Beaton 1999).  This historical narrative posits that 
Greeks were enslaved and oppressed by the Ottoman Empire for 400 years.  However, the role of 
Greeks as the oppressed leaves little space for a reflexive understanding of Greeks as oppressors, 
or withholders of rights.  Greece represents a useful case study to provide insight into the 
challenges presented by the role of E.U. immigration policy conflicting with assertion of national 
identity.  The Dublin II Regulation enforces the ―safe third country‖ rule, meaning that migrants 
have to claim asylum in the state that they first enter.  For the majority of migrants entering the 
E.U. this is Greece.  Greece does not have the financial resources to enforce deportation and does 
not have the administrative capacity to process all the claims (Sitaropoulos 2000).  The result is a 
huge backlog that leaves thousands of migrants unable to claim assistance and unable to leave.  
The border then is visible in everyday life.  Thus my analysis is aimed at looking at the nascent 
discourse in Greece, via media and popular culture, which grapples with social identity in order 
to confront the borders embodied in disenfranchised migrants. 
 The country studies are juxtaposed with the narratives of forced economic migrants 
within those states in order to understand the collision between the discourse constructing 
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undocumented migrants at the state level and the self-perceptions in terms of security and 
insecurity.  This provides an understanding of how human rights can be reconceived in order to 
address issues of ontological insecurity.  The narrative interviews with individuals in a situation 
of ontological insecurity provide insight into what elements the rights-seekers themselves 
identify as most immediate needs that can provide ontological security.  Both the discourses at 
the state and society level and the narratives and experiences of rights seekers are necessary to 
understand the collision and to understand the production and reproduction of bodies as borders 
and boundaries preventing access to rights. 
   
 Critical discourse analysis 
Using the tools of critical discourse analysis (CDA) I gather and analyze data relating to the 
construction of asylum seekers as a threat and pertaining to the state level of analysis.  Critical 
discourse analysis critically examines language understood as discursive events that become 
meaning-terms that exist within a given genre and reproduce a collective meaning that is 
implicated within a given power dynamic (Locke 2004).  For Fairclough, a discourse is ―a 
practice not just of representing the world but of signifying the world, constituting and 
constructing the world in meaning‖ (Fairclough 1992:64).  The receiver of the meaning is 
implicated in the constitution of meaning: discourse constitutes meaning through collective 
understandings and the acceptance or rejection of a particular construction of meaning (Locke 
2004, Fairclough  1992).  Fairclough defines discourse as practice, in that meaning is constructed 
in communication, or ―verbal and non-verbal signifying systems,‖ it also is implicated in human 
activities, and in collective memberships (Fairclough 1992 , Gee 1996 , Locke 2004).  Thus, 
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―discourses are … ‗ways of being in the world‘; they are ‗forms of life.‘ They are, thus, always 
and everywhere social and products of social histories‖ (Gee 1996, cited in Locke 2004 ).   
 In order to go about interpretation of a given discourse, one must recognize the genre, or 
form of construction; the context; the social complicity between the maker and the receiver; the 
expectation of the participants; and the rules in which the discourse is constructed (Locke 2004). 
In the project I conduct a cross-genre CDA to gather a comprehensive picture of the production 
and reproduction of the notion that asylum seekers threaten advanced industrialized states.  This 
way I attempt to encompass different contexts, audiences, and dynamics of communication in 
order to understand the construction of forced economic migrants across society. My discourse 
analysis focuses on the notion that undocumented migrants and ―bogus‖ asylum seekers are 
discredited in European immigration discourse.  I follow the method of Van Dijk (1993) 
pertaining to the organization and institutionalization of the power and dominance of an ―in 
group‖ and its elite representatives, over an ―out group.‖  Van Dijk examines how discourse 
reproduces systems of social inequality via a theory of ideology that is based on the shared 
mental representations of social groups.  The social group represents the limitation that ―makes 
explicit which groups, group members, or institutions are actually involved in the formation, 
confirmation, reproduction, or change of such ideologies‖ (Van Dijk 2000:93).  I look at the 
mechanisms in Britain and Greece that construct a particular understanding of asylum seeker in 
the national discourse, examining national politics and the popular media.    
My selection of the genres for the study of Britain is informed by Didier Bigo‘s (2002) 
three levels of threat construction. I examine the contextual background with a genealogical 
history of British policy towards asylum seekers.  Situated within this context, I analyse political 
speeches and parliamentary discourse to represent the elites or those engaged in threat 
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construction, taken from the years 2008 to the present, covering the 2010 election campaigns.   
Documents published by the UK Border Authority and the UK Serious Organized Crime 
Association represent the ―managers of unease‖ and offer insight into the threat construction at 
the level of security professional. Finally, an analysis of the tabloid media represents the ―fear 
mongers‖ that produce and reproduce the popular perception of asylum seekers as a threat.  
These are limited to the bounds set by the threat construction analysis and will examine the years 
from 2008 until the present. Popular culture represents an important but often overlooked 
element of IR.  It represents the everyday encounters that people have with IR, the ―living‖ of IR 
as opposed to the theorizing of IR (Krishna 1993, Krishna 1999, Nayak and Selbin 2010). The 
tabloid media crosses the boundary between popular culture and news media, as the content is 
known to be sensationalistic, dramatic and a source of entertainment (Conboy 2006).  The 
tabloid media also represents five of the six most-read newspapers in Britain.   
 Greece differs from Britain in regard to discourses constructing asylum seekers and 
economic migrants. The case study of Greece is informed by existing work of writer Gazmend 
Kapllani, which looks at the portrayal of migrants in Greece as being ―without subjectivity.‖  
Kapllani, who is originally from Albania and migrated to Greece in the 1990s, has written at 
length on his experience of migration (see Kapllani 2009).  He suggests that migrants are 
removed from a surrounding context or story and are given the decontextualized role of migrant, 
thus their identity is denied and migrants are perceived and understood only in terms of what 
they mean to Greece.  The construction of migrants as without identity contrasts the continued 
reassertion of Greek persecuted identity.  I examine the clash between Greek reflexive identity 
and the experience of migration in Greece in a single genre media analysis.  The media 
demonstrates the presence of migrants in Greece without subjectivity, but instead portrayed with 
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only the identity of migrant.  Asylum seekers in Greece are a relatively recent phenomenon.  The 
media represents popular access to the political and social discourses constructing migrants and 
asylum seekers, thus the critical analysis will offer insight into places where subjective identity is 
absent from social perceptions.   
 Narrative interviews 
The purpose of the narrative interviews is to gain insight into the self-defined rights that 
migrants in Europe are seeking.  I gather personal narratives to provide me with an 
understanding of the participant‘s life experiences that might lead to his or her formulation of the 
concept of security in order to identify the needs most immediate to the participant.  Narrative 
interviews aim to gather stories and anecdotes that can offer interpretive insight into a person‘s 
life through the plots and structures of the narratives (Kvale 2007). This differs from 
psychoanalysis as one is not attempting to understand the individual psychologically.  The 
narrative exists as an event contingent on time, place, and circumstance.  Thus, analysis of the 
narrative is not analysis of the inner workings of the individual.  To add broader context, the 
narrative interview will be combined with ethnographic participant observation, identifying ―the 
need to posit research subjects whose inner worlds cannot be understood without knowledge of 
their experiences in the world, and whose experiences of the world cannot be understood without 
knowledge of the way in which their inner worlds allow them to experiences the outer world‖ 
(Holloway and Jefferson 2000:4). 
 I intend to explore security and insecurity in order to understand how the participant 
would self-define ontological security with the theoretical implication that this should be 
understood as underlying human rights.  I assume that meanings are generated by context and 
interactions, thus I want to access a participant-generated meaning frame through which I can 
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share migrants‘ own perceptions of security, insecurity, and human rights.  In narrative 
interviews my responsibility as a researcher is to listen while the participant is in the role of 
―story-teller‖ (Holloway and Jefferson 2004).  My questions reflect this, asking things such as 
―tell me the story of how you came to be here,‖ or ―do you have any anecdotes about problems 
you have faced here?‖  In doing this I shift the framing of meanings and content to the 
participant. 
 The participants fit the demographic of individuals who aim to seek asylum in Europe or 
who are in the process of appealing a failed asylum claim.  These individuals are situated in 
Greece and in the U.K. to mirror the geographic locales of the state level constructions.  In 
particular, I am concerned with people whose views conflict with that established in international 
relations and in state policy, thus people who have been unable to lodge a valid claim or who are 
appealing a failed claim are most likely to fit this criterion.  I aim to circumvent the state-
constructed notions of rights and security because the perspectives I explore are those of 
individuals who are prohibited from participation in the state generated notions of rights and 
security.  Furthermore, these individuals reside in a position of ontological insecurity, post 
rupture to their familiar existences.  This suggests that the ―unconscious body of knowledge‖ 
which maintains ontological security for Giddens will be accessible to the individual as 
highlighting what is provoking their insecurity as well as the elements that they need to realize a 
sense of security (Giddens 1984, 1991).  This allows me to encapsulate some of these elements 
in an understanding of human rights. 
 
Chapter outlines: 
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The first chapter comprises a theoretical investigation of the dialectic construction of 
asylum seeker.  Legitimate asylum seekers are considered those whose experiences comply with 
the Eurocentric refugee definition.  I look at state discourses that performatively construct 
―genuine‖ asylum seekers and ―bogus‖ asylum seekers.  This leads into a second chapter that 
exposes the security discourses that construct ―bogus‖ asylum seekers as a homogenous group 
that represents a threat to the state.  The security discourse simultaneously denies both social and 
political subjectivity for asylum seekers.  The critical discourse analysis of Britain offers insight 
into these discursive mechanisms in chapter three.  The fourth chapter turns to the Greek 
experience and illustrates the constitution of the homogenous category of ―bogus‖ asylum seeker 
against state identity.  I elaborate on the denial of subjectivity to the category of ―bogus‖ asylum 
seeker, or forced economic migrant, which resists empathetic understandings of asylum seeker 
experiences and allows the Greek identity to remain unchallenged by the physical appearance of 
denial of rights to ―outsiders.‖   
The fifth chapter illustrates extant challenges to the state discourses constructing asylum 
seekers.  Chapter five explores the paradigm of human security, deconstructing the roots of 
human security in human development and human rights, both in policy and in IR theory.  I offer 
the framework of ontological security as a means of decentering the theoretical paradigm of 
human security to foreground human experience rather than state interests.  Chapter six then 
analyses the self-definitions of those asylum seekers who do not meet the state definition: those 
who have made a claim that has failed, or who have not claimed on arrival because they fear 
deportation. The conceptualization of human security engaged here questions established 
political citizenship boundaries. This chapter provides the critical insight generated by narrative 
interviews with those individuals seeking access to human rights in Europe, contextualized by 
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ethnographic participant observation.  I look at these narratives to understand the self-identity of 
asylum seekers that can allow for a shift in the conceptualization of rights pertaining to the needs 
that asylum seekers in a state of ontological insecurity identify as most immediate.   
My conclusion draws together the utility of moving away from state-centric discursive 
constructions of those seeking rights, with the shifted conceptualization of rights offered by those 
who fall outside the boundaries of legitimacy offered by the Eurocentric state-based definition.  I 
return to pinpoint answers to the research questions outlined in this introduction and point to 
potential avenues for future research.  
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Refugees in a World of States versus States in a World of Asylum Seekers. 
  
The ―refugee problem‖ has been widely studied from a variety of perspectives.  This 
chapter will illustrate the processes surrounding the refugee definition and the application of that 
definition to asylum seekers.  I note the Eurocentric bias and the temporal influences in the 
drafting of the definition and consider the implications of this bias in contemporary asylum 
seeker identifications.  I identify a dialectic process whereby asylum seekers become thought of 
as ―bogus‖ or illegitimate by the states where they claim entry.  This labelling of asylum seekers 
then reinforces the justifications for the current restrictive definition and its need in the 
contemporary international environment.  Bogus asylum seekers exist in and are reproduced by 
state discourses.  They are, according to this dialectic, ―illegal immigrants‖ who deliberately 
travel to Europe only to exploit the system of benefits and advantages that these states provide 
for their deserving citizens, while simultaneously undermining the ability of the benevolent 
Western states to provide asylum to those genuine asylum seekers who flee persecution to 
embrace the values of liberal democracy.  The production of the ―undeserving‖ category 
underlies the disparity between self-definitions and state-definitions of asylum seekers.  I 
investigate the disparity between self-definitions and state-definitions of asylum seekers, with a 
view to highlight the need to incorporate asylum seeker ―self‖ definitions in global 
understandings of seeking asylum and gaining access to rights.  Unlike the refugee definition, the 
category of asylum seeker is not applied by a global, international or national institution or 
agency, but is a label used to talk about a group of people that have not yet acquired an 
internationally recognized immigration status. 
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 The first part of this chapter outlines the development of the refugee definition according 
to conventional understandings.  I then examine in more detail the asylum ―category,‖ 
demonstrating that it is not a category at all but a label applied to a group of people essentially 
without a recognized immigration status.  I look at the construction of ―bogus‖ asylum seekers 
and illegal immigrants, categories states apply to those who have not been determined ―genuine.‖  
Bogus asylum seekers and illegal immigrants are those individuals that the state deems as 
undeserving of the rights and privileges the state applies to its citizens.  I problematize the 
constructed category of bogus asylum seeker in light of the restrictive nature of the refugee 
definition, and the lack of an independent asylum seeker definition.  I suggest that because 
―genuine‖ asylum seekers instrumentally become refugees when recognized those who are 
asylum seekers carry the label of ―bogus‖ or ―illegal.‖ I then turn to the assertion that asylum 
seekers must self-define and examine how this interacts with the international state system.  
 
Refugees in a World of States 
 The development of the refugee definition:  
The principal  documents in international law that codify the characteristics that define a 
refugee are the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the status of Refugees, and the 
subsequent Refugee Protocol that was published in 1967, which removed the temporal and 
geographic constraints of the original definition.  This definition is as follows: 
 
A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence 
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as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to 
it (UNHCR 1967). 
 
The definition was founded in Article 14 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
This article states ―(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution. (2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from 
non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.‖  
The Refugee Convention definition of a refugee then delimits this right to a specific group of 
people who are victims of individually targeted persecution motivated by one of the five nexus 
reasons. 
It is important to note that the Convention definition of a refugee did not appear in a 
vacuum and was certainly not the original refugee legislation.  However, there was little concern 
regarding refugees prior to the 20
th
 Century.  While in political philosophy there has certainly 
been a history of a duty to offer refuge, and a concept of responsibility towards the stranger (see 
Arnaout 1987 for early Arab-Islamic concepts, and Bau 1985 for concepts in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition), there was no real consideration of a standardized refugee policy or codification 
regarding the people to whom such a policy would apply before the United Nations promulgated 
the Refugee Convention.  The former lack of consideration is generally thought to be the result 
of two points: the first is that immigration was favourable in industrializing countries, bringing in 
manpower to sustain economic growth; the second is that there was not a case of mass movement 
of a population or a group of people across established state boundaries that was pronounced 
enough to provoke consideration of legislation to codify state reaction to such a movement 
(Marrus 1985, Hathaway 1991).  The explanation that relies on the idea that there was not 
previously a mass movement of people is of course dependent on one‘s perspective regarding 
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who constitutes a refugee and how we define movement: for example the forced migration of 
Native Americans known as the Trail of Tears can certainly be considered a mass displacement 
of peoples, persecution and even ethnic cleansing; however, the situation reinforced rather than 
undermined the primacy of Western ―civilization‖ and the sovereign state borders established by 
the United States. Consideration of this mass displacement of people does not factor in the 
refugee literature.  The situations that are considered relevant to the development of the refugee 
definition are those in which mass movement undermined established sovereign state boundaries, 
or was considered economically or politically threatening to sovereign government or society.  
Thus, sovereign boundaries are essential to the existence of refugees.  Hannah Arendt explores 
this connection in The Origins of Totalitarianism.  Arendt posits that the growth of nationalism 
in Europe created stateless minorities.  The rights of citizenship were predicated on belonging to 
a state, and nationalism caused the state to be conceived as ethnically homogenous.  The very 
fact that stateless people ―without nationality, without money, and without passports‖ were 
crossing frontiers seeking protection in large numbers hardened the borders of states and 
undermined the notion of universal human rights (Arendt 1972).  Arendt establishes that the 
question raised in negotiations for international refugee legislation focused firmly on repatriation 
and problems arose from the new understanding of stateless people: ―Every attempt by 
international conferences to establish some legal status for stateless people failed because no 
agreement could possibly replace the territory to which an alien, within the framework of 
existing law, must be deportable‖ (Arendt 1972:284).  It was inconceivable to think that there 
could be mass movement of people who were without territory.  To address the political 
concerns would violate the sovereignty of the refugee sending-state.  To compel a state to bestow 
citizenship would violate the receiving state sovereignty. The way the refugee has been defined 
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in international law responds to the movement of several million people in Europe during World 
War II, movement preceding that compelled by national and ethnic conflicts.  Furthermore, states 
that formulated the refugee definition did so in a political environment that posited the interests 
of liberal democracy and Enlightenment individualism against Soviet communism (Geddes 
2003).  The criteria of the refugee definition then, responded to particular events that occurred at 
a particular time in Europe, was formulated around European understandings of sovereignty, and 
responded to the political questions that European states were facing at the time.   For these 
reasons the definition can be considered inherently Eurocentric. 
  James C. Hathaway provides an account of the negotiations preceding the development 
of the contemporary refugee definition, identifying three distinct periods: the juridical, the social, 
and the individualist period (Hathaway 1991). According to Hathaway, states began to 
implement instrumental refugee policies to serve their needs early in the 20
th
 Century.  The mass 
movement of Russians between 1917 and 1922 followed by the Armenian exodus from Turkey 
in 1922 inspired the first international accords regarding refugees.   Hathaway terms this period 
of law the juridical approach and it covers the effects in the international sphere caused by a state 
failing to offer de jure protection, through refusing to recognize or take responsibility for a group 
of people (Hathaway 1991).  This period lasted from 1920-1935, when focus shifted to the social 
approach. The social approach lasted until roughly 1939, and was needs-based, recognizing 
anyone who needed help or protection due to circumstances causing them to lose de facto state 
protection. This in particular applied to people fleeing the Nazi party in Germany (Hathaway 
1991, Haddad 2008).  The third period then goes from 1939-1950 and represents the individualist 
approach.  Hathaway describes this approach as revolutionary as it rejected group determinations 
and focused on individuals.  This understanding of refugee protection was criticized by the 
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Soviet bloc, who made the argument that political dissidents should seek protection in states 
sympathetic with their views but should not fall into a category that is deserving of international 
protection given that the political views in question might not reflect an international consensus.  
Nonetheless, the 1951 Convention definition of a refugee maintained the individual aspect and 
endorsed pro-Western political values, while rejecting the social need-based or the juridical 
group-based conceptualizations. 
The protection offered in the 1951 convention definition of a refugee is based on civic 
and political values.  The drafting of the definition was strategic: the definition consciously 
offers protection to the opponents of communism and so prioritizes pro-Western political values 
that are embedded in Enlightenment liberalism and modernity.  Thus, in the polarized political 
environment of the Cold War, the refugee convention operated as a political tool (Hathaway 
1991).  As Hathaway points out, ―the strategic dimension of the definition comes from the 
successful efforts of Western states to give priority in protection matters to persons whose flight 
was motivated by pro-Western political values‖ (Hathaway 1991: 35).  It is conspicuous that the 
definition includes no capacity to protect ―persons denied even such basic rights as food, 
healthcare, or education‖ (Hathaway 1991: 35).  The main shifts then have been the move away 
from group based protection and social protection based on need.  Instead the refugee definition 
came to be based on very particular attributes.  However, the group based and social based 
protections that were not included in the 1951 definition ceased to be a concern of the 
international community at the moment of drafting, but did not cease to be an issue for 
individuals.  These individuals still migrate for various reasons and these de facto refugees 
claiming refuge at the borders of a state still exist, in the form of asylum seekers.  As Haddad 
asserts, there is no such thing as an illegal refugee; this is a misnomer.  A refugee is a person 
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who has already met the refugee criteria (Haddad 2008).  An asylum seeker is a person who is 
outside of the law, outside of his or her legal or habitual country of residence but not yet 
recognized by states or the international community as having acquired a new status that 
guarantees certain rights, such as those of citizenship.  Asylum seekers are both de jure and de 
facto people without citizenship or immigration status and consequently without rights. 
In the 1960s there were attempts among UN member states to draft an international 
convention on territorial asylum (Musalo et al 2007).  The convention definition of a refugee 
requires non-refoulement but not admittance.  That is, a state cannot forcibly return an individual 
to a place where he or she will face persecution but the state still holds the sovereign power to 
determine who may or may not be admitted to the territory.  States are not required under 
international law to admit asylum seekers, they are simply required not to return them if there is 
a credible chance of persecution on return.  The conference that aimed to draft a convention on 
territorial asylum and so reach a solution on this distinction did not achieve its goal.  It did 
expand some aspects of the refugee definition, giving states license to interpret certain elements 
as they saw fit.  Thus, asylum seekers are individuals who exist in an international realm but who 
are unaccounted for in international law.  Some of them are recognized by states as meeting the 
refugee criteria, some are not.  Asylum seekers represent de facto migrants who are outside of 
state protections and outside of international protection.  Refugees are within international 
protection, but refugees become refugees only once they are recognized.  Asylum seekers remain 
seekers of recognition until they are admitted by a state. 
 The asylum category 
The refugee definition determines who is a refugee as an international status.  Asylum 
seekers are without international status: they have not been recognized by an international 
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authority and they claim asylum at the borders.  Thus, state sovereignty is protected in that states 
decide who they admit.  Presently all states considered ―Western‖ are party to the Refugee 
Protocol and adopted refugee definitions that are based on this protocol.  Britain signed the 
protocol in 1968; the United States in 1968; Germany, Greece, and Canada in 1969; France in 
1971; Italy 1972; and Spain in 1978 (UNHCR, 2008).  However, despite being signatories many 
of these states did not adopt the definition into domestic law until later.  In Europe the adoption 
of the definition into domestic law tended to coincide with the demographic of asylum seekers 
changing after the end of the Cold War: rather than being a tool to offer refuge to individuals 
fleeing communism in Eastern Europe, the refugee definition became a mechanism to protect 
states from influxes of people fleeing a variety of situations in the global South.
2
 
 In Europe the codification of asylum policy into law generally occurred in the early 
1990s.  For example, in Britain prior to the 1990s asylum policy was governed by the 1971 
Immigration Act.  The 1971 Act did not include any specific procedure or policy to deal with 
refugees or asylum seekers and Britain was reluctant to incorporate the convention definition 
into domestic law (Stevens 1998).  During the late 1980s Britain implemented some visa 
restrictions against arrivals from certain areas, and the 1987 Carrier‘s Liability Act implemented 
fines for people who transported undocumented arrivals and implemented detention of 
undocumented arrivals (Stevens 1998).  The first comprehensive legislation aimed at asylum 
seekers in Britain was implemented in 1993, and this focused on two main goals: expediting 
appeals to reduce the backlog of applications, and deterring ―bogus‖ asylum seekers.  Greece did 
not implement immigration legislation until 1991, but the legislation that was passed in 1991 
incorporated asylum seekers.  For example, Law 1975 of 1991 ―Entry, exit, sojourn, 
                                                   
2 I follow literature on neoliberalism and access to human rights in use the term global south, for want of a better 
description (Bakker 2007).  It refers to the part of the world that has experienced lesser degrees of economic 
development along with social, political and economic upheavals that are often a result of processes of globalization. 
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employment, removal of aliens, procedure for the recognition of refugees and other measures‖ 
focused on curbing migration and facilitating removal.  This law was not particularly effective 
and in 1997 a programme was created geared at legislating terms for migrant workers, then in 
2001 a subsequent programme offered steps towards residency for undocumented migrants.  
Other European states followed similar time frames, with Southern European legislation 
occurring slightly later than that of Northern and Western Europe given that many of these states 
had previously been considered migrant sending states rather than migrant receiving states, with 
emigration vastly outnumbering immigration.  However, the temporal distinction between 
signing the refugee convention and protocol, and implementing asylum policy demonstrates that 
the asylum seeker category was legislated as something analytically separate from refugees: the 
refugee definition is adopted by states to determine which asylum seekers are legitimate.  The 
restrictive nature of the refugee definition means that many people who arrive at the borders of 
the liberal democracies that participated in the creation of refugee legislation are denied entry.  
On arrival many people looking for human rights are denied access: they remain neither citizens 
nor legally-determined refugees.  Migrants are considered to be under the state-based categorical 
definition of ―asylum seeker‖ while their case is being processed.  In the limited understanding, 
people only become asylum seekers once having made an application for asylum to the state.  
They only are considered asylum seekers whilst that application is being processed.  During 
transit and prior to filing an application they are simply without status.  If a case is denied they 
are considered failed asylum seekers and, if they do not accept voluntary repatriation they again 
revert to being without status.  
According to the UNHCR repatriation is considered the principal and preferred 
―solution‖ to the refugee ―problem‖ (UNHCR 1993).  The Dublin Regulation in Europe 
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implemented a layered form of repatriation: those seeking asylum are not returned to their 
country of origin or former habitual residence, but are first returned to their first safe third 
country state.  The safe third country is the first state that is considered safe that an asylum 
seeker passed through on the way to the country in which he or she makes a claim. This type of 
repatriation is justified by the rights of states to protect their sovereignty and to protect their 
borders against influxes of needy people, not by the rights of individuals. The convention 
definition was written with the individual at the core, to protect individual rights.  However, 
when individual rights clash with sovereignty, the states revert to state interests over individual 
interests.  Psychiatrists tend to agree that policies of detention and forced repatriation often 
aggravate post traumatic stress disorder and mental health problems in asylum seekers.  The 
uncertainty and insecurity of repatriation policies have a negative effect on the mental wellbeing 
of the asylum seeker (Silove et al 1997, Sinnerbrink et al 1997, Silove et al 2000).  Thus, the safe 
third country ruling essentially prioritizes the rights of states over the human rights and physical 
wellbeing of asylum seekers.  Furthermore, deportation in safe third country cases occurs prior to 
determinations of ―legitimacy‖ and ―illegitimacy.‖  The right of the state in question is the right 
to protect sovereign borders and the right to reserve social services for citizens and so is 
embedded in sovereignty and citizenship.  Referring back to Arendt‘s observation that mass 
displacement of people problematized the state-citizen-territory triangle (Arendt 1972), asylum 
seekers, as people who fall outside of the triangle expose the continued prevalence of the 
relationship between the state, citizenry and territory and this is exemplified in the ―safe third 
country‖ ruling.  States reinforce sovereignty over the territory and reserve rights for citizens 
while asylum seekers who are stateless cannot access rights and are constructed as bogus due to 
their presence within territorial borders.   
 
32 
 
The safe third country ruling is posited as burden sharing between EU member states.  
Logically, it is assumed that asylum seekers want to reach the wealthier European states to make 
their claims and so the safe third country ruling forces asylum seekers to claim in the Southern 
European states that form the European frontier with Africa and the Middle East.  Burden 
sharing efforts are aimed at guaranteeing that any one state is not overwhelmed with a mass 
influx of asylum seekers.  Thielemann (2009) demonstrates that EU member states have 
converged their asylum policies with regard to the specific issue of border security.  The 
converging of asylum policy is seen as a necessary security measure to protect EU border.  
However, the focus on security reinforces the idea of illegitimacy, or more specifically, the need 
to protect the state from bogus asylum seekers.  The security efforts are underlined by burden 
sharing: the aim being that no one state must bear the burden of an influx of asylum seekers and 
can transfer applications to other member states with both the consent of the state parties 
involved and of the individual asylum seeker.  However, the emphasis on burden sharing has two 
effects.  First of all, it reinforces the emphasis on the economic burden, increasing the suspicion 
towards those migrating for economic reasons.  Second of all, it relies on a de facto 
categorization of asylum seeker prior to the application being processed.  Burden sharing relies 
on one state experiencing an influx of asylum seekers.  However, as discussed, asylum seeker is 
not a legally determined category.  According to states, asylum seekers only become so after 
having filed a legal claim for asylum.  Any legal status determination is reliant on state 
recognition.  Therefore, before agreeing to burden sharing the member states will want to 
determine that they are not in fact accepting potential ―bogus‖ asylum seekers or ―economic‖ 
migrants only to bear the cost of transfer and deportation.  This is demonstrated in the 2004 
Qualification Directive, which establishes common criteria for the recognition of asylum seekers 
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in the EU.  The objectives of this directive include standardized criteria for the identification of 
genuine refugees.  Asylum seekers in Europe become refugees once it has been established that 
they are within the bounds of the law. The law determines that genuine asylum seekers are those 
people whose claim meets the convention definition of a refugee.  Thus ―asylum seeker‖ is the 
individual making an application prior to legal recognition.  However, within the category of 
asylum seeker we see the further distinction between genuine and bogus asylum seeker.  Bogus 
asylum seeker is a rhetorical category that is not established in international frameworks and yet 
is referred to in state discourse and in policy documents.
3
  ―Bogus‖ asylum seekers are in fact 
asylum seekers.  To be understood as ―genuine‖ an asylum seeker must be recognized by the 
state in which he or she seeks admission.  To gain recognition, he or she must meet the refugee 
criteria and therefore on recognition he or she becomes a refugee.  Consequently, every asylum 
seeker is a bogus asylum seeker; the only legitimate asylum seeker is actually a legally 
recognized refugee.  The discourse that constructs and reproduces the distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate asylum seekers in fact only creates an idea of illegitimate, fraudulent, 
or bogus asylum seekers. 
 
States in a World of Asylum Seekers  
States create refugees: the displacement from territory would not occur without 
established delimited territories.  Thinking of the world in terms of states and the relationship 
between state, territory, and citizenship is problematic regarding the grounds on which 
citizenship is determined: both jus solis and jus sanguinis leave space for individuals to be 
outside of these categories, particularly given the fact that each sovereign state determines its 
                                                   
3 For example, British Home Office White Paper on immigration ―Secure Borders Safe Haven‖ refers repeatedly to 
―asylum shopping,‖ the ―international free for all‖ of the asylum system, and the need to restore integrity to the 
system in order to protect against fraudulent asylum claims. 
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own criteria for citizenship. Individuals remain on one territory or another within the continuity 
of their own lives, however disrupted or unknown that continuity becomes.  Asylum seekers are 
subject to recognition by states yet in practice, asylum seekers must self-define before making an 
application.  There is no legal criterion to seek asylum, only to be provided it, and that criterion 
is the refugee definition.  However, to become what is thought of as a ―genuine‖ asylum seeker 
under the current system one must file an application for asylum with a state and be recognized 
as an asylum seeker by a state.   Haddad proposed that refugee identities are essentially different 
from citizen identities because they are not composed of attachment to a nation state, but instead 
are dependent on a home state, a displaced person, and a host state.  The identity of the refugee is 
constituted by the interaction of those elements (Haddad 2008).  However, this is problematic as 
it encourages conceptualization of an ―essential‖ refugee identity, which allows such an essential 
identity to be reproduced and reapplied and thus discounts alternative identities.  Furthermore, 
the refugee identity as Haddad defines it is complicated by longevity.  Refugees who are born in 
refugee camps do not have the interactive identity between the home state and the host state, but 
instead have a host state prior to resettlement.  In the temporary home state migrants are often 
housed in camps and do not have comparable social and political rights to those of citizens.  
They then might move to a second host state for resettlement; however, identity may also be 
dependent on ethnicity, religion, nature of persecution or any number of individual experiences. 
 The distinction between refugees and asylum seekers allows asylum seekers to be treated 
as an analytically separate category from refugees, despite the same recognition criteria.  The 
experiences of an asylum seeker are likely to differ from those of a refugee, although the extent 
to which they will differ is subject to individual experience.  Asylum seekers and refugees are 
certainly perceived differently by states: refugees are accepted as genuine while asylum seekers 
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are interrogated.  Haddad points to the blurring of the category between asylum seeker and 
migrant, suggesting that refugees were somewhat ―rebranded‖ as asylum seekers.  The 
subsequent growth of economic migration and the interrelated causes of migration that include 
civil unrest, poverty, and natural disasters, all of which are not covered by the refugee definition, 
create mixed movements (Haddad 2008).  Reasons for the blurring of the category are traced to 
the initial creation of a distinction between refugees according to the 1951 definition and other 
migrants (Karatani 2005) and post Cold War changes in state needs and asylum seeker 
demographics (Hathaway 1997, Huysmans 2000, Lavenex 2001).  The role of state needs and the 
nature of the influxes speak to the more stringent restrictions governing asylum seeker 
recognition.  The inefficacy of the fixed convention definition that was drafted in response to 
temporal needs and circumstantial events is certainly a compelling explanation for the inability 
of that definition to account for all forced migrants in need of humanitarian protection.    
Refugees have conventionally been differentiated from migrants based on the idea that a 
migrant makes a choice to migrate while a refugee is forced to migrate (Haddad 2008).  Haddad 
catalogues some of the distinctions: for example, migrants want to build a better life, while 
refugees simply want to rebuild what they have lost; migrants consider both push and pull 
factors, while refugees are simply subject to push factors.  However, this is of course an 
oversimplification of the nature of experiences and the decision to migrate. Such an 
oversimplification, to the extent that it is adopted by states and interacts with the 
―legitimate/illegitimate‖ distinction, has a resultant effect on the treatment of asylum seekers on 
arrival.  Because asylum seekers must meet the refugee criteria, then asylum seekers must prove 
that they did not decide to migrate but were forced to migrate by individually targeted 
persecution that gave them no other option.  This means that broader structural causes for 
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migration that compel migration are not acknowledged.  Asylum seekers do not have a legal 
status but have to prove that they are not migrants, they did not choose to migrate.  If they did 
choose, then the implication is that they are actively attempting to defraud the asylum system.  
The distinction between migrants and refugees assumes that because a migrant makes a choice to 
migrate then the experiences in the process and on arrival are parts of that decision.  The migrant 
is constructed as a rational individual who has made a cost benefit analysis prior to leaving his or 
her home state.  The refugee made no such analysis and is seen as a victim and so deserving of 
protection.  
Carens (2006) addresses the ethical onus on a state with regard to asylum seeker 
admissions.  He posits a distinction between refugees and asylum seekers in that refugees have 
been recognized by the UNHCR.  Thus, states can ethically ignore refugees who are already in a 
safe haven even if that safe haven is a refugee camp.  However, if a state returns an asylum 
seeker to face persecution then the state is implicated in what becomes of the asylum seeker, 
because the asylum seeker applies to the state for protection.  Carens posits that while states have 
moral obligations there are some exclusion criteria that states apply to asylum seekers that can be 
considered morally permissible, one of which is state security (Carens 2006).  However, Carens 
also acknowledges that the people asking for asylum can form a continuum from those facing 
persecution and danger of death at home, and those simply claiming to be refugees but facing no 
real danger.  The state holds the power to determine who is who.  Carens recognizes that the 
refugee definition is open to subjective interpretation giving states the sovereign right to decide 
asylum policy (Carens 2006).  The state security rhetoric surrounding asylum provides an ethical 
justification for the state to deny entry to certain people.  Here, I build on scholarship that 
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suggests the security rhetoric surrounding migration blocks certain individuals from realizing 
their security and human rights needs. 
Bigo observes the experiences of migrants within a state as created by a dialectic of the 
state‘s desire to expel the individual and the state‘s desire to prevent the individual attempting re-
entry.  He clarifies that the treatment of migrants by states should not be understood as an 
attempt to discipline behaviour, but simply to prevent re-entry (Bigo 2001).  However, in 
preventing re-entry the state is labelling the individual as an incompetent member of the 
neoliberal system, subject to incarceration to protect the public (of the host state) and to 
discourage future deviant behaviour (crossing sovereign borders).  In that guise then the 
treatment of asylum seekers who have not received a positive determination of refugee status can 
be understood as disciplining behaviour.  Incarceration, maltreatment, and deportation will 
prevent the individual repeating the decision to migrate.  The individual migrant who is not a 
refugee is understood as rational and calculating and thus negative experiences and maltreatment 
will act as deterrent factors.  This can be seen in the language of illegal immigrant, fraudulent 
claims, and bogus asylum seekers used by states as justification for harsh security measures at 
the border.  The word bogus suggests that the migrant is fully aware of the criteria of the refugee 
definition and actively attempting to undermine state law and security.  The consequences of 
these rationalist assumptions regarding migrants and including asylum seekers prior to posit ive 
status determinations means that the asylum seeker gets caught between ―push factors‖ in the 
home state and deterrent factors in the receiving state.  The resultant experiences of asylum 
seekers do not comply with standards of human rights and human dignity that the liberal 
democracies that are denying asylum claims purport to uphold.  
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Deterrent behaviour on the part of states compels a vision of asylum seeker behaviour 
that is dependent on rationalist assumptions regarding asylum seeker motivations.  This can be 
seen as an overflow of Western neoliberal governance across state borders to manage the 
behaviour of the migrant.  Literature in international relations that explores the ―governance of 
the self,‖ which understands global politics with recourse to Foucault‘s notion of 
―governmentality,‖ can offer insight here into the operation of that governance on the asylum 
seeker.  Governmentality is a mode of governance that focuses on the management of 
populations through decentralized bodies such as agencies, corporations, and decentralized 
bureaucracy.  Within the state system, international institutions, states, and state agents adopt the 
view that poverty is not a compelling reason to migrate.  If an individual attempts to migrate 
without going through the proper visa channels and it is for a reason outside of the limitations of 
the refugee convention definition then that person is tagged at the very least as a deviant 
manipulating the system, more likely as a criminal, and in some circumstances as a terrorist 
(Kanstroom 2005, Miller 2005).  The security framework challenges the freedom of movement 
that is part of conventional liberal values (Mau 2010).  Additionally, the freedom to move is 
equally ―managed‖ by neoliberal forms of governance.  For example, those individuals who are 
profitable and economically solvent need to be distinguished from those who are not.  The 
solvent profitable bodies are imported to the receiving state through visa programmes.  However, 
at the global level determinations of who is profitable cannot be made on an individual basis.  
Thus, just as in domestic scenarios where those who are from low income, inner city, and 
particular ethnic backgrounds are considered more likely to be criminals (Pratt 1999, Stenson 
1999), those from what may be termed the global South (for want of a better description), or 
from the global proletariat, are considered more likely to be deviant or criminals who are 
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scheming to ―steal‖ something ―they do not deserve‖ from those good self-governing folks in 
wealthy liberal democracies (Smith 2004-05).  In this vein, states adopt the discourse of bogus 
asylum seekers, illegal immigrants, and welfare state tourists, which discredits the individuals 
who are thought of as undesirable and a potential burden to the state. 
 
Asylum seekers as a challenge to the state 
To then shift the emphasis to the asylum seeker, one must move from the concerns of 
states that are evident through the global climate via legal instruments (the refugee convention 
and protocol definitions) and through the normative structural assumptions and observations, to 
consider instead the encounters an asylum seeker might have with states as he or she migrates.  
As outlined above, the asylum seeker must self-define as an asylum seeker until he or she is 
officially recognized and accepted by a state.  After being formally recognized the asylum seeker 
shifts to asylum ―sought and found,‖ acquiring instrumental refugee status, that is, the legal 
rights and the perceived identity of a refugee.  To obtain these rights the asylum seeker must first 
self-define and then travel to the location where he or she intends to seek protection.  On doing 
this, while in transit, the asylum seeker enters an international zone where he or she does not 
have access to legal status and must remain without status, regardless of the physical 
environment, until the claim is processed and a positive result is obtained.  
Giorgio Agamben‘s understanding of bare life has been usefully and variously applied to 
understanding the lack of access to human rights for refugees.  Bare life is the situation of a 
person that has been banished from society and placed outside of the law, societal participation 
and juridical subjectivity being the two apparatus that constitute a being as human (Agamben 
1999).  For Agamben, the existence of spaces of bare life demonstrate a failing of the system of 
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human rights and more tellingly as a failure of the state-citizen-territory connection as the 
refugee him or herself is constructed as nothing other than a human rights category (Agamben 
1999).  The location in which bare life is exposed for Agamben is the camp.  Agamben equates 
different forms of camps (including concentration camps and refugee camps) in locations where 
sovereignty operates on the body as a form of biopolitics. The human who is not a citizen is 
reduced to bare life; he or she is not permitted to participate in society and is not within the 
bounds of the law, so cannot claim rights that are guaranteed by the law.  Refugee camps are a 
location in which humans are reduced to bare life (Agamben 2000).  The framework in which 
human rights become obsolete is one in which the citizen can access rights but the human 
cannot.  Agamben in that vein distinguishes between active and passive rights: Passive rights are 
those human rights that society was formed to protect; active rights are the legal rights through 
which society was formed (Agamben 1999).  Thus within a society there are people who are not 
active voting citizens that possess passive rights; for example, children, women in some 
societies, the infirm, the mentally ill, and criminals.  They are within the bounds of the law and 
offered passive protection from it, although they do not have the active right to change or use the 
law.  However, the act of forming a society for the agreed protection of rights thereby constitutes 
an inside and an outside; the creation of citizens also creates non-citizens who therefore lack 
both active and passive rights.  However, in Agamben‘s discussion territory is held constant.  
Citizens and passive rights-holders are within the territory, those who are outside of the territory 
do not have access to rights.  Refugees expose this problematic: they are ―nothing less than a 
limit concept that radically calls into question the fundamental categories of the nation state‖ 
(Agamben 1998: 78).  However, when considered via the context in which the refugee definition 
was drafted, refugees are not produced as a limiting concept, but as a reaffirming concept.  The 
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category of ―refugee‖ reinforces the values of liberalism and the benevolent nature of liberal 
states.  It was drafted by states in the environment of the Cold War to protect those individuals 
who objected to and fled from communism.  In this way, it reaffirmed the values of benevolent 
liberal democracies and the freedoms within them. The category of refugee as it is legally 
determined is in itself a category of the nation state and a category of liberal governance.  It is in 
fact the inefficacy of this categorization to account for migration and to delimit and control 
migration that actually calls into question the categories of the nation state.  Asylum seekers 
expose the inefficacy of the refugee definition, in particular those asylum seekers deemed 
illegitimate who seek human rights within liberal democracies but are prevented from accessing 
the rights and freedoms that liberalism promises.  This then offers insight into why nation states 
discredit asylum seekers.   
Furthermore, the space in which Agamben observes the lack of rights is in camps as 
stated above.  However, asylum seekers further problematize this assumption because they must 
self-define and request a legal status at the border or once inside the territory of a state.  While 
many are detained and the detention of asylum seekers has become more prevalent, there are 
many asylum seekers and irregular or undocumented migrants who do not have access to rights 
but are within the privileged territory.  This in particular applies to economic migrants who work 
without employment rights, are unable or afraid to seek access to healthcare and other social 
provisions, and often work long hours in dangerous locations without the ability to contest their 
situation.  They represent an ―illiberal‖ space within liberal democracies; they are within the 
territory rather than detained outside of it but are not provided access to basic civic, political, or 
social human rights. 
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 Sonja Buckel and Jens Wissel (2010) point to the role of borders in producing areas 
where rights are contested in a way that permits investigation into the lack of rights available to 
some peoples within liberal democracies.  The authors suggest that there is no physical place on 
earth that is not covered by human rights (a broad claim that is open to debate) , but there are 
people who are not, creating a paradox as the rights are human rather than territorial.  However, 
as a human if you are not in your proper place then you cannot access the legal framework of 
rights reserved for citizens.  While for Buckel and Wissel there is a potential difference between 
the basic rights that are universally human and the legal rights one can access as a citizen, I posit 
that this is not a useful distinction.  The concept of universal human rights is distinct from actual 
and accessible universal human rights and given the continued privileging of sovereign state 
rights, accessible rights remain a reality only for citizens, even within states that are said to be 
committed to the advancement of universal human rights.  
Marie Woodling points to the binary distinction between citizen and undocumented in 
which treatment towards one population would be considered unthinkable were it directed 
towards another, to some degree reiterating Agamben‘s distinction between the citizen and ―bare 
life‖  (Woodling 2010).  Asylum seekers might not exist in delimited areas but when collectives 
of asylum seekers form they directly challenge the structure in a way that refugees do not.  For 
example, ―in the simple act of calling for rights, the Undocumented break the identity between 
human and citizen and thus threaten to bring state power itself into crisis‖ (Woodling 2010: 151).  
The act of asking for rights in some ways reinforces the state power dynamic, in that collectives 
must ask for recognition before different societal actors or institutions (Rajaram and Grundy-
Warr 2007).  However, when movements erupt and demand rights this counteracts state power, 
particularly at times when rights are demanded by people to whom states or institutions are 
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reluctant to award rights.  A pertinent recent example includes asylum seekers aboard a ship that 
was not permitted to dock in Australia.  Here the asylum seekers on board petitioned Australia 
for access and in doing so constructed a narrative that conflicted with state discourse and 
eventually compelled the state to recognize them as political subjects (Budz 2009).  A second 
example is that of Sudanese refugees in Africa petitioning the UNHCR for rights, and rejecting 
the state-constructed narrative of legitimate and illegitimate concerning who was ―deserving‖ of 
rights and protection (Moulin and Nyers 2007).  In both these cases a collective of asylum 
seekers created an unexpected counter to the state narratives that construct who has access to 
rights.  In doing this the asylum seekers demonstrated an active political voice that gained 
recognition on the national and international levels respectively. 
While asylum seekers can be seen as ―hidden‖ rights-less subjects because they are not 
always within a delimited space, asylum seekers are inevitably political subjects given that in 
making the journey they must self-define as fleeing persecution.  Rather than remain passive, 
asylum seekers claim a political position and take action.  That is not to say that every person 
who self-defines as an asylum seeker is automatically fleeing political persecution, or even 
fleeing a form of persecution that both complies with the state‘s definition of persecution and is 
provoked by a protocol nexus reason.  However, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the 
majority of people within advanced industrialized states probably do not know the criteria of the 
refugee definition.  Individuals who self-define as asylum seekers probably do not know these 
criteria until they are told their claim is not legitimate.  However, when states construct ―bogus‖ 
asylum seekers as sneaky, devious, or intentional criminals, the states hold the asylum seekers to 
an improbably high standard of knowledge, which in part depends on the assumption that asylum 
seekers have made a rational cost-benefit analysis prior to migration.  Therefore the paradox is 
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evident.  Asylum seekers must self-define as such before making the journey to seek asylum.  
However, the self-definition frequently does not match with the state definition of an asylum 
seeker.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to demonstrate two separate but connected understandings of asylum 
seeker.  The first section demonstrated the construction of asylum seekers via the conventional 
narratives produced by states both on an international level via the UNHCR, and on a national 
level, via state policy and concerns.  The second section shifted the emphasis to examine how 
this understanding constructs bogus or illegitimate asylum seekers as the only asylum seeker 
category given that if asylum seekers meet the burden of proof required by states they are 
instrumentally subsumed into the refugee category.  This section also aimed to demonstrate the 
significant contemporary failings of the refugee and asylum seeker definitions based on the fact 
that they were constructed as a result of circumstances that were spatially, temporally, and 
ideologically specific.  Finally, in accepting that asylum seekers must self-define in order to seek 
asylum, this chapter called into question the paradox whereby self-definitions differ from state-
definitions and create a permanent category of being in which an individual cannot seek rights 
regardless of the liberal democratic body he or she is seeking them from.  However, the political 
nature of self-defining as an asylum seeker in order to seek rights is conducive to political 
agency which at times can expose the extant state-power dynamic.  
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Security and the construction of asylum seekers 
 
This chapter addresses the irony of immigration discourse in advanced industrialized 
states: that the insecure of the world are constructed as a threat.  I present a theoretical 
understanding of the security discourses that construct immigrants and asylum seekers into a 
homogenous unit that is seen as threatening a sovereign state.  In these discourses, concern for 
state security takes precedence over individualistic concern for human rights.  Both frontiers and 
societal identity in the state under threat are protected by the construction of a perceivable ―out‖ 
group or threatening ―other‖ that legitimizes restrictive policy while reinforcing identity.  The 
security- migration nexus provides a particularly compelling understanding of the experiences of 
asylum seekers, demonstrating the construction of asylum seekers at the state level in security 
dialogues while simultaneously raising the question of security to characterize the objective of an 
asylum seeker.   
The first section of this chapter examines theoretically the interplay between critical 
concepts of security and the development of asylum and refugee law and processes at the state 
level. I then turn the focus to decentralized and post-colonial readings of security and migration 
that highlight the utility of shifting the focus from the realities that state discourses produce for 
states to the realities that state discourses produce for those people who do not have a state-based 
identity such as citizenship.  I begin with a traditional understanding of state security and 
demonstrate how the processes dealing with asylum seekers have been manipulated to position 
them as a threat to this conventional conceptualization of security.  The production of asylum 
seekers as a threat is realized through the creation of a fictional collective of asylum seekers with 
shared negative characteristics, making the threat appear more salient in light of the traditional 
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notion that states threaten states as unitary actors.  I take into account economic security and the 
implicit contradictions in practice involving economic security: subsistence level security is not a 
significant part of traditional security studies, yet the economic threat to the EU member states 
represented by asylum seekers is emphasized.  Representation of asylum seekers as an economic 
threat relies on conceptualization of citizen entitlements and societal security.  I apply these 
understandings of security to the critical concept of societal security, looking at the role of 
identity in the construction of asylum seekers as a threat, and simultaneously the effect this 
construction has on perceived asylum seeker identities. The notion of asylum seekers as a 
collective is particularly significant because characterizing asylum seekers as a homogenous 
collective makes salient the idea that this collective will ultimately undermine the national 
identity of European states.  Furthermore, such a proposition concurrently constitutes and 
reinforces the authority of state-based identities, 
While critical security literature deconstructs state discourses that constitute asylum 
seekers as a threat for a more comprehensive understanding of threat production, post colonial 
perspectives can add additional insight into the underlying dialogues of sovereignty and the 
fortification of state borders that legitimize state based identities.  Much of the post colonial 
literature situates the contention with state based identities in contested border zones where 
groups and collectives become ―imperceptible,‖ written out of the post colonial globe due to 
power relations produced by the colonial organization of the globe and post colonial border lines.  
Borrowing from the post colonial literature, I shift analysis to asylum seekers within the borders 
of the European Union.  While the asylum seekers do not necessarily occupy a delimited space, 
they are prevented access to political agency and social participation in Europe.  The post 
colonial literature can offer insight into how individuals become ―imperceptible‖ within 
 
47 
 
European borders and additionally allows the potential to reconceptualize political agency 
around non-state-based identities.  I offer a review of the insights that critical and postcolonial 
literatures provide regarding the construction of asylum seekers as a threat.  I then move to 
ontological security theory to demonstrate how this provides an analytical tool capable of 
furthering a comprehension of the contention between state-based security discourses and a 
decentered understanding of security, offering insight into the power of state based identities. 
The paradox that is evident is, drawing from the previous chapter, asylum seekers are 
forced by law to seek asylum as individuals.  They must self-define as asylum seekers, 
distancing themselves from a collective and taking on an asylum-seeker identity.  The 
individualistic nature of seeking asylum in common practice prevents group based political 
agency at the global level.  However, states receiving asylum seekers construct asylum seekers 
into a threatening homogenous unit.  Asylum seekers as individuals without political agency 
cannot enter into a political dialogue with states to fracture this construction. 
 
Asylum seekers: collectively a threat? 
Security studies, particularly in US scholarship, have conventionally been state centric, 
engaging realist assumptions of states operating as unitary actors in an anarchical international 
system (McSweeney 1999, Smith 2004, Morganthau 1978, Fearon 1995, Lake and Powell 1999).  
Security typically refers to a state attempting to assure the continuity of its existence, via a 
negative conception of security, understood as an ―absence of threat‖ (McSweeney 1999:14).  
This negative understanding of security underlines the security dilemma in international 
relations, whereby a state attempts to escalate its security in order to reduce threat, yet in doing 
so simultaneously becomes understood as a threat by other states.  These other states, as rational 
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actors in pursuit of negative security, escalate their own security measures and the result is an 
antagonistic, tough realist world (McSweeney 1999, Herz 1950, Jervis 1978). 
The conventional security studies approaches emphasize security as ―freedom from 
threat‖, a negative conceptualization of security (Fierke 2007, McSweeney 1999, Roe 2010).  
The state functions as the referent object of security, based on the deduction that a secure state 
makes a secure population.  At the first level this assumes that the state protects the physical 
security of the population inside it, with physical security being necessarily more important than 
any other form of security (McSweeney 1999).  At the second level, state security represents 
freedom from threats against the existence of the state itself.  In this context geopolitics, 
realpolitik and conflict studies reify the state, which is treated as a unitary actor.  This negative 
conceptualization of security theorizes asylum seekers in the context of the potential threat they 
apply to the state.  The category of asylum seeker is considered an objective status.  Because the 
onus for recognition is on the state rather than the asylum seeker, the recognition of asylum 
seekers by states is then seen as a political action that could then have geopolitical implications.  
For example, if the US recognizes asylum seekers from Iran, then the US is making a political 
statement about the complicity of the Iranian government in persecution of its population.  In this 
context the recognition is a political statement, a use of soft power that could have security 
implications (Price 2006). 
 Asylum seekers might also be represented as a security threat, whether to the borders of 
the state or to the population from within the state.  In the latter case asylum seekers might be 
constructed as a threat to social cohesion or a threat to economic wellbeing among other things.  
These portrayals of asylum seekers are frequently seen at the state level (Milner 2000, Stedman 
and Tanner 2003, Lischer 2008, Betts 2009).  The relationship between theory and practice 
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suggests a hermeneutic understanding of asylum seekers in which negative security is theorized 
by scholars and by political actors.  Consequently protecting the population from the threat 
asylum seekers place on their wellbeing becomes a policy priority.  In the former case, in which 
asylum seekers are represented as a security threat to state borders, the asylum system might be 
seen as a route into the receiving state that can be exploited by extremists and terrorists 
(Kanstroom 2004, Miller 2005, Coleman 2007).  Thus, the borders are reinforced with policing 
mechanisms and at times the military; for example, the European FRONTEX force is a European 
military unit that patrols the border between Greece and Turkey.  To summarize, when questions 
regarding asylum seekers are asked in the context of conventional security frameworks, these 
questions tend to focus on the implications of asylum policy choices for international 
interactions, geopolitics, and diplomatic relations at the state level. 
Constructivist scholarship in IR shifts the understanding of security and insecurity from 
an objective observation and a necessary outcome of an anarchical system, to a condition 
constituted through social relations.  That is, ―anarchy is what states make of it‖ (Wendt 1992), 
and relationships conducive to security or insecurity can be developed in the international 
system.  However, critical security scholars have addressed a variety of means of shifting the 
conception of security, engaging such things as positive security (Huysmans 1998, McSweeney 
1999, Roe 2008), human security (Ramcharan 2002, Thomas 2004, Nuruzzaman 2006), security 
as emancipation (Booth 1999, 2005), and ontological security (Huysmans 1998, McSweeney 
1999, Steele 2005, Steele 2008, Mitzen 2006, Roe 2008, Zarakol 2010). Karin Fierke (2007) 
identifies security as an ―essentially contested concept‖ (ECC).  The key to a concept becoming 
an ECC is the attachment of a moral or ideological element, meaning that the concept resists 
precise accepted definition.  The conventional realist understanding of security can be seen as 
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ethnocentric as it emerges from Western-centric concerns with state security during the Cold 
War (Fierke 2007).  The ideological element in this conceptualization of security can be 
understood as preserving (or securing) liberal democracy, capitalism, and the global polity 
organized around the nation state.   For critical constructivists it then follows insecurity as 
generated by the security dilemma also must be understood as a result of the nation state-based 
global polity (Campbell 1998, Huysmans 1995, Watson 2011).  Identity is established through 
the nation state system, and the constructed social environment lauds liberal democracy and 
capitalism.  Thus, insecurity is understood as any threat to these elements that are constitutive of 
identity, rather than a threat to the person. The state and military focus of security scholarship 
and of security relations in practice serves to constitute the mutual understanding of insecurity 
and perpetuates the security dilemma not as objective fact but as a relational construct.  
Reconfiguring security as an ECC allows for attachments to other moral or ideological 
assumptions; for example, human security attempts to shift the referent object from the state to 
the individual and includes subsistence security.  Thus, it carries an ideological element that 
challenges current global wealth distribution.    
Critical and constructivist conceptions of security can offer insight into the irony that 
subjects of forced migration are constructed as a threat.  As discussed in detail in the previous 
chapter, asylum seekers must self-define as such, acquiring the title when seeking admission to a 
state, given that there is no category to establish asylum seekers in motion.  In immigration 
policy ―genuine‖ asylum seekers are distinguished from categories such as ―economic migrants,‖ 
―bogus‖ asylum seekers and ―illegal immigrants,‖ all labels that serve to characterize people 
seeking asylum as illegitimate and undeserving. Here I will first look at how these categories 
serve as the basis for the construction of asylum seekers as a threat, then I move to understand 
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how this threat-production obstructs asylum seekers from political and social participation.  In 
this chapter I continue to use the term asylum seeker to cover more broadly those persons who 
understand themselves to be asylum seekers and are attempting to find protection in Europe, 
including protection from poverty.  
In the traditional understanding of security, particularly in US international relations 
scholarship, military conflict between states is the primary concern.  Rather than thinking in 
terms of collectives composed of individuals, states are thought to threaten states as unitary 
actors.
4
  The construction of asylum seekers into a threatening homogenous collective allows the 
threat to be engaged within security discourses. Yet the collective construction of asylum seekers 
contradicts the liberal individualistic tradition of refugee law that I outline in the previous 
chapter.  It would be difficult to justify restrictive policy based on the characterization of a single 
asylum seeker as a threat.  The fact that asylum seekers are portrayed as a homogenous group 
creates the illusion of a unitary actor that is compatible with traditional understandings of 
security.  International refugee law was written with individual security and individual rights - 
particularly of the persecuted person - in mind.  The Refugee Protocol definition established five 
criteria for seeking asylum that discount poverty or natural phenomena.  An individualistic 
interpretation of this definition was adopted into state practice and remains today, primarily as a 
means of protecting the state from the problem of potential mass influx.  No exception to the law 
of non-refoulement was allowed to account for cases of mass influx (Hathaway 2005:358).  The 
conclusion was ―states are allowed to deny entry to refugees only in truly exceptional 
circumstances, and only to the extent truly necessary to protect their most critical national 
                                                   
4While in International Relations scholarship more generally varied approaches that take into account the individual 
level of analysis have become widely accepted, it is fair to say that Security Studies in US Realism continues to 
dominate and that paradigm emphasizes the military aspects of security as they pertain to the nation state. 
McSweeney gives a concise overview of the domination of the state centric approach in US Security Studies in 
Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations, (1999) Ch. 1 
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interests‖ (Hathaway 2005: 359).  Cases of mass influx from the conception of refugee law were 
dealt with through the commitment to burden sharing.   
However, the floodgates issue has been salient throughout the development of state 
practice. For example, upon claiming asylum, an individual is required to demonstrate a well-
founded fear of persecution.  This well-founded fear must show that the persecution is aimed 
specifically at the individual who is claiming asylum.  The perpetrators of the persecution must 
be aware of the individual in question and there must be reasonable evidence that they will 
directly target the individual if he or she were to return to the state of origin.  In other words, a 
person cannot claim asylum based on the fact that he or she belongs to a particular religious 
group only because other members of that religion have been persecuted.  The individual must 
show that he or she specifically is under threat.  Conversely, if each individual and his or her 
circumstances were given consideration in terms of how much he or she singularly threatens the 
state in which she is seeking asylum, it is unlikely a threat would be apparent; nevertheless, 
asylum seekers when constructed as a collective create a perceivable threat from a homogenous 
unitary actor.  The negative characteristics then attributed to this actor through representations in 
public narratives and the mass media further consolidate the contrary image of asylum seekers as 
a homogenous collective that threatens state interests.  The individual asylum seeker that is 
escaping persecution is undermined by association with this ostensibly threatening actor.  Hence, 
the predominant ontology in US IR scholarship that perceives states as the only relevant actors in 
international politics perceives this constructed actor as a threat not only to a given state, but 
perhaps, by its very existence, to the integrity of the state system itself.  
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Asylum seekers and critical conceptions of security 
Critical security studies move away from the priority on the state and the security 
dilemma in international politics in two directions.  Firstly, critical conceptualizations of security 
broaden security  to include themes other than military threat such as threat posed by the 
environment (Myers 1989, Weber 2006, Hoyden 2006), by poverty (Wallerstein 2004, Smith 
2004), or by health (Elbe 2005, Youde 2005), amongst other things.  Secondly, critical security 
studies rethinks the referent object of security, moving away from the state in favour of society 
(Waever 2005, Williams 2003), individuals (Booth 1991, McDonald 2002), or communities 
(Booth 1999, Linklater 2005).  I will concentrate on three approaches within critical security 
studies before moving to post-colonial voices in security studies for additional insight into 
constructions of asylum seekers in Europe.  Finally, I will turn to the theory of ontological 
security to demonstrate the potential for a decentered understanding of security that can take into 
account non-state-based identities.  
The ‗Copenhagen school‘ is one of the main homes of security studies in Europe and 
focuses on securitization.  Scholars affiliated with this school of thought look at security 
discourses as a means of depoliticizing issues.  According to Barry Buzan et al ―security is a 
quality actors inject into issues by securitizing them, which means to stage them on the political 
arena … and then to have them accepted by a sufficient audience to sanction extraordinary 
defensive moves‖ (Aradau 2004, Buzan et al 1998).  The scholars associated with the 
Copenhagen school look at the political dynamics of threat construction and the use of speech 
acts to legitimize apolitical decision making.  The referent object of security becomes society, 
rather than state territory  
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The Aberystwyth school of critical security studies, in the tradition of critical theory, 
aims to problematize the assumptions seen as self-evident in conventional security.  This school 
posits that security can be understood as a form of emancipation, defined as ―the freeing of 
people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them 
carrying out what they would freely choose to do‖ (Booth1991:319).  While conventional 
security studies assert that the state provides security for the populations within it,  Booth 
suggests that the state should be treated as ―means, not ends‖ (Booth 1991:319), shifting the 
referent object of security to the individual or collective victim of ―human wrongs‖ and security 
is conceptualized as emancipation.   
 Additionally, the Bordieu and Foucault-inspired approach of Didier Bigo (the ‗Paris 
school‘) looks at power relations and the production of threat through post-structural scholarship 
and power dynamics (Waever 2004).  Here, security discourses are deconstructed in a way that 
exposes threat production and the corresponding constitution of the protected ―inside‖ of states.  
The Paris school provides insight into threat creation and the post structural analytical tools 
supply an understanding of security as a form of disciplinary power that disseminates through the 
population.  Situating security as a form of disciplinary power uncovers the mechanisms of threat 
production as a cycle of power relations that reproduces itself.  In this context, the state can be 
seen as implicated in the mechanisms of threat creation.   
These Europe-based approaches lend themselves to the concern of this chapter that looks 
at the construction of asylum seekers as a threat.  I maintain that a key element of threat-
construction is the notion of a unitary actor threatening the state and society within it, in this case 
a threatening group of ―illegal immigrants.‖  The legal / illegal distinction can be understood 
through critical works regarding the identity-difference nexus constituting ―insides‖ and 
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―outsides‖ of states, which is dealt with in more detail below (Fierke 2007: 37).
  
Additionally, the 
human rights and emancipation focus offers insight into the nexus between human rights and 
security that underlies the core questions of this research.  The notion of a unitary actor is also 
compatible to some extent with US security scholarship, which looks at physical threat to a state 
from a unitary actor, although in this case the threat is not military.   
 In order to outline this security-migration relationship I begin with the concept of societal 
security engaged by the Copenhagen school.  Buzan emphasizes the need for security discourse 
to refer to a collective rather than an individual, because ―most threats to individuals arise from 
the fact that people find themselves embedded in a human environment‖ (Buzan 1991:37).  The 
primary human environment in which individuals exist is the local society, which is in turn part 
of a larger society, such as a national or religious group.  Societal security in Ole Waever‘s 
framework refers to national society in its function as a partial composition of the state (Waever 
1993:23).
    
In understandings of societal security, identity as a member of a collective is 
particularly important because of its constitutive role for society.  Buzan describes societal 
security as concerning ―the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of 
traditional patterns of language, culture, and religious and national identity and custom‖ (Buzan 
1991:19).  Waever defines societal security as ―the ability of a society to exist in its essential 
character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats‖ (Waever 1993:23).
  
Thus, 
identity is fundamentally part of national security if one conceives of society at the national 
level.  The securitization scholarship highlights critical constructivist contentions with the 
reproduction of the state based power structure.  Securitization of issues outside the conventional 
ambit of security studies further solidifies state power and the perceived legitimacy of the nation 
state.  For example, Watson points to the securitization of health in the movement of people in 
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and out of Canada, which presents the state as the provider of security against health risks.  In 
this way, incorporating health as a security issue makes space for the state to construct itself as 
the provider of security against the threat of ill health (Watson 2011).  The Copenhagen school 
offers insight into the securitization of migration and the movement of peoples as a discourse 
constructing the state as the body that provides security against this threat to identity (Waever 
1993, Huysmans 1998, Williams 1998).  The discursive construction of state identity depends on 
demarcating an inside and an outside with citizens on the inside, and outsiders representing the 
threat.  
 
An understanding of the identity/security nexus that is relevant to this project is that of 
the importance of the existence of a perceivable ―other‖ for the constitution of identity; that is, 
societies are constituted by the fact that they are recognizable from the outside.  Part of this is 
recognizing what they are not.  Identity is often constituted through difference (Fierke 2007:77).  
David Campbell asserts that ―difference is a requisite of identity (and) danger is inherent to that 
relationship‖ (Campbell 1998:81). Jef Huysmans develops the role of the ―other‖ in the context 
of security and migration, asserting that ―securitizing migration and asylum constructs political 
trust, loyalty and identity through the distribution of fear and an intensification of alienation‖ 
(Huysmans 2006:47). In other words, alienating an ―out-group,‖ especially if that out-group is 
within the state territory, solidifies the identity of the ―in-group.‖ This phenomenon is apparent 
in the securitization of migration within the European Union.  Furthermore, difference is 
traditionally hierarchical; for instance, in the example of European discourse, ―difference was 
equated with inferiority and similarity with equality‖ (Fierke 2007:77).  State interests and 
identity are mutually constituted and ―both may be transformed through interaction‖ (Fierke 
2007: 80, McSweeney 1999).   
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Huysmans argues that the securitization of migration policy in the EU, in particular 
during the 1990s when debates towards a common immigration policy took place, incorporated 
the theme that migration was a danger to domestic society (Huysmans 2000, see also Bigo 1994, 
Den Boer 1994, 1995).  The idea of migration as danger or as threat feeds into the understanding 
of migration as something that states needed to securitize against.  Huysmans asserts that 
security policy is ―a way of mediating belonging‖ and because migration is identified as 
weakening national tradition and social homogeneity ―it is reified as an internal and external 
danger for the survival of the national community or Western civilization (Huysmans 2000).  In 
other words, migration threatens the very survival of the nation state in terms of its societal 
identity.  Huysmans offers valuable insight into the mechanisms in Europe that have led to 
immigration policy being made in the security realm.  While the state and society internal to the 
state are understood to be constituted by discursive constructions, Huysmans leaves room for 
consideration of the effect of these discursive constructions on the subaltern populations that 
constitute the threat.  In other words, Huysmans‘s work highlights the construction of 
immigrants and asylum seekers as a homogenous force that threatens Europe.  While Huysmans 
offers insight into the processes of securitization he creates space to analyze what the effect of 
this understanding of a homogenous threat is on the disparate individuals that constitute the 
threat. 
If the referent object of security is shifted to individuals within the state or to society, the 
identity of that society must be securitized against the internal other who is not part of that ―in-
group‖.  This securitization is reinforced because the ―out-group‖ is within the physical 
boundaries of the state.  Since the traditional image of securing borders to secure the state is out 
of the question, the most feasible way to protect societal identity, and so the survival of society 
 
58 
 
itself, is to maintain a distinction between the ―in-group‖ and the ―out-group‖ within the state.  
Elspeth Guild discusses the differentiation between citizens and non-citizens in terms of rights, 
which plays into the concept of ―the other.‖  She asks ―why would we need a Declaration of 
rights both for men and for citizens if there was not an inherent difference between the two‖ 
(Guild 2005:107). Her study indicates that non-citizens have fewer rights when it comes to 
questions of national security because they are seen as untrustworthy.
  
Hence, the non-citizens 
are conceived as being fundamentally different from citizens, contributing to the construction of 
the ―other.‖   This understands the in-group and out-group dynamics more generally: rather than 
the in-group being internal to Europe as in Huysmans‘ study, the in-group incorporates all people 
who possess membership of a state.  The out-group then is composed of stateless peoples, 
asylum seekers, and anyone whose identity is not based on state membership. 
If societal security is perceived as dependent on an identity that is sustainable although 
subject to natural organic evolution, mutually understandable, and objectively verifiable, then the 
notion of it changing is particularly problematic, especially in light of the conception of security 
that is focused on continuity and familiarity (McSweeney 1999).  The denial of participation in 
society is represented in asylum law through economic measures and restrictions on personal 
liberties, as Guild demonstrates.  For example, in the UK the freedom to appeal a judicial 
decision in court is certainly extended to members of society, but denied in immigration 
decisions (Stevens 2001). This law precludes immigrants from fully entering society, creating a 
stigmatized ―other‖.  The discussion of identity is strongly related to Foucault‘s idea that 
discourse generates modes of power and exclusion (Fierke 2007).  This exclusion is further 
related to the construction of the other, as ―the social space of inside / outside is made possible 
and helps constitute a moral space of superior / inferior‖ (Campbell 1998:73).  Here I borrow 
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from the Paris school and Didier Bigo‘s understanding of the construction of immigrants as a 
threat.  For example, in a 2002 paper, Bigo posits the flow of the security discourse of migration 
through three levels of diffusion (Bigo 2002).  The diffusion begins with the supposition that 
security problems benefit politicians as the politician can be seen to manage the problem hence 
strengthening his or her authority.  Migration is particularly susceptible to this according to Bigo, 
because it lends itself to the image of something foreign invading the body.  The second level is 
comprised of people who buy into the problem and reinforce the image such as security 
professionals, the military, and the police.  Bigo asserts that for ―the intelligence service and the 
military, migrants are not a political dilemma but a national-security problem.‖  The image that 
was a political problem is then a national security problem and like many national security 
issues, it is adopted by the media, particularly the tabloid media, and fear is disseminated through 
the population (Bigo 2002). While politicians provide the starting point for Bigo, unalloyed 
agency should not necessarily be attributed to politicians.  They are affected by the views of the 
populous but are also members of the said populous and so are invested in the particular ―fear‖ 
that is disseminated.  Politicians act on at least two levels: at the desire to be re-elected and at the 
level of personal concern.  As Foucault would have it, they cannot step outside of this normative 
structure that constructs and maintains power relations (Foucault 1982).    
 The concept of emancipation provides the principal analytical tool of the Aberystwyth 
school of critical security studies. Emancipation shifts the referent object of security outside of 
the state or the society, instead focusing on ―ethical communities‖ (Booth 1999).    Rather than 
thinking in terms of cultural relativism based on the state system, the ethical communities are 
defined as those who have been subjected to human wrongs.  The universal recognition of human 
wrongs provides us with a tandem universalistic understanding of human rights (Booth 1999:62-
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63).  However, the definition of Emancipation holds inherent to it an Enlightenment 
understanding of individualistic liberties.  We understand humans as oppressed based on 
Western liberal conceptions of what oppression looks like and the form of emancipation follows 
that model.  Emancipation offers ―a theory of progress for politics, it provides a politics of hope 
and it gives guidance to a politics of resistance … Emancipation is the only permanent hope of 
becoming‖ (Smith 2005: 42). The analytical tool of emancipation serves to combine human 
rights and security studies, shifting the focus to individuals or groups who can be considered 
victims of ―human wrongs‖ and defining security as potential.  However, it remains attached to a 
static conception of threat as composed of human wrongs, which can be identified through 
appealing to Western liberal human rights.    The Aberystwyth school shifts analytical attention 
from state security to human rights, and allows for relational understandings of security.  
However, security in this case can be seen to some extent as hierarchical rather than horizontal, 
given that the agents of emancipation are either Western or bearers of Western ideas (Fierke 
2007).  This does not mean that the concept of emancipation is inherently oppressive or 
problematic, but simply that care needs to be taken because the concept itself is a product of 
unequal relations.   Further, adopting the state as the means of acquiring security reproduces the 
status quo in which individuals or collectives without state-based identities have no means of 
security. 
With regard to the phenomenon of asylum seekers we see the bearers of Western ideas 
unwilling to recognize asylum seekers who self-define and do not correspond with the refugee 
definition, which has liberal individualism embedded within it.  Thus the unequal power 
relations reproduce state-based categories of ―need‖ and ―human wrongs‖ provoking the danger 
that states turning away individuals who self-define as asylum seekers will not be recognized as, 
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or recognize themselves to be, committers of human wrongs.  The category of asylum seeker 
understood by the Convention definition is limited and the discourses constructing ―bogus‖ 
asylum seekers remain largely unchallenged.  While the actions of states towards undocumented 
migrants are open to criticism via understanding of human dignity, ―bogus asylum seekers‖ are 
not understood as composing an ethical community because they already carry the connotation 
of unethical behaviour, that is disrespect for the rule of law that establishes sovereign boundaries 
and due to the individualistic nature of claiming asylum, they are removed from a community. 
The nexus between asylum seekers and state security is that the outside, represented by 
the ―other‖, moves to be physically inside the state, which means the values, culture, and identity 
of society must be reinforced within this context.  Conceptualizations of security that take a 
rights-based approach such as the Aberystwyth school and the human security literature are 
generally situated in non-Western locations.  When the threat is seen as within the Western state, 
military action would be impossible and ineffective, and sealing the borders militarily would 
equally be ineffective as the threat has already penetrated the borders.  Concurrently, security is 
focused on securing the state in the context of physical threat, economic threat, and identity 
threat to the state or the members that compose it.  The inverse of that, security for asylum 
seekers is not considered.  The tools of the Aberystwyth school prove inadequate because the act 
of seeking asylum represents the opportunity of becoming.  That is, the asylum seekers are 
―emancipated‖ and the obstructions to rights in Europe form a separate analytical question that 
the theory of emancipation does not ask.  
In European immigration narratives, the identity of the group that is excluded is 
responsive to change in the international and domestic environment; the identity of the ―other‖ 
changes over time in accordance with respective national interests and identity.  For example, I 
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take three categories of threat: physical security, economic provision, and identity.  These 
categories represent different national narratives that gain attention within EU states.  The first 
category of physical security is conventionally part of domestic narratives, and the relationship 
with immigration has been related to social unrest, particularly in EU states that have seen ethnic 
and racial violence such as France and Italy (Seljuk 2007, Kennedy 2009, Donadio 2010). 
Additionally, there has been a resurgence of the relationship between physical security and 
immigration following a growing focus on terrorism after terrorist attacks in Spain in 2004, and 
the UK in 2005 (Guild, 2006).  Military troops have been deployed at European land borders, for 
example between Greece and Turkey (Traynor 2010).  Following recent migration from North 
Africa there have been calls to close internal Schengen borders so states can protect their 
national boundaries.   
The second category of security and threat production, economic and subsistence 
security, features in European security discourses with regard to immigration in the context of 
the potential strain immigrants might place on the economy.  Here the rhetoric of ―welfare 
tourism‖ is important, and asylum seekers are paired with the notion that they come to take 
―handouts‖ from the European states, which ought to protect social welfare and subsistence 
security for their citizens.  The framing of asylum seekers as an economic threat is dominant in 
the UK and has been present particularly in the tabloid media since the 1990s (for examples see 
The Daily Mail, 8 December 1998, Daily Record 16 March 2000, The Express 13 December 
2002, Innes 2010).  The narrative dispersed by the tabloid media suggests asylum seekers are 
coming to the UK with economic motivations to take something they do not deserve from 
deserving British citizens.   
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Finally, identity security is increasingly visible in Europe, particularly with regard to 
European integration.  States prioritize national identity to avoid merging with co-European 
cultures.  In states such as France this has been an important part of national policy for some 
decades; however, an increased interest in identity is becoming evident across Europe.  For 
example, Britain introduced citizenship classes to the national curriculum in 2002, teaching 
British students what it means to be British, including civic rights and responsibilities and a unit 
on British identity (Qualifications and Curriculum Development Agency, accessed 2011).  With 
regard to immigration policy more and more states are adding citizenship tests and language 
requirements to immigration criteria (Lowenheim and Gazit, 2009). The notion is that 
immigrants who are unwilling to assimilate threaten state identity and therefore are undesirable.    
Claudia Tazreiter indicates in the words below how the threat presented by asylum seekers is 
particularly relevant to societal security:  
The psychological yearning for a social space defined and able to be controlled 
within a nation-state for members, fosters antagonism toward the stranger who 
would encroach possibilities for certainty, or the comfort of cultural traditions; a 
yearning for an idealized past.  Those most visible at having encroached valuable 
social distance are likely to become the target of policy initiatives aimed at national 
security and ‗sealing‘ measures flowing in the opposite direction to economic and 
political initiatives of co-operation towards transnational, global initiatives.  Asylum 
seekers within the borders of a state, and particularly where they have entered in a 
clandestine fashion, are a likely target of such measures (Tazreiter 2004:10). 
  
Tazreiter suggests that asylum seekers are particularly problematic because they have 
encroached upon the ability of a state to confine its resources to citizens.  This is relevant to the 
economic threat and the identity threat represented in public narratives. The presence of the 
stranger threatens ―the comfort of cultural traditions‖; the concern is not just for economic 
factors but for the sense of belonging that should be reserved for members who participate in 
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cultural traditions and perpetuate them.  In this sense, economic security and identity security are 
interrelated.   
 
Post-colonial insights  
The security literature that focuses on a post-colonial decentering steps outside of the 
dominant security narratives in IR to a greater extent.  While the critical security schools attempt 
to shift the referent object of security or develop analytical tools that reject objectivist state-based 
understandings of security, the post-colonial literature situates IR security studies into the spatial 
and temporal narratives that inform a Northern / Western view of the globe and consequently 
global political narratives. In this sense, a theoretical concern with the territorial aspect of power, 
and the relationship between sovereignty, territory, and citizenship including how that 
relationship is performed globally offers additional insight into the security nexus between 
asylum seekers and the state.  Furthermore, post-colonial theory rethinks the conceptualization of 
security as the absence of threat. Conceptions of the global environment have been constituted 
through a variety of power relations, in particular those that give precedence to Northern / 
Western ideas and see these ideas propagated internationally.  Understanding security as 
―absence of threat,‖ even if the referent object is shifted away from the state, still incorporates a 
single understanding of existence with an end-goal of removing threat.  What composes threat is 
universalized and suggests a trajectory of action that starts with practice in the least-threatened 
societies and diffuses outwards.  A post-colonial perspective resituates the threat and security 
nexus to examine the ways in which security for one group of people (for example, citizens of 
Western states) means insecurity or threat for another group of people (for example, those who 
do not have a state-based identity).  This is a tandem relationship and so suggests interrogating 
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the conceptualization and practice of security as an extant power relationship privileging one life 
over another.  In the context of this chapter then, constituting state security against a 
homogenous unitary actor ―asylum seekers,‖ suggests that security for state citizens removes 
security for the individuals that are disregarded as individuals and seen as a homogenous 
collective. 
David Slater provides a post-colonial critique of postmodernism, suggesting that in 
postmodernism there is no attempt to anthropologize the west and no need to deconstruct the 
myths of the west because they are based on rationalism and reason, which are used to justify 
adopting the economic model of the West for the globe (Slater 2004).  Furthermore, for Slater 
postmodern or critical approaches often fetishize the idea of despair; for example, they carry the 
implicit suggestion that a ―saviour‖ is needed in the shape of postmodern emancipators who can 
rebuild and recreate the potential for political power.  On the other hand, a post-colonial analysis 
seeks to recognize the political power that is already there but disguised or oppressed by extant 
discourses of power and domination in the shape of Western ideas.  For instance, Slater tracks 
the development of discourses of progress, civilization, modernization, development and 
globalization that both constitute and reproduce the respective roles of the colonizer and the 
colonized, the centre and the periphery, the globalizers and the globalized (Slater 2004).  
Through shifting the emphasis with regard to the study of difference, agency, subjectivity, and 
resistance, the post-colonial project can challenge and destabilize these Western discourses.  For 
Slater, post-colonial analysis adds an ethico-political dimension that is rooted in the critique of 
colonialism and imperialism, and the revalidation of autonomy and resistance to subordination.  
The understanding of global politics that divides the globe into territorial nation-states is a 
manifestation of colonial power that can be destabilized by a post-colonial geopolitical analysis. 
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 One of the principle locales of power that emanates from the West as the colonizer is the 
geopolitical understanding of the world and spatial identities applied to people.  In particular this 
refers to national identity based on territorial attachment and sovereign government within 
nation-states.  Such a spatial understanding was fixed in Europe as a response to the need to 
establish a physical sovereignty in addition to the metaphysical sovereignty attributed to the 
sovereign person and office during the sixteenth century (Hansen and Stepputat 2005).  
Colonialism then transferred this spatial understanding of sovereign territories elsewhere and 
established a hierarchy of citizens.  Hansen and Stepputat navigate through the role of 
sovereignty and citizenship and how both relate to formulations of identity.  For example, in the 
modern world the democratic ideal is to vest sovereignty in the people.  That way, each citizen 
personifies national interest which, referring back to the identity – difference nexus, means that 
the national collective is constituted against what remains outside of it.  Thus, citizenship is not 
simply a legal status, but becomes a larger metaphysical identity represented by the composite of 
the nation state.  Hansen and Stepputat describe the transformation from legal citizenship 
through the social contract to a collective national identity of ―the people‖ as the crystallization 
of the state in the people.  Following this trajectory, sovereignty is performed through violence, 
which is exercised against threats.  In the colonial world these threats came from abroad, from 
within, and from those who were not considered ready to be sovereign, that is slaves and 
colonized people (Hansen and Stepputat, 2005).  Thus sovereignty is constituted through 
sovereign actions oppressing and eliminating freedoms from the bodies that compose threats. 
 Uncovering the interconnection between territory, sovereignty, and citizenship is central 
to post colonial analyses.  Perera understands space as the ―raw material of colonial sovereignty‖ 
producing boundaries, hierarchies, zones, enclaves, subversion of existing property 
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arrangements, categorical classification of people, resource extraction, and manufacturing of 
cultural imageries. The spatiality that connects people living in ―peace‖ with people living in 
locations of violent terror is the same spatiality that allows people living in ―peace‖ to remain 
unaware of the violent or non-peaceful realities within the territorial spaces in which they reside 
(Perera 2010).  Thus, the preservation of security for one group of people simultaneously 
threatens the security for another group of people.  The crystallization of the sovereign state 
preserves the spatial identities adopted by Europeans in the global North, but none-spatial 
identities become oppressed as a result of the globalization of Western norms.  Non spatial 
identities fall outside the geographies of reference (Slater, 2004).  Asylum seekers in Europe 
exemplify this issue because they are within the geography of the West, but do not have access to 
the democratic participation, citizenship, and rights that are emblematic of the West.  
Nayak and Selbin underline that conceptualizations of security simultaneously create 
spaces of insecurity.  Creating a positive where security is present also creates a negative where 
security is absent.  When the understanding of security relies on the state then those without 
state-based identities remain in a zone of insecurity.  These zones of insecurity then threaten the 
secured society: securing the people in zones of insecurity requires developmental action, 
military action, or migration, all of which are disruptive to established categories of existence 
that do not comply with the spatial state-based model (Nayak and Selbin 2010). Thus one 
person‘s security becomes another person‘s threat.  For example, to protect Europe it is 
necessary to deny the security of all the people who are not permitted entry.  To provide for their 
security would be perceived as a potential threat to the wellbeing of citizens in terms of social 
cohesion, identity, and access to economic entitlements.  Furthermore, to allow open access to 
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the states of Europe would require reconfiguring the meaning of citizenship in the modern world 
and would thus threaten the European citizen at the level of existence.  
Sovereignty is uniquely threatened by migrants.  Nair observes that ―state insecurities are 
constructed in relation to perceived threats to national sovereignty emergent from the 
unregulated flow of transnational migrants‖ (Nair 2010:101).  This flow cannot be regulated, 
despite excessive efforts on the part of states.  Extensive monitoring efforts are put in place, and 
the policing of borders is becoming increasingly common using increasingly advanced 
technology with the aim of making states more secure.  Security of states comes at the cost of 
migrants.  For example, low wage migrants are highly vulnerable to actuarial and statistical 
technologies that establish identities and likely behaviour based on race, class, and gender, which 
make these characteristics inherent in the reproduction of insecurity.  For example, ―illegal 
immigrants‖ are characterized as a high crime group in the US, based on statistics showing 
―illegal immigrants‖ as disproportionately inhabiting prisons.  However, for many of these 
individuals the reason for their incarceration is their status as an ―illegal immigrant.‖  Thus, the 
identity of ―illegal immigrant‖ as criminal reproduces itself (Miller 2005, Coleman 2007).  The 
same mechanisms apply to reproduce asylum seekers, or given groups of incoming migrants, as 
undesirable consequently duplicating insecurities or perceived vulnerabilities.  Thus, insecurity is 
a result of the intersection of security and sovereignty, which shapes hegemonic practices around 
borders and migrant bodies.  The experiences of migrants should be understood in a neo-
imperial, neoliberal context where border practices reify colonial boundaries and practices of 
inclusion and exclusion (Nair 2010).  These practices then perform the sovereignty that was 
established around the crystallized European sovereign state.  
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Much of the post-colonial literature that deals with migration in the realm of security is 
situated in borderlands, examining the effect of power relations that have constructed the border 
as such to create insecurity for individuals in specific locations (Perera 2010, Decha 2010, Nah 
2007, Toyota 2007, Hortsman 2007, Dean 2007).  Drawing in particular on Giorgio Agamben, a 
second focus looks at how the insides and outsides act upon the person in specific places, 
particularly within refugee camps (Bigo 2007, Nair 2010, Tagma 2010). In this research I shift 
the focus to the asylum seeker in Europe.  In my analysis I understand space as metaphysical 
rather than physical. While asylum seekers may be within the territory or physical space of 
Europe, they are denied political agency and social participation, or access to sociopolitical 
space.   The individual in these circumstances is prevented from accessing social and political 
participation while having been removed from his or her home community.  The role of space 
with regard to the relationship between borders and sovereignty has been widely studied given 
that, from the Northern / Western tradition, borders determine spatial conceptions of identity 
(Biswas and Nair 2010, Ramjaran and Grundy-Warr 2007, Albert et al 2001).  However, the 
definition of an asylum seeker, as extant in international legal narratives, becomes particularly 
interesting with regard to spatial identities.  First of all the asylum seeker must be physically 
removed from the locale of his or her spatial identity.  While the asylum seeker definition 
recognizes the five nexus reasons of race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, or membership of a 
social group the claim itself must be based on individually-directed persecution.  Persecution 
aimed at entire groups is not treated as a valid reason for an asylum claim, based on the concern 
of creating precedent for an influx, which is detailed above.  The asylum seeker must be to some 
degree excepted from his or her group identity while at the same time the persecution must be 
based on membership within that identity.      
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To seek asylum is to deny collective identity and present an individual identity: that of 
asylum seeker.  The process of seeking asylum takes time, varying from a number of months to 
more than a decade.  During this time an asylum seeker is distanced from his or her community 
identity but not yet permitted to properly enter the social and political space of the state in which 
he or she is seeking asylum.  Moreover, many individuals do not file claims but remain 
undocumented in order to be safe from expedited deportation.  This situates asylum seekers in a 
social and political ―space in between‖ or situation of ―bare life‖ (Agamben 1999).  However, 
state power constructs collectives of asylum seekers as a threat and refuses to allow participation 
or entry into the privileged space of the state: not necessarily the physical space, but the social 
and political space. Therefore, even within European borders and without the firmly delineated 
lines of the camp, individuals become imperceptible, or considered less than human, based on a 
social and political condition rather than presence in a physical location. While physically they 
are within the ―West,‖ my focus is a non-spatial identity that is prohibited access to ―the West.‖  
This identity is constructed and maintained as an outsider identity.  It can be seen as a product of 
the Western understanding of sovereignty and citizenship, and imbalanced colonial relations that 
construct spatial identities.  Rather than maintaining individual identities on self-defining as 
asylum seekers, the individuals seeking asylum are stripped of their identities and take on a new 
one, simply as an ―asylum seeker,‖ a ―bogus asylum seeker‖, an ―illegal immigrant‖, or an 
―undocumented migrant‖ with various degrees of negative connotation.  However, state based 
discourses reconstruct this new identity into a homogenous threatening unitary actor that is 
perceived as harmful to the security of citizens in the receiving state.  The nature of seeking 
asylum simultaneously requires dismissing collective identity.  Thus, asylum seekers within the 
European territory are far from being part of the social and political space of European countries.  
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Even without the clear limitations provided by analysis within a refugee camp, or on territorial 
border liners, asylum seekers within Europe are rendered imperceptible and consequently are 
prevented from accessing the rights they are seeking.  
 
Ontological Security 
 Ontological security theory can offer unique insight into the processes that construct 
asylum seekers as a threat via the national narrative.  It can also offer insight into the nature of 
the reproduction of the sovereign state that serves to exclude individuals with non-state-based 
identities.  In this way, ontological security becomes a vehicle through which one can understand 
the security dynamics that create security for some people while simultaneously creating 
insecurity for others.  Furthermore, the analytical attention ontological security theory gives to 
the structure-agency relationship can offer particular insight into forced migration.  The 
structure-agency relationship also situates the scholar as an autonomous actor capable of 
reflexivity (Giddens 1984), meaning that security scholarship contributes to the discourses 
constructing particular security dynamics.  This then demands ethical reflexivity within security 
studies as a subfield. 
Ontological security refers to a core sense of security based in the certainty of the 
routines and practices of daily life, and a ―futural sense‖ of social life (Giddens 1984:62).  
Knowledge and autonomy of the self within the routines and practices of daily life is necessary 
for a sense of ontological security: in this way the theory is established via Giddens‘ 
structuration theory, offering insight into the structure-agency relationship.  Rather than 
portrayed as dichotomous concepts, structure and agency are each affected by, created by, and 
reproduced by the other. Structure is not a compelling force but is the dynamic in which the 
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autonomous agent manages his or her actions.  Thus, ―ordinary day-to-day social life … involves 
an ontological security founded on autonomy of bodily control within predictable routines and 
encounters‖ (Giddens 1984:64).    
 McSweeney engages the structure-agency dynamic to investigate the attribution of 
identity in International Relations.  He posits ―we can only do security, or do identity, if there is 
a body of typified actions, mediated by structure, from which to draw in order to make sense‖ 
(McSweeney 1999:166).  Identities can be configured at many different levels, including states, 
societies, and other communities, recognizable and produced by social practice.  States hold an 
identity but the impulse of security and the monopoly that states possess over security discourses 
at the global level means that state-based identities are prioritized.  Furthermore, in appropriating 
security to mean only military security, the state (or the agents within the state that perpetuate 
such an understanding of security) privileges military security over other forms. .  McSweeney 
argues that if security is our physical survival then security takes a logical priority over other 
human needs.  This is based on the relationship Giddens builds between ontological security and 
existential anxiety.  Ontological security is an internal mechanism of ―answering‖ existential 
questions, which Giddens divides into four categories, two of which focus on existence and 
human life and can fall into the realm of physical security.  The other two include the experience 
of others, and the continuity of identity as a biographical narrative (Giddens 1991).  Scholars of 
ontological security have applied these second categories at the state level to offer insight into 
security relations among states.  
  Ontological security theory has developed in IR providing insight into state constructions 
of identity and social relations amongst states (Mitzen 2006, Steele 2005, Steele 2008, Roe 2010)  
as well as identities within states (Skey 2010, McSweeney 1999), engaging both aspects of the 
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self, and aspects of social relations.   In the international relations literature ontological security 
is a burgeoning area that has emerged out of political sociology and the constructivist tradition 
with an emphasis on identity and discourse.  Much of the literature in IR has engaged state 
centric assumptions and taken states as the principal actors.  Ontological security can offer 
insight into state actions through attributing identity characteristics to states, thereby broadening 
and deepening analyses of security issues.  For example, Steele distinguishes between ―security 
as survival‖ and ―security as being‖ at the state level in which the former relates to physical harm 
in the face of military threat and the latter relates to a disruption in the identity narrative of the 
state provoked by behaviour that does not reflect that identity narrative (Steele2005, also see Roe 
2010).  Identity characteristics of states might be a product of social relations and constituted 
through communication between states (Mitzen 2006, Roe 2008), or they might be a product of 
an identity discourse within a state (Skey 2010, Steele 2008), or of course a combination of the 
two (Zarakol 2010).  While this certainly offers valuable insight into state actions, I look to 
understand the condition of ontological insecurity of stateless people or stateless communities, 
which can be considered a consequence of the state understood as the key provider of security.  
 In the contemporary status quo the state holds agency to make a normative judgment 
about the security needs of individuals.  It follows that individuals without a state based identity 
are left with little capacity for autonomous agency in questions of security.  Rather they must 
appeal to a state.  Roe provides a review of McSweeney‘s work, situating his ―positive security‖ 
as understanding security as a product of social relations grounded in the human individual.  
While this necessarily excludes natural and environmental threats (McSweeney 1999, Roe 2010) 
it also challenges the primacy of the state, as the human retains agency to make the normative 
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judgment regarding his or her security.  McSweeney retains the human individual as the referent 
object of security and asserts: 
―To say that security must be grounded in the human individual means that our 
understanding of the concept must be drawn from a judgment of human needs, not 
assumed to be so linked and read back into human needs on the basis of state 
institutional requirements; that our calculation of threats – internal and external – 
must be referred to the criterion of human needs in the positive, as well as 
negative dimension‖ (McSweeney 1999:99). 
 
As discussed above, negative security represents absence of threat, while positive security 
represents a secure feeling, ―the human need for ontological security‖ (Roe 2010).  While Roe 
suggests that the state should pursue positive security, here I assert that shifting analytical 
attention to the populations for which the state actively blocks positive or ontological security 
problematizes the role of the state as the security provider.  Attention given to the normative 
ranking of security needs can expose the need for a state based identity to realize security needs.  
Shifting attention to the persons for whom the state blocks security can then offer a broadened 
conceptualization of security that retains the human as the referent object and does not rely on 
the state. 
McSweeney deconstructs the relationship between security and identity, demonstrating 
the potential for ontological security to shift security concerns away from the state in 
international relations.  Furthermore, McSweeney‘s work offers a starting point to understand the 
nexus between citizenship and security at the individual level.  When physical security at the 
state level is prioritized it means the state has made a normative judgment about  the hierarchy of 
human needs (McSweeney 1999:154).  In order to maintain a sense of ontological security the 
autonomy to secure one‘s own daily life is necessary (Giddens 1984 63-64).   Thus, the 
individual should retain the autonomy to identify his or her most immediate need when in a 
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situation of insecurity.  If one presumes the security needs of the state are the priority, then one 
permits the state to make this normative judgment. That may or may not be a huge concern for 
state members; for example, calls such as ―I want my taxes to fund education, not a war‖ 
represent a challenge to this hierarchy of needs.  However, if non-members of the state are 
refused entry because of security needs then the state hierarchy acts upon their potential to gain a 
sense of ontological security.  For example, according to current refugee law, states maintain the 
capacity to make a normative judgment regarding security needs of individuals.  The need to be 
protected from persecution warrants state action in the form of granting refugee status and leave 
to remain.  The need to be protected from poverty does not.  Returning to Giddens‘ conception of 
the structure agency dynamic, the distinction is not between forced and voluntary migration 
because structure constrains the choices of an actor and in both cases the migrant has made a 
decision to migrate.  The distinction is between the circumstances that the individual has fled and 
in that context the state makes the normative judgment to rank certain human needs below 
others.  
 The work on ontological security that engages identity can further inform the 
understanding of the duality in the role of the state as provider of security and withholder of 
security.  Work on ontological security and shame understands shame as a social phenomenon 
that can problematize state identities and therefore ontological security (Steele 2005, Steele 
2008, Zarakol 2010).  Recent work by Zarakol examines identity and ontological security with 
regard to shame as constituted by intersubjective identities.  Zarakol attributes feelings of shame 
to states because of how they are perceived and constituted from outside.  Shame can be 
generated by reflection within a state on behaviour that does not correspond to the state‘s identity 
narrative (Steele 2005, Steele 2008), and also by how other states and actors characterize a 
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particular identity (Zarakol 2010). Zarakol refers to early twentieth century Europe in which a 
shared modern worldview ―allowed for those who were labelled as inferior to feel the burn of 
stigmatization‖ (Zarakol 2010:11).  Zarakol examines how feelings of shame inform state 
identities by drawing on work in psychology that looks at shame at the level of individual 
identities.  Here, I assert that one can understand the stigmatization that is broadly applied to 
those who have non-state-based identities and have been rejected by appeals to a state for 
inclusion and leave to remain in the same way. In other words, an asylum seeker who the state 
calls ―illegal immigrant‖ may come to reconfigure his or her identity as an ―illegal immigrant.‖  
In this context, the theory of ontological security can offer insight into the power of state based 
narratives of security and identity in maintaining ontological insecurity for those who are outside 
of the state system. In the following chapters I explore the construction as asylum seekers as a 
threat in Britain and Greece.  The case of Greece is particularly interesting with regard to the 
national identity narrative.  Following that I revisit ontological security at the level of the human 
individual, offering a reading of human security that disrupts state-based conceptualizations of 
security. 
  
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the literature regarding the intersection of security and 
migration.  Critical security offers insight into security discourses without relying on the state as 
the referent object of security but incorporating societies and individuals.  The formulation of 
security within this body of literature is not based solely on physical security such as provided by 
the military, but also looks at economic and subsistence security, and identity security.  The post-
colonial security literature focuses on colonial power relations that construct and reproduce the 
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dominant contemporary ideas with regard to territory, sovereignty, and citizenship.  The spatial 
understanding of the world and the nexus between sovereignty and citizenship that is situated 
within a given spatial territory can be understood as emanating from European history, which 
colonialism then projected across the globe.  The rights-less, less than human individual is 
constructed as a result of this understanding of citizenship because the citizen is the rights-
possessing human individual.  A person without citizenship becomes the inverse of the citizen. 
Colonial identities are hierarchical and rely on a spatial conception whereby identity is 
configured through territory. Asylum seekers are in a position where they are removed from their 
community-based spatial identity but denied access to a social and political identity.  States then 
use this lack of identity to reconstruct asylum seekers as a threatening homogenous unitary actor 
that threatens the interests of the receiving states.  The theory of ontological security is a useful 
analytical tool to understand how the state operates as a producer of insecurity, and how that 
insecurity is reproduced by the emphasis on the state as the provider of security.  In this way the 
theory of ontological security can bridge the gap between critical security studies and post-
colonial scholarship on citizenship and sovereignty with regard to migration. 
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The construction of asylum seekers in British discourse 
 
Having considered in chapter two the position of asylum seekers within the configuration 
of security politics, I move here to examine in detail the case of Britain.  In this chapter I look at 
the discursive constructions that characterize asylum seekers in Britain as a threat, encompassing 
the idea of a ―bogus,‖ illegitimate, or an illegal presence in Britain that threatens British security 
interests.  Asylum seekers are the insecure of the world and yet in advanced industrialized states 
they come to be constructed as a threat to national interests.  In this chapter, I examine the 
mechanisms of such a threat construction in Britain.    
 Didier Bigo theorizes threat construction in society as a set of relations between actors at 
different levels of the political and security processes (Bigo 2002).  Politicians are at the head of 
this threat construction in which they stand to benefit from being seen to successfully manage a 
threat.  Therefore, to manufacture a threat or to emphasize a particular threat allows them to 
manage that threat.  The second level of threat construction Bigo understands to include security 
professionals or as Bigo terms them ―managers of unease‖.  This group might also stand to 
benefit from the particular threat. For example, if migration is posited as a threat then a 
governmental department might receive funds to deal with this threat, elevating its resources and 
its importance.  Other agencies such as the military or private security companies can also fall 
into this category.  Finally, ―fear mongers‖ are those actors who disseminate the increased fear 
through the population, such as the tabloid media in Britain (Bigo 2002).  Other examples 
include television media such as news networks, and documentary shows such as Panorama in 
Britain, a well known BBC documentary programme that analyzes important issues of current 
affairs.  The process can be considered cyclical because it is not a neat pyramid of hierarchical 
relationships.  Rather, the agents and managers of fear are embedded within the population 
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among whom the fear is disseminated.  As the fear is disseminated it becomes accepted as self-
evident and is further normalized by appearance in popular culture.  For example, the television 
series 24, which ran from November 2001 until May 2010, represents the appearance of 
terrorism in popular culture at a time when terrorism was established as an important part of the 
US national security discourse.
5
   
In the study below I demonstrate how the object of fear becomes a self-evident threat that 
reproduces itself.  The object of fear here is asylum seekers, and I maintain the broadened 
understanding of asylum seeker that I outlined in previous chapters.  I incorporate coding for 
people ―seeking to enter Britain illegally‖ and ―failed asylum seekers‖ who would not be 
included in the definition of asylum seeker according to the state.  I take the view that the 
creation of these excluded categories plays a part in the construction of asylum seekers as a 
threat.  Of course there are variations and changes over time to the nature of the threat, the actors 
and agencies involved, and the suggested ways of dealing with the threat.  Below, I take the 
different levels of the cyclical process to carry out a multi-genre critical discourse analysis.  I 
study the production of the discourse at three levels and offer a reading of the construction of 
threat on the part of actors at each level. 
I contextualize the construction of asylum seekers in contemporary discourse within an 
understanding of the history of immigration policy and the political discourse surrounding 
asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants in Britain.  In the multi genre critical discourse analysis I 
first consider the political discourse, in the form of speeches of party leaders, and parliamentary 
                                                   
5 Brent Steele looks at the appearance of torture in the television show ―24‖ asserting that the dramatization of 
torture as the only way to guarantee state security then contributes to the reproduction of the acceptability of torture 
for Americans.  The acceptability of torture is manifested in the reality of the use of torture on detained enemy 
combatants (Steele 2008b).  Similarly, in her book The Dark Side Jane Mayer suggests that 24 can be understood to 
have contributed to the construction of the urgency surrounding matters of terrorism (Mayer 2008: 330) and also that 
the show acted as a source of interrogation techniques for military officials in Guantanamo (Mayer 2008:196).   
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communications on the topic.  The second genre examines the dialogue of security professionals 
with regard to asylum seekers, looking at reports and documents from the two primary agencies 
that are responsible for immigration security concerns in Britain, the United Kingdom Border 
Agency and the Serious Organized Crime Agency.  The third category is the media, looking at 
the most popular newspapers in Britain.  The analysis primarily focuses on tabloid press.  The 
tabloid press receives a wide readership in Britain; out of the six most-read newspapers in Britain 
five of them are tabloids, with the most-read news source being The Sun.
6
  
 
Contextualizing contemporary discourse 
The experiences of refugees in Britain can be traced back to the Huguenots and other 
Protestant religious refugees seeking safety from religious persecution in the Sixteenth Century.  
While the long history of immigration and nationality law affects political interactions with 
refugees and asylum seekers, here the analysis will begin in the 1930s, as this was the period 
during which international law conceptualized refugees and states started to meet the needs of 
refugees as an international obligation. 
During the 1930s the UK accepted substantial numbers of Jews fleeing German Nazism, 
and, following World War II, accepted people either fleeing Eastern European communism or 
people who were unable to return to their Eastern European homes.  As a liberal state, receiving 
people who were fleeing communism was in the national interest as it reinforced the positive 
associations of liberal government. However, the colonial history of Britain also affected 
immigration policy.  With decolonization in motion, many citizens of the British Empire 
migrated to the UK.  Nationals of commonwealth countries were not offered asylum but instead 
                                                   
6 National Readership Survey 2010-2011, The Sun is a tabloid that is generally conservative, although it notably 
changed its party allegiance prior to the 1997 election.  It has an average daily readership of 3million. 
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―exceptional leave to remain‖. Oftentimes, immigrants from former colonies held British 
passports leaving Britain with a complex system of entitlements to nationality and leave to 
remain.   
During the 1940s to the 1960s the policy of granting leave to remain for citizens of 
British colonies and former colonies was adapted following discourses of ―mass influx‖ from 
African, West Indian, and Asian colonial subjects.  In the mid 1960s a voucher system was 
introduced that was aimed at ―keep[ing] the rate of coloured immigration within acceptable 
bounds‖ (Paul 1997: 171). Theresa Hayter examines motivations for this policy, looking at 
racism within British society and the consequential effects on racist immigration controls.  For 
example, Hayter cites parliamentary documents in which blacks in Britain are blamed for 
provoking crimes of racist violence against blacks in Britain.  According to Hayter‘s analysis, the 
responsibility for violent crime was attributed to the presence of blacks rather than to the racist 
perpetrators.  The logic cited suggests that if black immigrants were not present in Britain the 
violence against them would never have taken place, thus black immigrants are the cause of 
escalating crime.   A connection is established between race, immigration and crime, initiating a 
security discourse that constructs immigrants as a criminal threat to domestic security.  The 
posited solution was to restrict the immigration of blacks into Britain rather than addressing the 
racism apparent in the white population during the 1960s and 1970s (Hayter, 2004).  
In the 1970s and 1980s, further restrictions saw a focus on who was eligible to enter 
Britain, with labour immigration only marginally restricted.  However the restriction that was 
enacted comprised a visa programme that privileged white Europeans over immigrants from 
former colonies in Africa, Asia, and the West Indies (Geddes 2003). Humanitarian immigration 
processes fell under the guidelines of the 1971 Immigration Act and there was no distinct asylum 
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policy until the early 1990s.  Asylum categories were then developed during the early 1990s that 
restricted the liberal policy that had been applied to Eastern Europeans fleeing communism 
(Geddes 2003).  After the collapse of the Soviet Union it was not in the interests of the liberal 
states to permit entry, as refugees were no longer comprised of political opponents to 
communism. Furthermore, the identity of liberal democracies that had relied on an opposition to 
communist authoritarianism was in flux. The interests in advanced industrialized states changed, 
as did the profile of the refugee.  There was no longer anything to be gained politically from a 
liberal entry policy given that liberalism no longer appeared threatened by communism.  The 
illiberal Soviet Union had collapsed and so the positive characteristics of a liberal identity no 
longer needed to be emphasized. 
Separate asylum and refugee processes were implemented in the early 1990s as a 
response to growing numbers of arrivals. These policies have since become increasingly 
restrictive and gradually more securitized in the UK.  The 1993 Immigration and Asylum Act in 
Britain aimed to reduce the growing backlog of asylum applications and to deter so-called 
―bogus‖ asylum seekers (UK Parliament 1993).   Subsequent acts have repeated and reinforced 
these aims, emphasizing the goal of deterring ―bogus‖ asylum seekers.  The first immigration 
legislation that New Labour implemented after taking office in 1997 was the 1999 Immigration 
and Asylum Act.  A principal element of this bill that has shaped asylum seeker experiences in 
Britain is the forced dispersal bill.  This bill promulgates that asylum seekers are to be dispersed 
into assigned housing across the country with the intention that no concentrations of asylum 
seekers should develop.  The Home Office, which is responsible for the dispersal programme 
does not take the preferences of asylum seekers into account, meaning that if an asylum seeker 
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would like to remain with family or join a familiar community it is not factored into the 
government decision making procedures (UK Parliament 1999). 
In the late nineties New Labour published a White Paper entitled Firmer, Faster, Fairer, 
which characterized the party‘s stance on immigration  This White Paper casts suspicion on 
asylum seekers as being economically motivated and making fraudulent asylum claims with the 
intention of accessing the British welfare state.  Alleged real-life examples are used to 
demonstrate failed asylum seekers whose story is ―a tissue of lies‖ making repeated appeals in 
order to stay in the country longer (New Labour 1998: 1.4).  Furthermore, the White Paper 
claims that ―illegal‖ migrants arrive ―with no legitimate source of income and resort to crime to 
survive‖, casting the migrant as a potential criminal (New Labour 1998: 1.18). 
The Home Office published a second white paper in 2002, entitled Secure Borders, Safe 
Haven, and this established a linkage with questions of national security.  The 2002 white paper 
connects the idea that the asylum system is vulnerable to fraud with the need to strengthen the 
borders and to keep incoming migrants out.   Don Flynn points out that, despite the positive 
rhetoric of the benefits of diversity in the introduction to the White Paper, the White Paper 
understands ―migration as a dire threat to British society, rather than its modernizing salvation‖ 
(Flynn 2005:473).  The situation portrayed is one of a large pool of criminal migrants who 
threaten UK interests and provoke the need for restrictive measures.  Both the concern that 
migrants are motivated by the welfare state and the notion of criminal migrants are reflected in 
subsequent legislation.   
The Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act of 2002 removed the option of asylum 
seekers receiving welfare unless they are receiving housing.  To receive benefits an asylum 
seeker must accept government provided accommodation and remain in that accommodation, 
 
84 
 
accepting the location to which he or she is dispersed.  Both Doty (2003) and Stevens (2004) 
address the dispersal programme, looking at the idea that the government wants to be aware of 
the whereabouts of asylum seekers at all times.  Such a way of policing asylum seekers and 
managing their whereabouts contributes to the construction of asylum seekers as a suspect 
population.  Additionally, the increased observation differentiates migrants from British society, 
and the position of asylum seekers on the margins of British social life is perpetuated.  
The policing of the immigration system and of asylum applicants in particular is taken 
further by the 2002 Act, which authorizes government agents to enter and search an asylum 
seeker‘s place of residence at any time, further separating the experiences and rights of asylum 
seekers from the experiences of citizens or even those who immigrate in any other status (Doty 
2003).  Further to this, the 2002 Act initiated the creation of asylum seeker accommodation 
centres.  These centres provide for the needs of the asylum seekers as determined by the 
government.  Accommodation in these centres lasts from nine months to one year and 
institutionalizes the immigrant, separating him or her from the rest of society.  This essentially 
puts an asylum seeker through a normalization programme before he or she is allowed access to 
the rest of British life.  The asylum seekers are under more intense surveillance than the 
population because they are perceived as outsiders.  The security element extends to the asylum 
seekers through a suspicion engendered within society.  They are excluded from the normal 
societal institutions and have their own separate institutions provided, to protect society from 
being overwhelmed by the perceived influx.  Stevens describes the accommodation centres as 
different from detention centres, or removal centres as they are now known.  In asylum seeker 
accommodation centres the residents are not detained, but do have to meet requirements 
reporting their whereabouts.  The centres provide ―full board accommodation, access to health 
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care, religious facilities, education, interpreters, and legal advice, plus anything else the 
Secretary of State decides ought to be provided for ‗proper occupation‘ or ‗maintaining good 
order.‘‖  The idea that asylum seekers must be separated from the population in order to maintain 
order plays into the view that societal security represented by society‘s ability to reproduce itself 
would be fundamentally disrupted by the incomers.  Children of asylum seekers are educated 
within the accommodation centres ―to prevent them ‗swamping‘ local schools‖ (Stevens 2004, 
citing former Home Secretary David Blunkett). Again this demonstrates that asylum seekers are 
differentiated from the remainder of the population and emphasizes the idea that social stability 
is disrupted by asylum seekers.  A special report by the Institute of Race Relations in 2000 
discusses how the framing of the discourse in terms of ―swamping‖ or ―flooding‖ creates a 
negative perception in the population and incites fear.  Rather than framing the dispersal process 
in positive tones of diversity and multiculturalism, the discourse engenders a culture of fear and 
suggests that asylum seekers need to be dispersed to avoid overwhelming the local populations. 
The notion of ―swamping‖ suggests that large numbers of incomers will undermine societal 
security by disrupting societal reflexivity, that is, the ability of society and social practices to 
reproduce themselves and be reproduced by the members of society thus establishing a 
recognizable social and national identity (Waever 1993).  Asylum seekers are a ―managed‖ 
population that is separate and distinct from the British population.  They are in the physical 
territory of Britain but cannot participate in British daily life.  
The question of access to social benefits is raised within the legislation as the idea that 
asylum seekers are economically motivated arises.  In terms of social benefits, the 2002 Act 
rolled back entitlement and tightened the mechanisms of accessing benefits for asylum seekers.  
It introduced the stipulation that one would only be able to access benefits if the claim for 
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asylum was made ―as soon as reasonably practical‖.  While the wording remains subjective, 
Stevens points out that the wording appears to have been interpreted to mean ―immediately on 
arrival‖ (Stevens 2004).  If an asylum seeker does not make their claim to asylum known 
immediately upon arrival then they are often considered to have missed the period in which they 
can access support.  
The policing that appeared in the 2002 act was extended in the Asylum and Immigration 
Act 2004, which further narrowed the potential for appeals and more importantly created 
criminal sanctions for those who arrive without travel documents.  The attachment of criminality 
to immigration becomes further solidified in subsequent acts, making asylum seekers not just 
suspect characters, but potentially criminal.  The Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 
made some changes to the appeal process, allowing for two opportunities to appeal an 
immigration decision, one at the time of decision and a second after the decision to remove the 
applicant.  This act also introduced the right for immigration officers to require examination 
through biometric methods such as fingerprinting. The UK Borders Act of 2007 increased 
immigration officers‘ powers of detention, search and arrest, replicating the  pattern of 
criminalization in immigration law and the introduction of policing powers at the borders.  The 
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act of 2008 solidified the relationship between crime and 
immigration in legislation, and the immigration aspects of this act refer particularly to ―foreign 
criminals‖ and designate special immigration status to those detained or convicted of a crime.  
The most recent immigration bill was the Borders, Citizenship, and Immigration Act of 
2009, which emphasized selective migration and earning the right to stay.  A main function of 
this Act was to reform the appeals process into a single option of appeal with heavy restrictions.  
It also implemented the requirement that a foreign national submit to a medical examination on 
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entry, if requested.  Measures such as the medical exam in this act further separate asylum 
seekers from British society, directing suspicion towards bodily health and creating the idea that 
people from outside of Britain bring with them the risk of disease.  In this context, asylum 
seekers are understood as outsiders who might threaten the health of society, or who might take 
advantage of the healthcare institutions consequently threatening the economic and physical 
welfare of society.   
While the policy represents increasing restrictions aimed at preventing asylum seekers 
from reaching Britain, the question of asylum seekers and ―illegal immigrants‖ has increasingly 
appeared in popular culture, creating a national awareness that does not just rely on policy 
documents and the news media.  This demonstrates the reproduction of the discourse in everyday 
life.  IR and popular culture is a burgeoning research area (Grayson et al 2009).  Existing work 
has examined the appearance of asylum seekers in contemporary film; for example in Steven 
Frear‘s 2002 film Dirty Pretty Things (Gibson 2006).  Television programming has been studied 
less consistently than film; however, a brief look at recent programming shows that migration 
has appeared in current affairs programmes and also in soaps, which claim to represent British 
everyday life.  For example, BBC current affairs show Panorama aired various episodes 
regarding immigration and asylum over the last decade, including episodes on February 7, 2000 
and July 23, 2003, September 10, 2007, and July 14 2008 that focused on asylum seekers; an 
episode about irregular economic migrants on April 24. 2005; an episode about the customs and 
excise agency on March 23, 2005; an episode about border security on December 4, 2006; an 
episode on May 21, 2006 about the deportation of foreign criminals; an episode about 
immigration to Britain in general on July 23, 2007; an episode looking at fraudulent marriages on 
March 24, 2011; and an episode on June 16, 2011 that focused on illegal migrants travelling to 
 
88 
 
Britain.
7
  This clearly shows that immigration and asylum concerns appear in the British national 
discourse that is not limited to political legislation or the news media.   
Some of the most-watched television programmes in Britain are nationally broadcast 
soaps by the BBC and ITV.  There has not been a study that looks specifically at asylum seekers 
and migrants in British soaps, yet the reproduction of social discourses in the television medium 
has been a central focus of the Cultural Studies discipline (Hall 1981).  It is generally accepted 
that soap audiences prefer content that is culturally proximate and reflects their immediate 
surroundings (Castelló 2010, see also Straubhaar 1991, Dunleavy 2005, La Pastina and 
Straubhaar 2005).  In recent years, immigration themes have appeared in British soaps; for 
example, BBC soap Eastenders broadcast a storyline about an illegal immigrant from Nigeria in 
2010-2011.  ITV‘s Coronation Street broadcast an illegal immigration storyline in 2007; and the 
less-popular soap offered by Channel 4 Emmerdale featured an illegal immigration storyline in 
2009.  These television programmes represent British culture and frequently receive the highest 
numbers of viewers.
8
  The storylines featured can be considered influential and influenced by the 
national discourse on these different themes.
 
    The storylines establish the reality of ―illegal‖ 
immigration in Britain and reflect the fact that immigration is a topic of national concern.  
 
Political discourse 
I analyze the discourse of British policy makers and officials with regard to asylum 
seekers and migrants coming to Britain to get an idea of the construction of security.  I code data 
from 2008 until the present.  I begin with some predetermined codes relating to security because 
I do not expect to observe the origin of the concept in the limited time frame I analyze, given the 
                                                   
7 Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/panorama/hi/default.stm 
8 Figures from the Broadcasters Audience Research Board (www.barb.co.uk) 
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history and development of British immigration law over recent decades.  The idea of the 
securitization of immigration does not emerge spontaneously but has been built and reproduced 
over time, combining discourses of economic threat and criminal threat which is then translated 
into a discourse of border protection.  The predetermined codes I used were ―state security,‖ 
―terrorism,‖ ―suspicious / bogus,‖ ―illegal / criminal,‖ and ―threat‖ which I divided into three 
subcategories: economic, physical (relating to crime), and identity which I also interpret as social 
and societal cohesion.  I also open coded, adding categories ―responsibility‖, ―limiting access‖ 
and ―separation / difference‖.    The data I code include the party conference speeches of party 
leaders for Labour, Liberal Democrats, and Conservatives from the years 2008, 2009, and 2010.  
These speeches are designed to clarify the party position on the current issues and the party 
strategy for the upcoming year.  I code Standard Notes of the House of Commons over the years 
2008-2011 on any aspect relating to asylum seeker policy.  These standard notes are designed to 
communicate the content of legislation and committee debates to the members of parliament ―in 
support of their parliamentary duties.‖  I understand these to be a means of communication 
between policy makers and therefore representative of the generalized discourse used on this 
topic.  Many different perspectives are summarized in these documents; they are non-partisan 
and frequently present the findings of focus groups and research think-tanks.  I considered them 
appropriate because I want to examine the discourse that is generally uncontested and considered 
―common ground‖ rather than an ideological position (Van Dijk 2003).  Finally, I include 
parliamentary debate data from the debates regarding the most recent immigration legislation.  I 
include this as a representation of the current discourse in parliament.  I studied these documents 
carefully for wording that communicated characteristics of asylum seekers and policy 
motivations with regard to asylum seekers. 
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The most frequently occurring themes at the level of political discourse in Britain were 
―illegal / criminal‖, followed by ―bogus / suspicious.‖  The frequency of the ―illegal / criminal‖ 
code points to the trend of criminalizing immigration law in Britain.  The code ―threat‖ is also 
prevalent, with more than half of the excerpts coded as ―threat‖ pointing specifically to an 
economic threat.  Economic threat encompassed all excerpts pointing to a strain on social 
services caused by destitute migrants (see table 3.1 summarizing the data in the Appendix). 
Other codes that occurred frequently although not as prevalently as the above-mentioned 
were ―state security‖, ―limiting access‖ and interestingly the idea of ―responsibility‖ or earning 
the right to remain in Britain.  The idea of responsibility in immigration legislation is something 
relatively new in that it does not feature heavily in the existing legislation but is becoming 
increasingly prevalent in the discourse represented in debates and speeches.  It symbolizes a shift 
from labelling immigrants as ―bogus‖ or as people intending to cheat the system, to a much 
broader burden of proof for all incoming migrants to actively demonstrate that they are 
responsible individuals who will not become a burden on the state due to their possession of 
desirable characteristics, in order to earn the right to remain.  This is interesting in the context of 
existing literature on governmentality, as it demonstrates the emphasis on a shift of responsibility 
from the state to the individual (see Amoore 2006, Lowenheim and Gazit 2009, Lowenheim 
2007, Salter 2008, Stenson 1999).  This shift has been observed in other immigration related 
practices, most notably the incorporation of citizenship tests (Lowenheim and Gazit 2009). 
 Illegal / criminal 
The idea of illegality creates a broader public perception of incoming migrants as 
criminals.  Things such as detention, fingerprinting, photography for facial analysis, extensive 
requirements for registration, and observation applied to migrants increases the understanding of 
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the migrant as criminal.  There is some distinction between ―foreign criminals‖ and asylum 
seekers in the political discourse but because of rulings of criminal behaviour and criminal 
convictions for immigration fraud, the idea of who is considered a foreign criminal is becoming 
broader.  For example, in the parliamentary discourse it is emphasized that it is ―a criminal 
offense to enter the UK in breach of a deportation order.‖  Thus, a person who might not have 
engaged in any other criminal act in his or her life can become categorized as a foreign criminal.  
The rhetoric of criminality and harsher penalties are justified by the following objective: ―We 
want to signal that criminals and cheats are not welcome and highlight the consequences to those 
who abuse our hospitality‖ (The draft Immigration Bill and simplification of immigration law, 
Standard Note, January 4, 2010).  There is concern that the public will perceive the act of 
granting leave to remain to long-term cases as ―rewarding criminal behaviour.‖  This concern is 
buttressed by the fear that an amnesty for long term cases will create an incentive for more 
unlawful entries, or ―criminal behaviour.‖ Where the political discourse links the idea of a 
criminal offense to that of an immigration offense it creates the notion of migrants as criminals.  
Broadly the political discourse plays into public fears of crime, suggesting that if migrants are 
willing to commit immigration ―crime‖ then they are likely to participate in other crimes. 
 Bogus / suspicious 
The idea of ―bogus‖ asylum seekers was prevalent in the late nineties and early 2000s. 
While the term ―bogus‖ does not appear to be used quite so frequently in recent parliamentary 
documents, the idea of suspicion surrounding those who make asylum claims is still apparent.  
Thus, in this section I coded statements and policies that suggest the state needs to be vigilant, 
casting suspicion upon asylum seekers and suggesting they are untrustworthy characters, in 
addition to the more direct language regarding ―bogus‖ asylum seekers.  Within the 
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parliamentary documents there are reminders that ―criminals and cheats are not welcome‖ and 
the documents reinforce the desire to exclude people who ―abuse the system‖.  The 
parliamentary documents outline the extended powers of surveillance attributed immigration 
officers, which are needed to observe ―suspicious‖ asylum seekers and prevent them from 
evading their responsibility to report to immigration authorities.   
A particular practice that constructs asylum seekers as suspicious is the decision to 
provide store cards rather than cash benefits. Through the cards the government can control 
where the asylum seekers shop (the cards are only accepted at certain shops), how much money 
they can spend each week because the money that is added to the card cannot be carried over 
week to week, and what products they buy since certain items are restricted.  For example, the 
cards cannot be used to buy alcohol, and cannot be used to buy items that are neither consumable 
nor toiletries, such as clothes.  The use of cards then reflects the idea that asylum seekers within 
the borders are a suspect or irresponsible population that cannot be trusted with cash.  Asylum 
seekers outside of the borders are constructed as a population that is intent on raising money and 
will be attracted by the ―pull factor‖ of cash handouts. 
 Threat (economic)  
There is a clear emphasis on the idea of asylum seekers presenting an economic threat to 
Britain, given the number of references to the strain placed on public services caused by asylum 
seekers.   For example, a recent document (Immigration and asylum policy: the Government‘s 
plans, Standard Note, June 27, 2011) points to pressure on ―key public services such as schools, 
the health service, transport, housing and welfare.‖   The same document illustrates the need to 
―protect‖ public services through capping immigration.  There are some references to 
employment but the most obvious focus is on limiting access to the welfare state.  It is 
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acknowledged in places that the government has created greater pressure on local social services 
through reducing support and stopping entirely the support of those who are considered ―failed‖ 
asylum seekers, leaving them entirely dependent on the goodwill of different charitable 
organizations.  It is acknowledged in this document that migration is beneficial for the economy.  
The idea is to attract the right type of immigrant and to limit access for those who are seen as 
undesirable.  The document emphasizes that public perceptions in general believe migrants as 
undeserving and the public understands migrants to put unnecessary pressure on services that 
should be reserved for tax-paying citizens.  Politicians appear to follow public opinion and limit 
access to social welfare for migrants.  Current rules do not permit asylum seekers to work while 
their cases are in progress and consequently they are dependent on social welfare.  As a result 
asylum seekers become a target group to limit.  The lack of permission to work and the 
subsequent scape-goating as a strain on benefits means that asylum seekers come to be seen as 
the ―wrong‖ type of migrant, possessing undesirable characteristics.  Thus, arguments that call 
for limits on provisions for asylum seekers come to reproduce themselves. 
 
Security Professionals 
Security professionals are at the second level of Bigo‘s three-level threat construction thesis.  
Security professionals have the responsibility of analyzing and managing threat.  The main 
professional body that deals with migration in the UK is the UK Border Agency (UKBA).  The 
UKBA was created at the beginning of the 2008 financial year, merging three existing agencies: 
the Border and Immigration Agency, UK Visa, and part of Her Majesty‘s Revenue and Customs.  
The UKBA states that it ―protects the UK borders, and is one of the largest law enforcement 
agencies in the UK‖ (UKBA.gov 2011).  The agency‘s focus on security and law enforcement 
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means that the question of ―illegal immigration‖ is of course at the forefront of this agency.  In 
this context ―illegal immigration‖ is linked with state security.   
The objective of the UKBA is to secure the border and reduce net migration.  UKBA puts 
forward three principal strategic objectives: ―1) protect our border and our national interests; 2) 
tackle border fraud, smuggling, and immigration crime; 3) implement fast and fair decisions.  
The emphasis on immigration crime is established by UKBA‘s partnership with the Serious 
Organized Crime Agency (SOCA).  According to the website, ―SOCA tackles serious organised 
crime that affects the UK and our citizens. This includes Class A drugs, people smuggling and 
human trafficking, major gun crime, fraud, computer crime and money laundering‖ 
(SOCA.gov.uk).  The objectives of SOCA implicate immigration interests because serious 
organized crime includes people smuggling and human trafficking.  While there is certainly a 
connection between the work of SOCA and immigration, it is interesting that SOCA partners 
UKBA, rather than an organization with a different set of objectives.  For example, UKBA could 
be partnered with an organization that provides welfare and health services, or an organization 
that focuses on cultural acclimatization.  The partnership of SOCA and UKBA underscores 
threat and security as the core concern of UK immigration. 
To analyze the discourse of security professionals I used the annual report of UKBA from the 
year of its creation (2008-2009) until the most recent report which covered the period April 1, 
2010 – March 31, 2011.  To represent the voice of SOCA I used two publications that 
specifically focused on ―immigration crime‖, rather than any of the other types of crime that 
SOCA deals with. The first is a guide for lorry drivers regarding securing the vehicles against 
crime, in particular against clandestine passengers seeking to enter the UK.  The second is a 
section of SOCA‘s informational report that deals with ―organized immigration crime‖.   
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The code categories I used were the same as those for the political discourse.  Here, the 
most frequently occurring code was ―illegal / criminal‖ followed by ―state security‖.  This is not 
surprising given that the purpose of these agencies is to provide security against threats.  
Drawing attention to threat will of course elevate their importance and consequently their 
funding.  The emphasis on threat is therefore in part to secure the continued existence of these 
agencies.  At this level of threat construction security professionals emphasize risk and it is in 
their interests to do so, as risk ensures the need for security professionals.  
The third most frequently occurring code was ―limiting access‖. Threat was frequently 
coded although for the most part the focus was on threat as opposed to a specific type of threat.  
Hence, I coded the base category of threat frequently, but did not specify the particular form as 
economic, social, or physical.  Furthermore, the code ―bogus / suspicious‖ appeared almost as 
frequently as threat, which suggests that these qualities are considered a point of concern for 
security agencies (for a full summary see table 3.2 in the Appendix). 
 Illegal / criminal 
The excerpts that I coded as illegal / criminal were not always directly associated with 
asylum seekers but for the most part related to people attempting to enter the UK without 
inspection.  The security agencies link the act of attempting to enter without inspection to more 
serious crimes.  For example the UKBA establishes its objective as follows: ―the agency 
prevents drugs, weapons, terrorists, criminals, and would-be illegal immigrants reaching the 
United Kingdom‖ (UKBA Annual Report and Accounts 2009-2010).  Here, ―would-be‖ illegal 
immigrants are included in the this list of things that generally represent serious crimes.  The first 
annual report of UKBA clarified the main motivation as alleviating the threat presented to 
Britain by people entering illegally.  The agency also establishes its role in reducing organized 
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crime through preventing people entering the UK illegally.  Here immigration crime is attached 
to other forms of organized crime, with migrants who evade inspection constituting a suspicious 
population that is associated further with criminality. 
SOCA‘s document defining organized immigration crime incorporates ―attempts by 
illegal migrants to enter the UK using false documents‖ (SOCA ―The United Kingdom Threat 
Assessment of Organized Crime 2009-10).  The suggestion here is that there are pre-existing 
illegal migrants who are waiting for the chance to enter the UK illegally.  A person can only be 
considered an ―illegal immigrant‖ by law after he or she has made an illegal entry.  However, 
SOCA‘s statement suggests that people are illegal migrants before they have entered Britain.  
Furthermore this statement suggests that people who are using false documents are automatically 
illegal migrants.  However, a person who intends to make an asylum claim is unlikely to have 
travel documents given that travel documents are issued by national governments and even 
according to the conventional limited definition an asylum seeker is fleeing persecution by the 
government or an agent the government is unwilling or unable to control.  In other words, the 
statement by SOCA assumes a person is an illegal migrant before he or she has attempted to 
enter the UK.   SOCA also published a ―lorry crime prevention booklet‖ that suggests ways to 
stop criminals gaining access to freight lorries for means of clandestine entry.  In this case, the 
potential migrants are referred to as ―criminals‖ who are waiting to break into vehicles.  One can 
make the case that breaking and entering is a crime; however, this does not account in any way 
for the circumstances or context that has lead an individual to be desperate enough to enter the 
UK that he or she is willing to risk his or her life to do so.  Rather, any individual attempting to 
do so is labelled as a criminal who must be prevented access.  The idea of people who enter 
illegally being criminal individuals who engage in further crime once in the UK is put forward 
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by SOCA; for example, ―Organised immigration crime is an enabler of other types of organised 
crime, providing a ready workforce to work in criminal sectors‖ (SOCA ―The United Kingdom 
Threat Assessment of Organized Crime 2009-10).  While this may be factually or statistically 
true to an extent, using this argument to prevent entry at the borders implies that a band of 
criminal migrants is threatening the integrity of Britain.  Structural social and economic factors 
within Britain are ignored.  For example, the reduction of access to benefits and the removal of 
support for ―failed‖ asylum seekers leaves individuals with little choice other than entering the 
irregular workforce. 
 State security 
State security is a clear emphasis of these agencies, which is unsurprising given that they 
are security agencies.  The first objective of the UKBA is to secure the border and the majority 
of excerpts in the category of state security regard the protection of the border, protection of the 
public, and the protection of national interest.  I coded excerpts that referred directly to the 
protection of the borders of the citizenry as state security.  In other words, I considered state 
security any reference to the physical territory of the state or the physical wellbeing of the people 
considered members of the state, in line with conventional ―negative‖ security (McSweeney 
1999, Roe 2010).  The UKBA annual report describes the duties of immigration officers.  The 
report uses rhetoric that reflects a tough, realist conceptualization of security; for example, it 
describes immigration officers as ―front line staff‖.  It also elaborates on powers of surveillance 
and intelligence-gathering to protect the border, which established the notion of threat associated 
with the border.  Furthermore, the UKBA report frequently groups together the words ―terrorism, 
crime, and illegal immigration‖ to characterize the threats posed to the UK, establishing the need 
for border forces to be constantly vigilant.  The area that generates the most discussion in these 
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documents is that of ―illegal immigration‖, reflected in the frequent appearance of the ―illegal / 
criminal‖ code.  Thus, one might assume on reading the documents of security professionals that 
―illegal immigration‖ poses the biggest threat to the UK. 
The e-borders initiative is raised frequently in UKBA documents.  This initiative requires 
individuals to register online prior to travel, allowing the UKBA to carry out a number of checks 
on them. This initiative gives the UKBA surveillance power over people planning to come to the 
UK.  E-borders allows for the agency to check passengers before they begin their journey.  To 
some degree the e-borders programme undermines the asylum system.  A person who intends to 
seek asylum does so at the border or once inside the state.  The e-borders programme aims to 
prevent ―undesirable‖ people, those without permission to enter, to even reach the border.  
Asylum seekers do not generally go through visa processes, and often travel without documents.  
Thus, they will be prevented from boarding an aeroplane or a ferry under the e-borders 
programme.   
 
Fear Mongers 
The fear mongers represent the voice that disseminates generalized fear across the 
population. I consider the British tabloid press to be representative of this voice.  Tabloids in 
Britain are more frequently read than their broadsheet counterparts.  I coded the six most-read 
newspapers in Britain and five of these were tabloids, the sixth (fifth in readership rankings) was 
conservative-leaning broadsheet, the Daily Telegraph.  The language of the typical tabloid is 
simple and straightforward, making tabloids accessible to the majority of people.  In fact tabloids 
were originally intended to be a voice accessible to the working classes (Conboy 2006).  The 
contents are generally known to be sensationalist, focusing on ―the bizarre, the lewd, sex, 
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suppression fees, cheque book journalism, gossip, police news, marriage and divorce, royal 
news, celebrities, political bias, and any kind of prurience that can be included under the general 
heading of human interest‖ (Conboy, 2006:12).  Tabloid contents are dramatic, emotive and 
generally entertaining, which explains why they are so popular, characterized by drama rather 
than news.  The tabloids also function as promoters of national identity.  Conboy examines the 
assertion of national identity in the tabloids through the continued construction of an inside and 
an outside.  He describes this type of othering as endemic to the British tabloids, concluding that 
the cohesion of the British ―insider‖ group is constructed by the repeated exclusion of a variety 
of outsiders and ―within the general context of the national focus on the tabloids, provides a 
further core of identification for readers‖ (Conboy 2006: 121).  Tabloids can be seen as a vehicle 
for the construction of national identity and therefore national security is a common concern to 
be raised.   
I coded articles that incorporated the terms ―immigra*‖ or ―asylum seeker‖ and ―security‖ 
for the years 2008 to the present from the six most-read newspapers in Britain, all but one of 
which are tabloids. According to Bigo‘s theorized circle, the role of the tabloids is ―fear 
mongers‖ and I expected the sentiments of the two previous groups to be replicated.  This tended 
to be accurate, with the most frequently occurring codes being ―threat‖, predominantly 
economic; ―illegal / criminal‖; ―bogus / suspicious‖; and ―state security‖.  Also of note were the 
occurrences of ―terrorism‖ and ―physical‖ threat.  I also observed a new category, which I added 
to my existing codes, where asylum seekers were portrayed as typical malcontents who are 
dissatisfied with the goodwill of Britain (for a full summary see table 3.3 in the Appendix). 
 Threat (economic) 
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The economic threat portrayed is generally linked to the welfare state and other social and 
public services that should be reserved for ―deserving‖ British citizens.  This reflects the rhetoric 
observable in government documents regarding the idea of earning the right to be in Britain.  
Thus excerpts such as the following portray asylum seekers as a drain on the economic wellbeing 
of Britain, as well as possessing characteristics of laziness and dishonesty: ―Born in Bethlehem, 
44-year-old Qatada arrived in Britain in 1993 on a forged United Arab Emirates passport.  He 
claimed asylum and, within a year, was granted refugee status.  Weighing 20 stone and claiming 
incapacity benefit for a bad back, father-of-five Qatada is a drain on the welfare state‖ (James 
Slack, Daily Mail, April 10, 2008).  This quote presents a negative view of an asylum seeker, 
emphasizing a man who is overweight, has health problems and does not work.  The grounds for 
which he was given refugee status are not cited and the overall effect is that he is characterized 
as undeserving and a drain on British resources.  This is despite the fact that he has been 
positively recognized as a refugee and has the right to be in Britain. A second example portrays 
asylum seekers as malcontents who are dissatisfied with the provisions the government have 
given them (Daily Mail, August 19, 2011).  This similarly emphasizes the economic burden on 
British taxpayers.  Further to that, the idea is raised that to supply asylum seekers with housing 
and social benefits takes away social benefits from British citizens, solidifying the inside-outside 
mentality. 
 The tabloids present the idea of an economic strain on Britain that is caused by asylum 
seekers and is not limited to the alleged burden put on the welfare state.  The tabloids also cite 
the costs of increasing security at the borders.  Asylum seekers are attracted by British benefits 
and it is suggested that if Britain stops giving benefits to asylum seekers then the extra money to 
secure the borders will not be needed.  Asylum seekers are understood to be economically 
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motivated.  A second economic strain that the tabloid media raises is the cost of judicial review 
proceedings and the costs of payouts to asylum seekers who have been mistreated.  The 
suggestion appears that the provision of legal aid is being abused by lawyers making claims on 
behalf of asylum seekers.  In these cases the language tends to refer to the costs to British 
taxpayers.  
 Illegal / criminal 
The tabloids frequently focus on sensational stories related to crime and the criminal 
behaviour of asylum seekers.  While this is not outside the normal coverage of the tabloids, it 
does create a perception of asylum seekers as criminal which is then reproduced throughout 
society.  For example, there are several mentions of violent crime with intent to harm, such as an 
asylum seeker throwing a towel rail at the head of an immigration officer and an officer being 
bitten by an asylum seeker. The article emphasizes the fact that the asylum seeker in question has 
been diagnosed with AIDS.  The risk of AIDS being transmitted via a human bite is incredibly 
remote, yet the news reports sensationalize the issue as a means of demonstrating an intent of 
grievous harm on the part of the asylum seeker.  
 Immigration crimes appear frequently in the tabloid news, with an emphasis on document 
fraud and working without permission.  For example, ―the most likely outlets for the stolen 
passports are asylum seekers and illegal immigrants seeking to establish a ‗legal‘ presence in the 
UK‖ (Daily Mail, July 30
th
 2008).  This reflects the ideas generated and reproduced by the 
security professionals, in that asylum seekers are seen as perpetrators of immigration crime and 
therefore of likely perpetrators of broader crime.  Tabloids also focus on petty crimes committed 
by migrants, such as an asylum seeker stealing two MP3 players, or an asylum seeker who has 
been jailed for theft and petty crimes.  Such instances would be unlikely to appear in the national 
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news were it not for the identity of the perpetrators as asylum seekers.  The state of being an 
asylum seeker is then related to crime and the perception of criminality is transferred to all 
asylum seekers who are already contending with being seen as undesirable and undeserving of 
British assistance. 
 Bogus / suspicious 
The suspicious nature of asylum seekers is portrayed through stories regarding unsavory 
behaviour, or the extended measures of surveillance needed to manage the asylum seeker 
population.  The word ―bogus‖ applied to asylum seeker appears in these articles, although not 
with overwhelming frequency in recent years.  Suspicion was also applied to refugees; for 
example, it is suggested that DNA technology could be developed to identify ―bogus‖ refugees 
by identifying the country of origin of a person claiming to be an asylum seeker or refugee 
(Daily Mail September 19, 2009).  Given that nationality is not something that can be tracked via 
DNA this claim by the tabloid media appears outlandish.   
Other examples in the tabloid media propagating the notion that asylum seekers are 
suspicious include that of an Iraqi asylum seeker h is described as having ―boasted‖ about the 
ease with which he and his family managed to sneak into the UK.  The phrase ―sneak in‖ occurs 
several times, suggesting a negative connotation.  An Ethiopian asylum seeker is described as an 
―ex-druggie convert‖ by the Sun in an article that claims ―lying is the default position for 
Islamists‖ (The Sun, March 19 2009 Trevor Kavanaugh).  This is of course a sweeping statement 
that has no basis in truth and implicates by definition people who support Islam as a governing 
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system and by association billions of Muslims worldwide.  Further to that the article gives 
criminal characteristics to migrants from this group and directs suspicion to a group much larger 
than the single asylum seeker described in the article. 
A particular focus throughout the tabloid data is given to the irregular camp at Calais which 
portrays a number of asylum seekers or irregular migrants waiting for an opportunity to cross the 
border into Britain.  The camp itself is frequently associated with crime, suspicion and 
underhand behaviour.  For example, a café owner is described as frequently having ―knives 
pulled on him‖ by the residents of this camp.  A subheading describes the situation in Calais with 
the words ―swarming around a UK-bound truck, illegal immigrants prepare to stow away.  
Challenge them and they‘ll respond with knives and iron bars‖ (Daily Mail May 11 2009).  The 
picture is of a lawless group of criminals doing anything they can to ensure they enter Britain.  
The migrants at Calais are further described as ―intent … to get to what they see as a land of easy 
asylum, council housing, and generous benefits‖ (Daily Mail May 11 2009).  Rather than being 
portrayed as people who are potentially fleeing persecution or people who have been forced to 
leave their homes, these migrants are conceived as a group of economically motivated, violent 
individuals who are intent on reaching Britain to get access to social welfare.  This accuses 
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migrants in general of possessing negative characteristics such as violence, greed and laziness. 
The general suspicion is described by an article in the Telegraph
9
, which asserts:  
―We must re-establish authority over who comes to this country. Labour's 
shameful abandonment of border controls has led to tens of thousands of 
‗undocumented‘ asylum seekers settling in the United Kingdom. Who are these 
people? How do we know that they wish us no harm? I'm sure that the vast 
majority are law-abiding, but it takes only one to create mayhem.‖ October 16 
2009, Jeff Randal 
 
This targets all undocumented people as potentially suspicious and suggests that strict control of 
the border is the only way to limit the threat of harm to the United Kingdom. The headline of this 
article is ―Let‘s make Britain safer – pull our troops out of Afghanistan; the real danger lies with 
our unpoliced borders‖ (The Telegraph October 16, 2009).  This headline links the borders to 
national security and, in the context of the text of the article, suggests that undocumented 
migrants pose a bigger threat to Britain than military engagement in Afghanistan, the Taliban, 
and global terrorism.  While the threat of the military activity in Afghanistan, the Taliban and 
global terrorism may be debatable as facts, they are generally accepted to represent threats to 
British security in the conventional sense of state security.  Undocumented migrants here are 
being compared unfavourably to terrorists and suggested to pose a greater security threat.  The 
threat is then dramatized by the image of hundreds of migrants poised at Calais on the outside of 
the British border tirelessly searching for a way in.   
 State security 
The theme of state security is raised in the tabloid media and perhaps it is surprising that the 
code is not more prevalent given the conventional nature of the tabloids to assert the inside – 
                                                   
9 The Telegraph is the only non-tabloid newspaper included in the analysis because it is one of the six most-read 
papers in Britain.  It has a readership of approximately 900,000 
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outside distinction (Conboy 2006).  Threats to state security are linked to asylum seekers in 
terms of the threat of terrorism and fanaticism, and also in terms of social unrest and crime, 
visible in the co-occurrence of the state security code with ―illegal / criminal,‖ ―threat,‖ and 
―terrorism‖.   
The majority of occurrences of state security coded alone relate to political interactions with 
asylum seekers and migrants.  For example, the Mail on Sunday describes asylum seekers 
employed by the Home Office and at the House of Commons as a ―security breach‖ (Mail on 
Sunday, August 22, 2010).  The Sun also refers to an armoured vehicle that was freighted to 
London from the continent for Tony Blair.  Four asylum seekers were discovered stowed away in 
the lorry.  These examples refer to state security in conjunction with positing the presence of 
asylum seekers or migrants as a security breach.  There are also many explicit links to border 
security which occur commonly with crime and ―illegal immigrants‖.   
Articles in the tabloid media regarding migration frequently evoke military security in the 
notion that British troops abroad protect the borders indirectly.  For example, an article claims 
that asylum seeker numbers would ―increase significantly‖ without the presence of British troops 
abroad.  Furthermore articles refer to the national security budget as part of the economic threat 
that asylum seekers pose to Britain, including the cost of surveillance to ensure that asylum 
seekers do not threaten national security interests are, and the costs of imprisoning and deporting 
those who are considered a threat to national security.  In this way, the tabloid media constructs 
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asylum seekers as a collective that is potentially threatening to national security and 
simultaneously is an economic strain.  This reinforces the illiberal arguments that suggest Britain 
should severely restrict entry, and simultaneously creates a negative perception of asylum 
seekers more broadly. 
 
Discussion 
Asylum seekers are constructed as undesirable in Britain, incorporating national security 
interests, criminality, and general negative characteristics that arouse suspicion and provoke the 
need for increased surveillance and observation.  The nature of the construction should not be 
seen as top-down, emanating solely from policy makers who want to secure their interests.  
Policy makers secure interests though responding to the population and while security rhetoric 
may be evoked by policy makers to establish the importance of an issue to the public, the public 
response will also direct the way the topic develops.  Across the three genre discourse analysis, 
the most occurring code is ―illegal / criminal‖ followed by ―bogus / suspicious,‖ ―threat‖ and 
―state security‖.  At the different levels ―illegal / criminal was the most occurring code in 
political discourse and in the discourse of security professionals.  It was the second most frequent 
in the fear-monger category, which has more occurrences of threat.  Threat as characterized by 
the fear-monger category was primarily economic but also included criminal threat and threat to 
social stability.  The appearance of ―illegal and criminal‖ in the discourse reflects the increasing 
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number of criminal penalties applied to breaches of immigration law.  This creates a self-
justifying hermeneutic, whereby criminality is legislated because it appears in the discourse and 
the discourse then refers to the legislation in reference to categories of criminality.  The 
understanding of illegal immigrants is the case in point.  The rhetoric of illegality is applied to 
people prior to them committing a crime.  The broad group of illegal immigrants is constructed 
as a collective that threaten British national security and threaten social stability and economic 
resources.  Thus, an individual who enters without documents, which could be for myriad 
reasons, is understood as ―illegal‖ or criminal.  The criminality makes that individual 
automatically undesirable in Britain based only upon the way in which he or she entered the 
country. 
The rhetoric of ―bogus‖ has been a part of British immigration discourse since the late 
nineties and suggests that migrants coming into Britain are actively attempting to cheat the 
system.  While the word ―bogus‖ is not found frequently in current political discourse, having 
been replaced by ―failed asylum seekers‖ it is still apparent in the popular discourse of the 
tabloid media.  Furthermore, the sentiment of suspicion it produces is still present at all levels of 
the discourse.  This suspicion is evident in the extensive surveillance operations applied to 
asylum seekers to ensure that people who are not considered ―genuine‖ cannot enter or remain in 
Britain.  The suspicion is applied to those thought to be ―undeserving‖ of British social services; 
however, by generating suspicion of a collective of asylum seekers, the asylum seeker individual 
 
108 
 
becomes suspicious and held to a higher burden of proof.  That higher burden of proof is of 
course harder to meet and is evident in increasingly restrictive policies.  
The threat that asylum seekers provoke is portrayed as predominantly economic at the 
level of politicians and of the tabloid media.  The threat at the level of security professionals is 
founded upon the perceived criminality of asylum seekers.  Both types of threat are bolstered by 
an inside-outside mentality.  The idea of threat becomes pervasive as a generalized menace 
threatening the economic interests and social cohesion of Britain.  Threat appeared most 
frequently in the tabloid media, comprising 22% of all excerpts from that genre and consequently 
fulfilling the category of ―fear mongers‖.  The idea of generalized threat plays into suspicion 
towards asylum seekers and makes popular belief more susceptible to the potential of 
criminality.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates the construction of asylum seekers in British discourse is 
overwhelmingly negative.  The discourse attributes criminal characteristics that threaten Britain 
in general and pose a threat to national security.  The construction of asylum seekers is a 
collective who in general cannot be trusted; they are to be treated with suspicion and subject to 
surveillance.  The surveillance is presented as necessary to protect British security interests.  The 
effects of the construction of asylum seekers as a threat separate asylum seekers from the social 
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space of Britain, provoking an aura of negativity attributed to the group as a whole, and thereby 
removing individual subjectivity.  Asylum seekers do not tend to be portrayed as victims of 
persecution of people in need of help, but instead as a potential unified threat composed of 
calculating individuals who want to cheat the British system and make money from it.  The result 
is that the system itself becomes more restrictive.  Policy makers and security professionals are 
embroiled in the system and responsible for making and practicing the legislation.  Because they 
are participants in the discourse and subject to the effects of the discourse, the asylum system 
becomes more restrictive in general, a higher burden of proof is needed for an asylum seeker to 
establish that he or she is genuine, and more advanced and intrusive methods of surveillance and 
policing are incorporated, which are justified through references to national security. 
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Greece for the Greeks and Greece for the Immigrants. 
 
 
Greece is of extreme importance to the European asylum seeker experience.  Greece does 
not receive the largest number of asylum applications in Europe but it is a very important transit 
country.  In fact, according to a Greek news source 90% of immigration related arrests in the EU 
during 2010 were made in Greece (Eleutherotypia, October 21, 2010).  While this figure may be 
inflated, many irregular migrants pass through Greece with the intention of seeking asylum or of 
seeking another form of leave to remain in a different EU member state (Papadopoulou-
Kourkoula 2008).  I continue to use an expanded understanding of asylum seeker that 
incorporates asylum seeker self-definitions in this chapter.  I include migrants who consider 
themselves to be in transit and have yet to formally file an asylum claim. This expands the state-
defined understanding of an asylum seeker, who is only known as such while the application is 
in progress.  When the application process is complete, under the conventional definition the 
asylum seeker either becomes a refugee or a variation of ―failed asylum seeker‖ who is to be 
removed.  However, individuals may continue to define themselves as asylum seekers despite a 
lack of state recognition, thus they are included in the expanded definition I adopt.   
Greece is a country that an enormous number of migrants travel through en route to the 
destination in which they intend to seek asylum and remain.  Consequently Greece becomes a 
point at which the migrant asylum seeker identity is visible, in a place where a large number of 
individuals understand themselves to be asylum seekers, yet their identity as an asylum seeker 
has not been recognized by a state.  People who understand themselves to be asylum seekers but 
have not yet made an application for asylum characterize many of the migrants in Greece.  It has 
been estimated that 90% of Europe‘s ―illegal‖ migrants enter through Greece (BBC, January 4, 
2011), meaning that Greece represents the first point of contact in the EU.  However, among the 
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90% of Europe‘s ―illegal‖ migrants, there are often people who consider themselves to be 
asylum seekers seeking leave to remain in Europe for a variety of different reasons. 
The number of migrants in Greece presents a challenge to Greek national identity that in 
some ways is more complex than claims to cultural dilution as one sees in Britain and other 
―civic‖ nation states.
10
  Greece can be considered an ―ethnic‖ nation state in which the nation 
emerged from the struggle for territory of the Greek ethnic group (Barrington 1997). Narratives 
in popular Greek culture from the 1830s onwards frequently position Greeks as a race of 
historically oppressed peoples (Beaton 1999).  The myth of Greek national identity is 
fundamentally tied to classical civilization with an understood continuity through the Byzantine 
Empire (Clogg 2002).  This tie to the classical civilization further complicates the national 
identity of Greece and its role in the EU and the ―West‖, given that the civilization of the Greeks 
forms the foundation stone for the understood Western trajectory of civilization (Koundoura, 
2007). Migrants in Greece challenge the national narrative because the presence of migrants in 
Greece shift the role of Greeks from oppressed peoples to privileged citizens.  Further, it is more 
difficult for a migrant to gain national membership in an ―ethnic‖ nation state like Greece as 
belonging depends on ethnic identity.   
In this chapter I first look at questions of political subjectivity in international relations 
theory.  Work in this area focuses on refugees, asylum seekers and other stateless peoples.  
Following the review of scholarship I examine Greek national identity, looking at the 
development and solidification of that identity.  I then turn to focus more closely on the position 
of migrants in Greece and the questions that the presence of migrants raises for national identity.   
I conclude from my analysis of the Greek experience that migrants are left without subjectivity 
                                                   
10 Scholars of nationalism differentiate between ―civic‖ nation states whereby the nation is bound by a common 
political identity, and ―ethnic‖ nation states, where the nation is bound by common belief in blood ties (Geertz 1994, 
Smith 2000, Yack 2001, Gellner 2006, Loizoidis 2007). 
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in Greece, which I demonstrate through a critical discourse analysis of the Greek media between 
2008 and the present.  Overall, this chapter functions to demonstrate where the state and social 
discourses in Greece further prohibit the development of migrant subjectivity, solidifying the 
migrant as less than human and without civilization.  The migrant is not considered a subject in 
popular discourse, and the effect is then to restrict the social and political participation of 
migrants in Greece.  
 
Refugees, asylum seekers, and political subjectivity 
The question of political subjectivity is central to scholarship dealing with refugees and 
asylum seekers.  The idea of the individual as a political subject can be understood as citizenship, 
given that citizenship provides political, civic, economic and social rights.  As discussed in 
Chapter 1, Hannah Arendt notably posits that citizenship is necessary to access human rights.  
Human rights are predicated on belonging to a state according to the liberal legalist view (Arendt 
1986, Cotter 2005).  In this view, Arendt problematizes the notion that universal human rights 
are extant in liberal states.  Rather universal human rights are absent because state membership is 
required to access rights, so stateless humans are without rights.  In The Right to Have Rights 
Arendt conceives of access to human rights as follows: ―the right to have rights … means to live 
in a framework where one is judged by one‘s actions and opinions.‖  Cotter points out that ―A 
refugee by contrast is judged by his status within the laws of the receiving country – to be an 
‗illegal alien,‘ an ‗economic migrant,‘ a ‗bogus asylum-seeker‘ or, if lucky, a ‗genuine‘ refugee‖ 
(Cotter 2005:109).  Thus Arendt‘s notion of citizen rights is removed from the liberal legal 
notion of citizenship rights.  Instead, Arendt‘s conception of citizenship reflects the idea of 
membership in a community, participation in that community, and is more comprehensive than a 
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legal status that is justified by the state system.  The state system, which promulgates citizen 
rights, undermines rights for non-privileged individuals who do not possess legal citizenship.  
According to Arendt‘s conception, a lack of citizenship fundamentally undermines human rights 
in which case exclusive categories of citizenship create people who are excluded from human 
rights.   
Arendt‘s conception of citizenship and rights has proved useful in studies of refugees and 
asylum seekers who attempt to gain political subjectivity in the international system.  For 
example, Michel Budz looks to Arendt‘s view on the centrality of the state in providing 
citizenship and suggests that refugee camps can be conceived of as ―spaces in between‖ where 
individuals lacking the bond of citizenship are stuck in transitory spaces (Budz 2009).  This 
argument contrasts somewhat Cotter‘s reading of Arendt.  Budz views Arendt‘s work as 
confined within the state system rather than critical of it, while Cotter posits Arendt‘s view as 
critical.  However, Arendt is valuable in Budz‘s work in order to understand the limitations 
posed by the state system with regards to political participation and human rights.  
Nevertheless, there is an apparent path to international political subjectivity through 
accessing a form of political power that for Arendt is ―utterly dependent on the relationships 
among persons whose collective solidarity enables them to act in concert‖ (Klusmeyer 
2005:140).  Thus, power can reside with collectives of individuals who act in solidarity.  A 
pertinent example can be seen in Moulin and Nyers‘ study of Sudanese refugees acting to assert 
their status as political actors in global civil society without being considered subjects of a state 
(Moulin and Nyers 2007).  Additionally Isin and Rygiel utilize an Arendtian conception of 
power to think of a border camp to be a space that irregular migrants come together to ―mobilize 
against processes of securitization, criminalization, and abjection‖ imposed by the sovereign 
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state system (Squires 2009, Isin and Rygiel 2006).  In these examples, migrants can access a 
form of international political subjectivity. 
Here I return to Giorgio Agamben and his theory of ―bare life‖ that is discussed in 
chapter one pertaining to refugees.  To reiterate, for Agamben the refugee camp can be 
understood as a location of bare life in which individuals are banished from society and 
considered outside of the law.  For Agamben, societal participation and legal rights are what 
constitute a being as human.  However, the understanding of the refugee camp as a locale in 
which migrants can access political subjectivity as in the above-cited literature contrasts the 
understanding of such a space by Giorgio Agamben.  Patricia Owens challenges Agamben‘s 
construction of the refugee, using the example of refugee lip-sewing as an example of access to 
political subjectivity, contra the supposition that the refugee camp is a delimited space of bare 
life whose inhabitants are less than human (Owens 2009).  I examine the tension between the 
competing conceptualizations of the refugee, albeit with an extended understanding of ―refugee‖ 
to incorporate all migrants who are living without access to legal status.  The people in question 
are not living in formal refugee camps although many of them spend time in detention centres 
and often live in informal camps or ghettoized city areas.  Thus, they are not within a delimited 
space of ―bare life‖ yet they do not have access to legal rights and are often marginalized from 
society.  Furthermore, I look in the context of interactions with a sovereign state, in particular 
with how migrants are portrayed in public discourses within that state.  The above examples all 
examine migrant interaction at the international level.  In this chapter I suggest that immigrants 
in Greece at the state level cannot be considered political subjects as they do not have access to 
social and political participation.   
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In the Greek case there are instances in which migrant individuals engage in political 
interactions, in which they can be considered political subjects, for example through staging 
protests and strikes that garner national attention.  However, I argue that the efficacy of their 
political participation depends on the construction of the migrant in society.  True social and 
political participation and consequently human rights cannot be accessed by marginalized 
members of society who are not taking part in day to day interactions or who are marked in these 
interactions as different or as outsiders.  Moreover, without legal status migrants are often afraid 
of the potential repercussions of political and social participation.   Thus the construction of the 
migrant in popular discourses will contribute to perceptions of the migrant.  Whether or not a 
migrant can become a political subject can be seen to depend on the construction of the migrant 
in national discourses.  In what follows I look at the portrayal of the migrant in Greek popular 
discourses, in particular the print media.  I suggest that the construction of the migrant in these 
discourses withholds subjectivity, creating instead migrants as a homogenous unit. 
 
Greek national identity 
Modern Greek national identity is often traced to a defining moment, when Greeks fought 
for national independence from the Ottoman Empire in the Greek War of Independence (1821-
1832).  However, Koundoura demonstrates that competing modes of understanding Greeks and 
Greekness were adopted at different times, with more or less significance given to different 
figures and different political arrangements.  The conventional narrative of Modern Greek 
history begins with the struggle for independence that culminated in war.  The Greek people 
before the War of Independence shared a collective identity based on common language, 
religion, and cultural practices.  The Ottoman Empire ruled by the millet system, and in doing so 
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maintained ethnic group identities as each millet was a religious ―nation‖ or group and there 
were Muslim, Orthodox (the largest after the Muslim millet), Jewish, Catholic, and Gregorian-
Armenian millets (Clogg 1999).  While the Orthodox millet included all of the Orthodox peoples 
within the Ottoman Empire and thus included many more Eastern Orthodox peoples, the Greek 
collective identity continued to be manifested in periodic uprisings against Ottoman rule.  
Prior to the Greek War of Independence the preoccupation with Classical Greece by the 
scholars of the West filtered to Greece although Greece was by no means at the forefront of the 
movement, given that it was alienated to some degree from the West.  However, Greeks under the 
Ottomans were often exposed to Europe through trade and education.  Clogg describes the interest 
that grew in Greece regarding Classical Greece as having reached ―obsessive proportions‖ by the 
time immediately preceding the Greek War of Independence (Clogg 1999: 27). Thus, the notion of 
continuity from Classical Greece was present in the shared identity via historical myths of the Greek 
people. 
The War of Independence was fought by Greek revolutionaries against the Ottoman Empire 
between 1821 and 1832.  The latter is marked as the end of the war because the Greek state was 
made official in that year.  However, what is known as the κεγαιί ίδεα or the ―Great Idea‖, the 
intention to add all the former territories of the Classical Greek Empire to the Modern Greek state, 
endured until 1922, and the end of the Greco-Turkish war.  This demonstrates an ongoing political 
intention that was shared by the Greek people.  However, the notion of continuity in the Greek 
identity grew post independence.  The first mention of the Great Idea in political discourse was not 
until the debates preceding promulgation of the 1844 constitution.  Furthermore, the linking of the 
Ancient, Medieval and Modern periods of Greek history along a single continuum has been attributed 
to Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, a Greek historian writing in the mid 19th century (Clogg 2002, 
Koundoura 2007).  Prior to the work of Paparrigopoulos, the Byzantine heritage had been largely 
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overlooked in claims to Greek identity.  On the other hand, a popular folk saying demonstrates the 
presence of the ideology in Greek culture of the time: ―Πάιη κε ρξόληα κε θαηξνύο / πάιη δηθά καο 
ζα‘λαη‖ [Once more, as years and time go by / once more they shall be ours] (cited in Bolukbasi 
2004). 
The Great Idea represents a form of offensive Greek nationalism, as it aims to retrieve 
territory ―lost‖ by the Greeks over time in order to recreate the Classical Greek Empire.  
Barrington, drawing on a collection of scholars of nationalism, defines nationalism as ―the 
pursuit – through argument or other activity – of a set of rights for the self-defined members of 
the nation, including, at a minimum, territorial autonomy or sovereignty‖ (Barrington 1997: 12).  
In this context, the Great Idea can be understood as a form of nationalism in which Greeks were 
seeking sovereignty over territory that extended east into Anatolia and south to Cyprus.  The 
pursuit of this territory culminated in the Greco-Turkish war. 
The attachment that Greek national identity has to Classical Greece adopts the idea of 
―civilization‖ as originating in Greece.  This claim suggests Greek ownership of the tenets of 
Modern political through.  Koundoura recognizes the claim as within a perceived ―Hellene / 
Barbarian dualism‖ where civilization is attached to Greek identity.  However, for Koundoura 
the concept of Greek civilization develops through education, wealth, and civilization as opposed 
to an ethnic identity.  Koundoura argues via a Hegelian philosophy of history that the Greek 
national identity that includes ethnicity is a product of the Modern Greek state (Koundoura 
2007). The notion of a Greek ―race‖ is present during the struggle for freedom led by the θηιηθή 
εηαηξία [filiki etairia, or Society of Friends] who fought against Ottoman rule during the early 
part of the 19
th
 Century and are attributed with motivating the War of Independence.  The notion 
of a collective Greek ―race‖ can be seen in philosopher Benjamin of Lesvos, who wrote ―Nature 
has set limits to the aspirations of other men, but not to those of the Greeks.  The Greeks were 
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not in the past and are not now subject to the laws of nature‖ (Benjamin of Lesvos 1820, cited in 
Clogg 2002).  A noteworthy Greek historian Korais produced several works linking Modern 
Greeks with the Ancients, although he is known for rejecting the Byzantine period of the 
continuum (Clogg 2002, Koudoura 2007).  It was only towards the middle part of the 19
th
 
Century that the continuum incorporating Byzantium was made popular by historian Constantine 
Paparrigopoulos and by the end of that century the link to the Byzantine Empire was providing 
justification for the Great Idea.   
The form of nationalism that is evident in Greece during the century of the Great Idea 
portrays the Greeks as an oppressed people over centuries of Ottoman rule.  While there are 
many examples in Greek culture, perhaps an excerpt from Giannis Ritsos‘ Romiosini displays 
this most clearly.  Romiosini can be translated as ―Greekness‖ and the poem was intended to 
capture the spirit and essence of Greekness.  It was set to music and recorded by Mikis 
Theodorakis in 1960, becoming well-known throughout Greece:     
Τὸ ρέξη ηνπο εἶλαη θνιιεκέλν ζηὸ ληνπθέθη / ηὸ ληνπθέθη εἶλαη ζπλέρεηα ηνῦ ρεξηνῦ 
ηνπο / ηὸ ρέξη ηνπο εἶλαη ζπλέρεηα ηῆο ςπρῆο ηνπο - / ἔρνπλ ζηὰ ρείιηα ηνπο ἀπάλνπ ηὸ 
ζπκὸ / θ᾿ ἔρνπλε ηὸλ θαεκὸ βαζηὰ-βαζηὰ ζηὰ κάηηα ηνπο  
 
Their hands are glued to their rifles / their rifles are extensions of their hands / their 
hands extensions of their souls – / they have anger on their lips / and grief deep 
within their eyes (Ritsos 1993) 
 
The idea put forward in this poem is that the essence of Greekness incorporates a love of the 
country and the landscape, and a need to constantly fight to protect it.  Greeks have been forced 
to protect their territory and culture for so long that the struggle has become part of their physical 
make up.  The prevalence of the Great Idea in Greek popular culture suggests that the rhetoric of 
Greek nationalism was reinforced throughout Greece.  The characteristics of Greek nationalism 
include a connection to the Classical Empire through a shared understanding of historical myths, 
manifested in a territorial attachment;  shared language in which an attachment to the Ancient is 
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also implicated, through the official ―katharevousa‖ (pure) version of the language that was 
derived from Ancient Greek and used in all official circumstances; shared Orthodox religion, 
which maintained the continuity with Byzantium; and the shared notion that Greeks have been 
historically oppressed and need to liberate Greek territories.  While the Great Idea was 
abandoned at the failure of Greece in the Greco-Turkish war, later termed in Greece the ―Asia-
Minor Disaster‖, the ideology continues to exist today in specific territories that remain 
contested, in particular Cyprus and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.   
 The reception of migrants is often related to how a state views itself.  For example, 
Huysmans studies security identities in the European integration process to understand the 
securitization of migration (Huysmans 2000).  Studies of European identity of liberal democracy 
have explained the development of migration policies before and after the Cold War (Geddes 
2003). The same phenomenon is apparent in Greece, where Greek national identity plays a role 
in the country‘s reception of its many migrants. The notion of a state ―viewing itself‖ in a 
particular way again borrows from the theory of ontological security.  Ontological security is 
provided by a state‘s ability to consistently reproduce its idea of itself via a national narrative 
(Steele 2008).  Ontological insecurity is then created when state actions conflict with the 
narrative constitutive of national identity.  Zarakol adds the idea that the ontological security of a 
state‘s identity is also constituted through the perceptions of other states (Zarakol 2010).  During 
the period in which Britain, the US, and other liberal states were welcoming asylum seekers that 
were defined as fleeing communism, Greece went through the political dictatorship of Metaxas, 
German occupation, Civil War, and a military junta, all of which  saw Greece sending rather than 
receiving migrants and refugees.  The interaction of incoming migrants with Greek identity is a 
fairly new phenomenon.  Greek national identity has been continuously reinforced in things such 
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as the Great Idea, a number of political struggles, and the establishment of continuity with 
Classical Greece and of ownership over Classical Greece.  Further, as a historically oppressed 
peoples, Greek identity frequently situates Greeks as the victims of oppression rather than the 
oppressors.  While situating Greeks as victims of oppression, Greek identity also incorporates an 
attachment to Classical civilization and an ownership over Western political and scientific 
principles.  Nationalist rhetoric in Greece cannot be understood simply as a backlash against 
migrants.  Rather I posit that the presence of migrants in Greece creates a tension with Greek 
national identity and the result is that migrants are not attributed identity.  More than redefining 
Greeks as the oppressors, Greek public discourse betrays a tension: Greeks as a historically 
oppressed people who have constantly fought to protect their territory must continue to protect it 
from this new invasion.  However, at the same time Greeks might identify and empathize with 
migrants as they have recently been in a similar situation.  Thus there is friction whereby 
migrants and migrant issues are portrayed in the context through which they alternately reinforce 
or threaten Greek identity but these contexts tend to be conflicting. 
   
Greek identity and migration 
The presence of migrants in Greece is inextricably linked to the rhetoric of national 
identity.  Laliotou observes that the growing presence of migrant communities in Greek cities led 
to not just observable racist actions but also the internalization of a ―naturalized‖ racism.  This 
naturalized racism is evident in Greek everyday life, in both the public and private spheres, 
internalizing discriminatory practices (Laliotou 2010).  A particular example can be seen in the 
education system which glorifies the Greek ―race‖ and the ancient ancestors (Zachos 2009).  
Zachos describes the education system as cultivating ―an image of superiority of the Greek 
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―race,‖ overvaluing anything Greek, undervaluing anything non-Greek … and ignoring the 
achievements, cultures, and histories of other peoples‖ (Zachos 2009: 146).  This generalized 
disregard for other cultures can be seen in the contemporary experiences of migrant communities 
who are considered only within their capacity to affect Greeks in public and private life in much 
of the mainstream media and popular culture.  For example, Laliotou asserts that the histories of 
migrants are silenced from public debate: ―It is as if the non-native people who live in our 
neighbourhoods have no present or past history, but just happened to be there, a bizarre historical 
accident‖ (Laliotou 2010:249).  Laliotou concludes that this lack of subjectivity is a result of 
internalized racist practices, asserting that any type of political mobilization on the part of 
migrants is met with radical repression (Laliotou 2010).  The elevation of the Greek ―race‖ or 
Greek identity that has been embedded in the reproduction of national identity through national 
historical myths and histories, as well as through the education system, prevents the migrant 
identity becoming a point of contention and protects the imagined historical continuity that has 
been so important since the birth of the Greek nation state.   
Anastasia Karakasidou describes Athens as a ―city of migrants, held hostage to its past as 
constructed through myths and fables of ancient civilization‖ (Karakasidou 2002: 148).   
Karakasidou reviews work by Neni Panourgia (1995) who argues that migrants from rural Greek 
villages crave the modern rather than the ancient past, and Marina Petronoti (1998) who looks at 
the lines demarking the difference between Eritrean migrants to Athens and Greek Athenians.  
She describes Eritreans as ―modern nomads‖ who ―generally live in unmarked basement 
apartments … work(ing) in domestic service for upper-middle class Greek households‖ 
(Karakasidou 2002: 151).There are two points of significance for contemporary migrant 
experiences here.  The first is the notion of modern nomads.  The majority of migrants who 
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arrive in Greece do not consider Greece their desired country of final destination.  This augments 
the number of undocumented migrants whether or not they consider themselves to be seeking 
asylum.  Because many of the individuals do not wish to remain in Greece but to instead intend 
to join family elsewhere, or intend to travel to a location with a familiar language, they attempt 
to avoid being detected by the authorities because European law dictates that they must seek 
asylum in the first state of arrival within EU borders.  They remain nomadic and therefore unable 
or unwilling to seek assistance.  The second point of note is the dislocation between physical 
territorial borders and sociocultural borders.  Karakasidou and Petronoti observe this 
phenomenon in the case of Eritrean migrants, who, despite their presence within Greek territorial 
borders, are unable to cross the sociocultural boundaries due to ―poor language skills and 
resistance to linguistic diversity, … discrimination in labour and housing markets, … 
overcrowded living conditions, and ... intra-ethnic marginalization and nativist discrimination‖ 
(Karakasidou 2002).  Thus, migrants in Greece are not easily absorbed into the social and 
political life, while at the same time any form of mobilization on the part of migrants tends to be 
repressed.   However, over the last decade the number of migrants arriving in Greece has 
increased significantly.  In fact, between 2003 and 2007 asylum applications in Greece increased 
by 185%, and as cited above an estimated 90% of ―illegal‖ migrants to Europe pass through 
Greece (Papadopoulou-Kourkoula 2008).  Unsurprisingly, migrant-related stories appear 
frequently in the news media and migrant-related political questions arise and become a tool of 
politics, the most notable event being the establishment of a nationalist party 2002.  In the 
following section I examine the portrayal of the migrant in Greek popular discourse in the news 
media to examine how migrants in Greece are portrayed.  I ultimately ask what the effect this 
portrayal has on asylum seekers‘ access to rights.  
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Discourse analysis: the Greek media 
In this section I use the tools of critical discourse analysis to examine the continued 
production of the migrants without subjectivity in Greece.  As detailed in the introduction, 
critical discourse analysis critically examines language understood as discursive events (Locke 
2004).  For Fairclough, a discourse is ―a practice not just of representing the world but of 
signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning‖ (Fairclough 1992:64).  
The receiver of the meaning is implicated in the constitution of meaning: discourse constitutes 
meaning through collective understandings and the acceptance or rejection of a particular 
construction of meaning (Locke 2004, Fairclough 1992).  Fairclough defines discourse as 
practice in that meaning is constructed in communication or ―verbal and non-verbal signifying 
systems‖ (Fairclough 1992).  Non verbal signifying systems include human activities such as 
collective memberships – belonging to an organization or group – which are also understood as 
discursive practices (Fairclough 1992, Gee 1996, Locke 2004).  To summarize, discourse is not 
limited to verbal communication but is much thicker: ―discourses are … ‗ways of being in the 
world‘; they are ‗forms of life.‘  They are, thus, always and everywhere social and products of 
social histories‖ (Gee 1996, cited in Locke 2004).  Here the ―way of being in the world‖ that I 
examine is the way for Greece, understood as a national collective, to exist with migrants.  By 
the term national collective, I refer to the state and society that defines itself through the shared 
national and cultural myths and historical narratives, as detailed above.  I look at the portrayal of 
migrants in this context as an abstract body rather than as individuals who have identities and 
personal histories.  I argue that the construction of migrants into a faceless collective 
demonstrates the lack of political subjectivity for migrants in Greece.  The discourse in the media 
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in demonstrative of the way Greece exists with migrants because it influences and is influenced 
by the way migrant presence is absorbed into the national quotidian existence.  I understand the 
media not as the agency constructing migrant identities.  Rather the media is implicit in and 
subject to the practice of the hermeneutic reproduction of the meaning of migrant identities in 
everyday life.  Thus I analyze the media as representative of the discourse, not actively creating 
the discourse.  
 In order to go about interpreting a given discourse, one must recognize the genre, or form 
of construction; the context; the social complicity between the maker and the receiver; the 
expectation of the participants; and the rules in which the discourse is constructed (Locke 2004).  
In order to examine migrants‘ lack of subjectivity in Athens, I understand the makers of the 
discourse to be the media, those who construct the discourse of public life such as politicians, 
policy makers, and public figures, and those who practice the meanings in everyday life.  The 
population who do not interact with migrants but digest the portrayal of migrants as a faceless 
mass thus reproduce the discourse.  In this way the discourses implicit in popular culture and in 
private life further reproduce the way migrant presence is absorbed into quotidian existence.  For 
example, Laliotou demonstrates the appearance of migrants in contemporary Greek soaps, which 
were incorporated to present a realistic interpretation of Greek life.  The physical presence of 
migrants is visible.  However, the migrant characters tend to be in subservient roles or 
stereotypes that internalize racist or xenophobic connotations of racial, ethnic, and sexual 
otherness (Laliotou 2010).  They are not attributed individual subjectivity outside of the 
stereotypes applied to migrants.     
 I use a single discourse genre in this analysis, that of the print media.  I analyze articles 
from the two most widely read Greek newspapers from 2008 to the present, looking at the 
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articles that score over 50% relevancy with regard to the subject matter of migrants.
11
  I adopt the 
word κεηαλάζηεο (metanastes) or immigrants
12
 rather than πξνζθύγεο (prosfiges) or refugees 
because there are a large number of migrants in Greece who are seeking asylum but do not wish 
to do so within Greece and instead wish to go elsewhere in Europe. Thus they become 
categorized legally as ―undocumented migrants‖ or, more frequently as παξάλνκεο κεηαλάζηεο 
(paranomes metanastes), meaning ―illegal migrants.‖ In the discourse analysis I do not focus on 
any particular ―meaning term‖ that was constructed but look to the portrayal of migrants as 
without subjectivity, which is less tangible. Thus I examine the context in which migrants appear 
and the different themes that emerge with relation to migrants.   
I used open coding of the data to develop an understanding of the principle topics and 
themes that arise with regard to migrants.  I did not pre-generate themes because the 
phenomenon I was looking for was a lack of migrant subjectivity rather than a positive repeated 
occurrence of a theme.  Open coding the articles meant that I could identify the most prolific 
themes in articles that deal with migrants in Greece, and then look at the common portrayal of 
migrants within and across these different themes.  The theme that most frequently occurred was 
―politicians / immigration professionals‖ which included any reference to policy or a political 
stance from government officials and professionals that consult on immigration matters who are 
not in an advocacy role, such as non-advocacy affiliated research organizations, and security 
professionals who are not elected officials.  The second most frequent code was ―migrant 
political action‖ which referred to organized action on the part of migrants for rights.  These 
articles featured two main topic areas: the first was the vote for second generation migrants and, 
                                                   
11 I set the boundary at 50% as I felt at this the data was saturated.  At this point articles regarding migratory species 
of fish and other unrelated phenomena tended to proliferate. 
12 While the word κεηαλάζηεο can be translated as ―migrants‖, I generally translate it as ―immigrants‖ given the 
context of its use in relation to the English use of the same words. 
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while this topic area is removed from the asylum seeker question that is the primary subject of 
this research, the topic is relevant because it relates to the role of Greek identity that contributes 
to a theoretical understanding of the position of migrants in Greece.  The second topic area refers 
to a hunger strike that lasted 44 days during which migrants protested for the right to remain in 
Greece.  The hunger strike took place in January and February 2011, and was featured 
significantly more heavily in left-leaning Eleutherotypia.  Other important themes that surfaced 
included ―migrant / Greek relations‖ which included segments that detailed the relationship 
between Greeks and migrants, and ―legal / illegal‖ which included any segment that referred to 
the legal status of migrants in Greece.  
 In order to identify a lack of migrant subjectivity I look at two separate themes that can 
be understood as representing migrant subjectivity.  The first includes interviews that appear in 
the media giving firsthand accounts of migrants‘ experiences.  The second is political action that 
situates the migrants as a political subject or political agent, and I analyze the local reactions to 
the appearance of this phenomenon.  In the context of the articles that appear in the media and 
the themes coded, firsthand accounts of migrant experiences are rare.  The majority of 
appearances in the data occur between 2008 and 2009.  Migrant political action appears 
frequently in the media.  Therefore this is an important place to look at the portrayal of migrants 
to understand scenarios in which they can be thought of as political subjects.  For a full tabular 
summary of the discourse analysis please see the appendix.  The next section will analyze the 
portrayal of migrants in the four most frequent codes: politicians and immigration professionals, 
migrant / Greek relations, legal / illegal, and migrant political action (for a full summary of the 
data see table 4.1 in the appendix).   
 Politicians and immigration professionals 
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In this category I coded articles that referenced statements by politicians and immigration 
professionals regarding migrants in Greece.  These articles included the political stances of the 
different parties and political speeches that were reported in the news media.  Politicians and 
immigration professionals tend to recognize the unpleasant circumstances in which many of the 
migrants in Greece live.    The treatment of migrants in Greece raises political questions 
particularly in the context of international interactions.  In the Greek media Greece is 
acknowledged as lagging behind the rest of Europe in terms of granting political rights to 
migrants, largely because of the tradition of jus sanguinis, that is, one has to be ethnically Greek 
to be considered a Greek citizen.  Proposals to pass legislation to grant the vote to second 
generation migrants who have completed their schooling in Greece are met with opposition and 
this opposition is widely reported.   
In the articles referencing politicians and immigration professionals, immigration is often 
recognized as being used as a political tool to serve the interests of the ruling or opposition 
parties.  Greece is generally a left-leaning state, the political right being largely undermined by 
memories of the rightwing military junta that was in power from 1967-1973.  However, the 
nationalist party ΛΑ.Ο.Σ. (Λατθόο Οξζόδνμνο Σπλαγεξκόο, or Popular Orthodox Rally with the 
abbreviation ―LAOS‖ meaning ―the people‖ in Greek), was founded in 2000 with the slogan 
―Greece for the Greeks‖ and the motivation of preventing immigration and cultural dilution.  
LAOS is currently the fourth largest party in Greece.  Much of the political discourse regarding 
migrants in Greece is generated by Karatzeferis, the leader of LAOS.  Karatzeferis claims that 
ruling party ΠΑΣΟΚ (Παλειιήλην Σνζηαιηζηηθό Κίληκα or Panhellenic Socialist Movement, 
abbreviation pronounced PASOK) is endangering Greek sovereignty: 
<<Απηό πνπ θάλνπκε έρεη κεγάινπο θηλδύλνπο. Όηαλ εληάμνπκε 500.000 
κεηαλάζηεο θαη ηνπο θάλνπκε Έιιελεο, απηνκάησο ηελ επόκελε κέξα ιόγσ 
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αλεξγίαο ζα πιεξώλνπκε ζηνλ ΟΑΔΓ άιινπο 500.000 αλζξώπνπο... Γεύηεξνλ, 
έρνπκε επαίζζεηα ζύλνξα... Να πξνζζέζσ άιιεο 400.000 κνπζνπικάλνπο. Θα 
γίλεη έλα κνπζνπικαληθό θόκκα ζηελ Διιάδα, όπσο θαη ζηε Βνπιγαξία>> 
 
―The things that we are doing are hugely dangerous.  When we legalize 500,000 
immigrants and make them Greeks, we automatically have to pay out social 
security to another 500,000 people.  Secondly we have a vulnerable border … we 
will get another 400,000 Muslims. We will end up with a Muslim party in Greece, 
like there is in Bulgaria‖  
 
This rhetoric plays on the conventional Greek discord with Islam represented by numerous 
clashes with Turkey.    The legislation that is being discussed would allow second generation 
migrants who have completed all their schooling in Greece to become citizens.  This legislation 
refers to distinguishing between citizenship and nationality, something that has not been done in 
Greece.  Karatzeferis suggests that passing such legislation is dangerous for Greece, raising an 
economic threat and a threat of increased migration.  Thus, the notion of threat to Greece 
becomes associated with the idea of allowing second generation migrants Greek citizenship, and 
this will add to the general threat migration poses to Greece and Greek identity.  Identity is 
implicated in this statement because the formative identity of Greece is constructed in opposition 
to the Ottoman Empire.  This is emphasized further if the formation of the Greek nation is 
understood as establishing territorial sovereignty for the Greek Orthodox Christians who 
liberated themselves from Ottoman Muslim oppression.  The idea of a Muslim party forming in 
Greece carries greater meaning attached to Greek identity.   
The references to immigration from politicians and other immigration professionals 
group all migrants together as ―κεηαλάζηεο‖ (migrants).  The differentiation that arises is 
between legal and illegal migrants as opposed to other categories of separation (such as refugees, 
economic migrants, temporary migrants or permanent immigrants, etc.).  That the Greek-born 
children of migrants are referred to as second generation migrants further creates a separation 
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that is based on identity.  These children have completed all of their education in Greece and 
their primary language and culture is arguably Greek, yet they are understood as migrants and 
their right to political participation is contested. 
Throughout the extracts in which politicians and immigration professionals refer to 
migrants, there is one example in which the humanity of migrants is of importance.  The 
government accepted proposed legislation that migrants with temporary leave to remain can 
return to their country of origin in cases of humanitarian need (such as a close relative dying), 
and then re-enter Greece without a problem.  While in cases the conditions in detention centres 
are described as ―inhuman‖ there is a lack of rhetoric in which migrants are understood as 
human, or as individuals with different needs.  Conventionally migrants are grouped together 
with the only recurring distinguishing characteristic being between legal and illegal migrants.  To 
understand the legal-illegal distinction as a discursive event incorporates the attachments 
associated with thinking of a person as ―illegal.‖  Migrants considered illegal are considered to 
have no right to be present in Greece and have no recourse to human rights.  This is justified by 
the idea that they have broken a law and so have given up their rights through their criminal 
behaviour.  The discourse of illegality that is reproduced by the politicians and immigration 
professionals is discussed in more detail below. 
 Migrant – Greek relations 
The news articles that are coded as discussing migrant Greek relations frequently distinguish 
between Greeks as an ethnic national group and migrants as a homogenous collective, with 
occasional generic differentiations such as ―κεηαλάζηεο από ηελ Αζία θαη ηελ Αθξηθή‖ (Asian 
and African immigrants).  The excerpts that reference relations between Greeks and migrants 
occasionally report overt Greek racism and discrimination and more frequently report Greeks 
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differentiating themselves from migrants.  Additionally, these excerpts frequently differentiate 
between Greeks and migrants in the text.  For example, the dichotomous choice is raised: 
Πξέπεη λα θαηαιάβνπκε νη Διιελεο θαη κάιηζηα λα ην θαηαιάβνπκε εγθαίξσο όηη 
ζην εμήο ζα (ζπ)δνύκε κε κεηαλάζηεο. Σπλεπώο ηα εξσηήκαηα πνπ εγείξνληαη 
είλαη: ελζσκάησζε θαη ώζκσζε; ή πνιππνιηηηζκηθόηεηα θαη δηραζκόο; (δειαδή 
ξαηζηζκόο, θαηαζηνιή θαη γθέην γηα ηνπο κεηαλάζηεο, θίλδπλνη αζθάιεηαο θαη -
αθόκα- εζληθήο αλεμαξηεζίαο, γηα ηνπο Διιελεο);  
 
We the Greeks have to understand, and understand right away, that we live and 
will continue to live with immigrants.  Therefore, the questions that are raised are: 
do we want to integrate and absorb immigrants? Or do we want multiculturalism 
and disunity (in other words, racism, oppression and ghetto for the immigrants, 
danger to our security and – moreover – national sovereignty, for Greeks)? 
 
Immigrants must be assimilated and absorbed into Greek culture because multiculturalism 
presents a threat to security and to national sovereignty. Thus, the theme of the article situates the 
migrant as a threatening entity which can only be removed through assimilation, or through 
making the migrant Greek.  The individual identities and attributes of migrants do not feature in 
this understanding of the role of migrants and the effects of migrants in Greece. 
There are several different instances where one can see a rejection of the possibility that 
Greeks are racist; for example, a particular news article details that ―Φνβηθνί απέλαληη ζηνπο 
κεηαλάζηεο, αιιά όρη ξαηζηζηέο νη Έιιελεο‖ (Greeks are fearful of immigrants, but are not 
racist).  However, the clear grouping of ―immigrants‖ into a single category that represents a 
threat to Greece here suggests that there is a lack of understanding individual migrants outside of 
their status as ―immigrants‖.  Furthermore, the characteristics of the ―immigrant‖ collective are 
frequently generalized.  For example, an article in Ta Nea states:  
«Λίγνη κεηαλάζηεο είλαη θαινί θαη εξγαηηθνί. Οη πεξηζζόηεξνη πίλνπλ κπίξεο ζηνλ 
δξόκν θαη θπθινθνξνύλ κε ηα απηνθίλεηα έρνληαο ηε κνπζηθή ζηε δηαπαζώλ θαη 
πξνθαινύλ.   Θα ήηαλ επρήο έξγνλ αλ αύξην θηόιαο έθεπγαλ όινη από ην ρσξηό 
καο» ππνζηεξίδνπλ νη πεξηζζόηεξνη. 
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―A few immigrants are good and are hard workers.  Most of them drink beer in 
the street and drive around in their cars with the music blasting.  It would be nice 
if tomorrow all of them went back to their own countries‖ is what most people 
say. 
 
While the article is not overtly applying negative characteristics to migrants itself, it is 
establishing the popular discourse.  Since ―most people‖ have this idea of migrants in Greece the 
article implies that there must be truth to the idea.  The article suggests that this generalization is 
an acceptable viewpoint to have despite it being a statement about a group that is actually 
diverse.  In the articles that I coded as characterizing the relationship between Greeks and 
migrants, the common portrayal sees migrants grouped into a collective that frequently is in 
opposition to Greeks, possesses negative attributes, or threatens Greeks on some level. 
 Legal / Illegal 
The Greek media frequently distinguishes between legal and illegal migrants.  However, this 
distinction does not tend to point out the rights and privileges of ―legal‖ immigrants, in fact the 
qualifier ―legal‖ tends only to be raised in opposition to ―illegal.‖  This means that if the topic of 
the article is deportation of illegal migrants, a phrase might explain that ―legal and illegal 
immigrants were detained‖. The subject of the article is the group of ―illegal‖ immigrants 
although there is a separation within the immigrant collective that recognizes some as ―legal‖ 
and therefore different.  This separation is factual, yet continues to be problematic because it 
constructs ―illegal‖ migrants as outside of the law.  This can be seen as putting them in a space of 
―bare life‖, and understanding ―illegal‖ migrants to be less that human.  Furthermore, the term 
―legal‖ is only used in opposition to ―illegal‖, which is the more prevalent term.  The prevalence 
of the idea of illegality among migrants is then reproduced in national discourse.  To understand 
the use of the word illegal as a discursive event means that the term is not a benign description of 
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whether a person has an immigration status.  The repetition of the word ―illegal‖, the Greek 
παξάλνκνο (paranomos), constructs a person as being outside of the law because his or her 
presence in Greece is a crime.  Thus the majority of migrants, constructed as ―illegal 
immigrants‖ are attributed criminal characteristics.  This idea of illegality or criminality is then 
reproduced in popular perceptions of migrants, in political discourse, and in the actions of the 
police. 
 This major legal-illegal distinction persists in political opinion and in the relations 
between migrants and Greeks.  For example, an article detailing the manipulation of immigrants 
as a political tool outlines that ―Οη κεηαλάζηεο νξίδνληαη σο λόκηκνη ή παξάλνκνη κε ζθιεξέο 
γξακκέο απνθιεηζκώλ θαη κε ζπλερείο παιηλδξνκήζεηο ηεο ελλνηνδόηεζεο ηνπ «λόκηκνπ» θαη 
ηνπ «παξάλνκνπ»‖ [Immigrants are defined as legal and illegal with harsh lines of exclusion and 
with continuous divisions made between ―legal‖ and ―illegal‖]. 
 An important topic that emerged in the articles with regard to legality is ―επηρεηξήζεηο-
ζθνύπα‖, or ―operation sweep-up‖, which is an initiative of the police force.  In the context of 
the news media ―operation sweep-up‖ is imbued with a sense of nationalism as the abbreviation 
for the Greek police force (Διιεληθή Αζηελνκίαο) is ΔΛ.ΑΣ, which, pronounced Ellas, means 
―Greek‖.  Thus the sense that is repeated throughout articles is that the Greeks are cleaning up 
the ―illegal‖ and ―clandestine‖ immigrants from the country, sweeping them out of the centre of 
Athens and transporting them to holding camps from which they will be deported.  The 
immigrants then are further dehumanized, becoming matter that needs to be cleaned from the 
streets.  This harsh action is justified by the notion that immigrants are illegal or criminal and do 
not have the right to presence in Greece. 
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It should be noted that there are exceptions in the news media, which, rather than 
participating in the dehumanization of migrants, instead point to the dehumanization of migrants 
as problematic. For example, an interview with a think tank, the Institute for Political 
Immigration appeared in Ta Nea‘s ―Twenty Questions‖ feature.  In the interview the president of 
the group Alexandros Zafos states that the word ―human‖ must be reinserted into rhetoric 
concerning migration: ―Μηα θξάζε δηαλζίδεη όιεο καο ηηο πξσηνβνπιίεο: «Γηα ηνπο Έιιελεο δελ 
ππάξρνπλ κεηαλάζηεο, ππάξρνπλ άλζξσπνη‖ [One phrase underlines all of our initiatives: ―For 
the Greeks there are no immigrants, there are people‖].  Further to this, an article in Ta Nea deals 
with the potential negative effects of the dehumanization of immigrants:  
―ην θξάηνο ράλεη από ηε δηθαηνδνζία ηνπ- θαη ελ ηέιεη από ηνλ ζεζκηθό ηνπ 
έιεγρν- έλαλ κεγάιν αξηζκό αλζξώπσλ νη νπνίνη, αλ θαη επεδίσθαλ λα εληαρζνύλ 
θάησ από απηήλ ηε δηθαηνδνζία, … βξίζθνληαη αληηκέησπνη θαη απεηινύκελνη 
από απηήλ‖  
 
(the state loses their jurisdiction – and ... the institutional control – of a large 
number of people who, although they are seeking to join that jurisdiction, 
ultimately find themselves confronted and threatened by it).   
 
This article does not establish the immigrants themselves provoking the threat.  The threat is 
provoked by the reluctance of the state to include immigrants and the effect of maintaining an 
underground immigrant economy.  ―Illegal‖ immigrants then see themselves as oppressed by the 
state and in opposition to the state, and this creates potential for a backlash against the state.  
While this posits the inclusion of immigrants in the jurisdiction of the state, it justified the view 
through the threat posed by not including them.  The discursive construction of migrants as a 
threat is still present. 
 Migrant political action 
I coded experts in which the newspapers reported political agency on the part of migrants.  
This is by far the most interesting theme with regard to understanding migrants as political 
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subjects.  There were two main events relating to migrant political action during the three year 
time period I coded.  Almost all of the excerpts coded as migrant political action were related to 
those two events.  The first was the debate regarding legislation to allow second generation 
migrants to become citizens in some circumstances,  The second was a hunger strike that lasted 
43 days in which migrants petitioned for the right to remain in Greece.  
The legislation that was under debate would restrict the privilege of citizenship to children of 
people with immigration status in Greece because Greece does not recognize jus solis, that is, 
people born on Greek territory do not automatically receive citizenship.  The content of the 
debates surrounding this new legislation for the most part establishes that, while controversial 
according to conventional understandings of Greek national identity under jus sanguinis, it will 
bring Greece in line with the policies in other EU states.  Opposition to the movement is reported 
in the news sources.  However, opposition is frequently rationalized through raising questions of 
identity, for example: 
Γηα ηνλ θ. Μπνπγηάξ, πνπ είλαη παηέξαο ηξηώλ παηδηώλ, ην δήηεκα ηεο 
εθπαίδεπζεο θαη θπξίσο ε έιιεηςε ηεο δπλαηόηεηαο ησλ παηδηώλ ησλ κεηαλαζηώλ 
λα δηδάζθνληαη ηε κεηξηθή ηνπο γιώζζα είλαη θπξίαξρν. «Πεγαίλνπλ ηα παηδηά 
καο ζηα ειιεληθά ζρνιεία αιιά δελ γλσξίδνπλ ηελ αιβαληθή γιώζζα», ιέεη.   Ο 
ίδηνο πάλησο δειώλεη Μπηηιεληόο. «Αλ κε ξσηήζνπλ από πνύ είζαη, ιέσ 
Μπηηιεληόο. Δδώ δσ, εδώ δνπιεύσ, εδώ κεγαιώλσ ηα παηδηά κνπ» ηνλίδεη. 
 
For Mr. Bougiar, who is a father of three children, the question of education and 
especially the question of the lack of opportunities for the children of immigrants 
to be taught their mother languages is of prime importance.  ―My children go to a 
Greek school but they don‘t know the Albanian language‖ he says.  However, at 
the same time, he calls himself ―Mitilinian. ―If they ask me where I‘m from, I say 
I‘m from Mitilini.  I live here, I work here, I raise my children here‖ he states. 
 
Here, the interviewee wants his children to be able to maintain their ethnic Albanian identity.  
The interview suggests that Greek ethnic identity would cease to carry meaning for the members 
of the nation, while other ethnic identities are preserved.  Access to political participation 
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through citizenship is posited as undermining Greek identity while providing the political voice 
to establish means of preserving other ethnic identities.  This is cited as an objection to the 
legislation.  Furthermore, opposition to the legislation is rationalized through the idea of 
progress: 
Τελ αληίζεζε ζηελ πξννπηηθή ε θνηλόηεηα ησλ Διιήλσλ πνιηηώλ λα αλνίμεη θαη 
ζε άιινπο, «αιινδαπνύο», «αιινεζλείο», «αιιόζξεζθνπο», «αιινγελείο», ζε 
μέλνπο δειαδή πνπ ζα έρνπλ ιόγν ζηα πνιηηηθά πξάγκαηα ηνπ ηόπνπ όπνπ δνπλ. 
Η αληίδξαζε απηή δελ είλαη θαηλνθαλήο: πξηλ από 170 ρξόληα είρε μεζεθσζεί 
δπλακηθή αληίδξαζε ζηελ πνιηηνγξάθεζε θαη ηελ απόδνζε πνιηηηθώλ 
δηθαησκάησλ ζηνπο «εηεξόρζνλεο», όπσο πξηλ από κηζό αηώλα ππήξμε αληίδξαζε 
ελάληηα ζηα πνιηηηθά δηθαηώκαηα ησλ γπλαηθώλ. 
 
 
The opposition, from the perspective of Greek citizens, is that it (extending the 
vote) opens up to other foreigners, other ethnicities, other religions, other races, 
foreigners in other words that will have interests in the political occurrences of the 
place where we live.  This reaction is not unprecedented: 170 years ago a dynamic 
reaction to naturalization and the access to political rights of ―(people of) different 
origins‖ rose up, half a century earlier there was opposition to the political rights 
of women. 
 
In this context however, the legislation is initiated because of EU obligations rather than as a 
result of action on the part of migrants themselves.  While there is the potential for political 
subjectivity to be established for those who meet the criteria stipulated in the legislation, that is, 
second generation migrants who have completed all of their schooling in Greece and whose 
parents have legal status; the political subjectivity is not for migrants.  The debate is whether the 
people in question can be thought of as Greek.  If they are recognized as Greek citizens they will 
no longer be thought of as migrants. The people in question make the shift into political subjects 
because they shift to a Greek citizen identity as opposed to a migrant identity.  
The second event that is widely reported and offers a view on migrant political 
subjectivity is a group of hunger strikers who protested their pending removal from Greece 
between December 2010 and February 2011.  The portrayal of the immigrant hunger strikers 
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established the people as a group with a political motivation, and both support for and opposition 
to the strike is reported.  However, there is a lack of critical consideration of the issues at hand 
apparent in the reports.  Nor are the identities of the immigrants considered.  The migrants taking 
part in the strike are consistently reported as ―immigrant hunger strikers‖ or ―illegal immigrants‖ 
rather than individuals.  Thus, the potential for the acquisition of political subjectivity is as a 
group, rather than as individuals.  This to some extent reflects Arendtian ―power in concert‖.   
While the migrant hunger-strikes gain a lot of media attention, migrant participation in 
the public discourse is limited and migrant identity is established only as ―hunger striker‖.  The 
explanations portray the hunger strikers as illegal immigrants who are protesting immanent 
deportation and have taken up residence in the Law School building of the Athens Polytechnic 
University.  The residence of the migrants on hunger strike in the university law school becomes 
a political issue in Greece, as the university buildings are known as a refuge where one cannot be 
arrested.  Thus many of the instances where the hunger strikes are reported and coded are simply 
reporting the political discussion regarding their presence in the University.   
What is most striking about the portrayals is not the attention raised by the migrants but 
the notion that politicians are adopting the immigrant question to serve their own political 
interests.  Instead of the issues at the core of the protests, the news media focuses on πνιηηηθή 
αληηπαιόηεηα (political rivalry); νπδεκία ζπληνληζκέλε ελέξγεηα (a lack of coordinated effort); ε 
αζθπθηηθή ζπζζώξεπζε πξνβιεκάησλ από ηελ αδξάλεηα ή από ιαλζαζκέλνπο θαη αδηέμνδνπο 
ρεηξηζκνύο επί ζεηξά εηώλ ζηα δεηήκαηα πνπ ζρεηίδνληαη κε ηε κεηαλάζηεπζε (A massive 
accumulation of problems caused by inertia and by wrong and blind management of immigration 
related matters for several years); and ε θνβηθή, γξαθεηνθξαηηθή θαη αλαπνηειεζκαηηθή 
κεηαλαζηεπηηθή πνιηηηθή (the phobic, insufficient, and bureaucratic politics of asylum).  More 
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simply put, the migrant protests are reported in the media in relation to the political climate.  
Rather than portraying the migrants as political subjects with a political agenda, the protest itself 
becomes a political object around which different political parties serve their interests.  Thus, 
rather than establishing political subjectivity in the national discourse, the migrants remain a 
faceless political issue.
13
 
 
Conclusion. 
This chapter has explored the question of Greek identity and suggested that migrants in 
Greece problematize the Greek identity.  The issue of migration towards Greece is prevalent in 
the news media and there are multiple stories reported in which migrants represent the principle 
subject matter.  However, migrants are not given subjectivity or a strong identity.  The discourse 
analysis demonstrates that the most common portrayals of migrants in Greece that emerge are the 
views of politicians and immigration professionals; relations between migrants and Greeks that 
group migrants into a homogenous category; the extant division within the migrant group, which 
is between ―legal‖ and ―illegal‖ migrants; and migrant political action.  While it appears that 
migrant political action provides a scenario in which migrants are attributed political 
subjectivity, this is limited.  The issues become active in political debate; however public 
discourse continues to construct migrants without subjectivity, making them instead into political 
objects.  The portrayals give little description of the migrants themselves and do not offer a 
critical analysis of the political issues pertinent to the migrants, rather they analyse how 
migration affects politicking amongst the major parties.  It is particularly noteworthy that the 
                                                   
13 However, that is not to say that there is no political agency or political subjectivity apparent at all.  The hunger 
strikes gained international attention, and as a result the migrants were made concessions by the Greek government, 
and were given leave to remain (see Douzinas, C. (2011). These hunger strikers are the martyrs of Greece. The 
Guardian.  In this context, the objectives of the migrants were achieved through collective action.  
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reports of the hunger strikers are frequently limited to the subject matter of politicking between 
parties and political actors, despite this representing spontaneous political action from a 
conventionally disenfranchised group.  In the Greek national discourse the migrants are grouped 
together in a homogenous ―migrant‖ category rather than being attributed individual identities.  
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Where is the human in human security? 
 
This chapter examines extant challenges to the state discourses constructing asylum 
seekers.  In particular I examine the failings of the human security paradigm in providing 
security for ―humans‖ as opposed to security for citizens.  I then suggest a shifted 
conceptualization of human security, using the prism of ontological security to allow 
incorporation of individuals who do not have state-based identities through which they can 
obtain immigration status.  In particular, I intend to allow for the human security paradigm to 
analytically include individuals who self—define as asylum seekers, regardless of whether the 
state recognizes their status.  Theoretically and practically this potentially leads to the 
recognition of asylum seekers in Europe as insecure, and consequently interrogates the 
circumstances that create this insecurity.    
My use of ontological security aims to demonstrate how conceptually this understanding 
can function to shift the human security paradigm away from state and citizen-privileged 
conceptions of security towards a broader understanding of ―human‖ that does not rely on the 
dominance of the state.  The conceptualization of human security that incorporates ontological 
security will question established political citizenship boundaries that are reinforced by the 
underlying paradigms that inform the human security paradigm: international human rights, and 
international development.    
It should be noted that human security comprises both a theoretical paradigm and a policy 
agenda.  These two separate approaches to human security lead to some conceptual ambiguity as 
the theoretical paradigm and the policy agenda are often left undistinguished in the literature.  
My focus is on human security as a theoretical paradigm, although it is necessary to incorporate 
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the policy agenda into this analysis.  Human security, while based on human rights, offers a 
paradigm shift towards a conception of human rights that focuses on individual well-being.  
While the intention behind the notion of human security is to broaden and deepen a traditional 
understanding of security so it is focused on individuals rather than states (Commission on 
Human Security 2003), human security research has overwhelmingly focused on how security 
can be supplied in order to uphold human rights more effectively in failed states or developing 
states, in which the state apparatus is unwilling or unable to provide rights and security for its 
citizens.   A general assumption would be that in an industrialized state with functioning 
democratic governance, human security would already be implied.   
Human security is embedded in two frameworks that I argue impede the provision for a 
―human‖ understanding of security and reproduce dominant geo-political power structures that 
undermine the potential for security for people without state based identities in the form of 
citizenship or immigration status.  The first of these frameworks is human rights, and the second 
is development.  In this chapter I explore the roots of the human security paradigm as they are 
situated within these frameworks.  I consider the power structures that are inherent to these 
frameworks as conventionally understood, demonstrating the tension in that they subscribe to the 
rhetoric of individualistic human rights advanced by international neoliberal governance, while 
at the same time preventing the realization of these rights for individuals who do not have, or 
have become alienated from, state based identities. 
This design of this chapter is as follows: I offer a brief outline of the human security 
paradigm, characterizing the principle debates.  I then demonstrate where the concept of human 
security incorporates and is influenced by human rights and human development, offering an 
understanding of the consequences of these imbrications. Following that, I move to a critical 
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perspective, engaging Mark Duffield‘s (2007) analysis of the human security paradigm that 
demonstrates human security in application as a form of biopower, and as an organizational 
method to protect the global consumer economy from surplus population that constitutes a threat 
to it.  I then offer an alternative conceptualization of human security that incorporates ontological 
security and I demonstrate how the inclusion of ontological security can function to decenter the 
human security paradigm from the state, and allow for the self-definition of rights and security 
on the part of individual migrants.  I suggest the incorporation of ontological security as a means 
of shifting the human security paradigm back to the individual human and allowing for 
subjective understandings of rights and security that are not determined by the state. 
 
Human Security 
The 1994 Human Development report defines human security and provides a useful 
starting point for the study of the concept.  The Human Development Report recognizes that ―for 
most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread 
of a cataclysmic world event‖ (Human Development Report 1994).  Human security and human 
rights, while not interchangeable concepts, certainly overlap.  The 1994 Human Development 
Report proposes four dimensions to human security:  it should be universal, it is interdependent, 
it is easier to ensure through early prevention, and it is people-centered.  The final criterion 
demonstrates a shift from human rights in the conventional framework.  While human rights are 
individualistic, they are still promoted and upheld by states.  The understanding of human rights 
that any given state chooses to engage, whether referring to civil and political rights, social and 
economic rights, or a combination, fundamentally affects the rights to which individuals will 
have access.  The definition of human security given by the human development report involves 
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two main aspects:  ―It means first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease, and 
repression.  And second it means protection from such sudden and hurtful disruptions in the 
patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs, or in communities‖ (Human Development 
Report 1994:23).  Human security initiatives have been implemented by international 
organizations when states appear unable or unwilling to uphold and protect human rights, and 
where states cannot provide for basic subsistence needs.  The Human Security Commission, now 
succeeded by the Advisory Board on Human Security, established the Human Security Unit of 
the United Nations.  The emphasis of the Human Security Commission is to develop methods of 
implementing human security through a concrete programme of action (Ramcharan 2002).  A 
potential problem is that human security issues are thought of as being confined to the 
developing world where the availability of human rights protections and subsistence resources 
are considered inadequate.  Human security at present is not helpful for those individuals in 
advanced industrialized states who are unable to claim rights, including basic subsistence needs.  
People without immigration status in advanced industrialized states fall into this category. 
Human security purports to shift analysis away from state security to the insecure 
individual (Leaning 2004, Newman 2004, McDonald 2002). This allows analysis not of which 
rights are applicable for subjects of forced migration but of what these individuals are lacking in 
terms of their individual security.  Looking at what individuals lack is important because such a 
question helps to identify which needs are dominant, that is, what is the most pressing need for 
the individual in question.  Furthermore, human security is not as susceptible to being negated in 
favour of state security as human rights have been in the past.  Human security creates a nexus 
between individual security, state security and the security of the international system (Human 
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Development Report 1994, Hampson 2004).
14
  As all of these things are interrelated according to 
the human security school of thought, all three must be upheld in order for security to prevail.  
One cannot logically be substituted for another because removing one hinders the survival of the 
others. However, critical scholars of human security have suggested this is problematic as such a 
conceptualization emphasizes the state and the neoliberal, Western-dominated global system.  
Consequently, subaltern populations such as people with non-state-based identities are 
overlooked by these analyses or actively suppressed by these analyses (Duffield 2007, 
Nuruzzaman 2006, Thomas 1999).  
Acknowledgment of insecurity on the individual level makes it easier to identify exactly 
where reform is needed.  Generally, human security scholarship focuses on developing countries 
where human insecurity is pervasive.  In these cases the dominant need tends to coincide for a 
large group of people.  Not surprisingly, The Human Development Report demonstrates a 
linkage between development and improved security.  Insecurity, according to the human 
security research programme, includes subsistence level security, in other words, the access an 
individual has to food, shelter, and clean drinking water.  Insecurity is not just subsistence: it also 
includes physical insecurity on the individual level; for example the likelihood that violence will 
be targeted at an individual (as opposed to physical insecurity being understood solely as military 
or state warfare).  The locations where human security literature is empirically focused include 
―failed‖ states, states in condition of civil war, developing states, and states that have 
experienced natural disaster.  In these geographic locations, human insecurity is considered to be 
                                                   
14For example, the human development report draws a connection between deprivation and discontent that can be 
seen to ultimately fuel violent conflict, whether domestic or international (see page 23-24).  Also see Hampson 
(2004). 
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prevalent and is generally related to poverty or inefficient state institutions and a history of 
conflict.   
According to the Human Development Report, the growth of human insecurity is related 
to human rights in the sense that humans are often unable to claim their rights.  King and Murray 
point out the ―people-centered‖ ambitions of human security and the aim to shift from 
consideration of individual nations to an individual level of analysis (King and Murray 2001-
2002).  However, the starting points listed above (―failed‖ states, states in condition of civil war, 
developing states, and states that have experienced natural disaster) all include the state as the 
basis for identifying insecure humans.  To uncover the utility of the concept of human security 
from a people-centered perspective, one must remove the state from consideration as the defining 
provider or withholder of security.  If the state is considered as the principle agent of security 
provision within the theoretical conceptualization of human security, then the security of a 
human is dependent upon the security of the state and this overlooks a) individuals without a 
state-based identity, and b) insecure individuals who are within what are considered ―secure‖ 
states.  Through engaging a conception of human security that focuses on the insecure individual 
as a separate entity from the state, I look at human insecurity when it occurs within stable, 
relatively wealthy states.  In these locations, individuals are assumed to have access to their 
human rights and human insecurity is not generally considered an insurmountable problem.  
However, if one engages the notion that human rights are applicable only under an arbitrary 
hierarchy determined by citizenship or state-based identity, then a locus of human insecurity can 
be uncovered in these states.  In other words, the rights available to citizens and those with 
immigration status differ from the rights available to people considered undocumented migrants 
or ―failed‖ asylum-seekers.  Asylum seekers are often located in an advanced industrialized state 
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that would not be identified as a location of insecurity.  However, the individual security of 
people seeking asylum is often threatened.   
Human security has evolved since its conceptualization in the early 1990s.  Human 
security as a concept for the study of international relations has been criticized as fuzzy, vague, 
and difficult to put into practice (Shani et al 2007).  It has also been linked to the reinforcement 
of the state as the principle actor in international politics despite its emphasis on human.    How 
to understand human security has been subject to debate.  For example, there are two cores to 
human security, understood as based on human rights and human development.  The human-
rights based core is also known as the ―narrow‖ understanding of human security and it relies on 
the framework of negative civil and political rights spawned by Enlightenment Liberal thought 
(Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007).  The human development based core is the focus of human 
security espoused by the Human Security Commission chaired by Amartya Sen.  The latter is 
known as the broader understanding of human security and looks at the prospect for human 
security based on human development goals such as the Millennium Development Goals 
(Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007).    Migrants who move towards advanced industrialized states 
tend not to be incorporated in analyses of human security either with a rights based focus or a 
development based focus; however, consideration of migration highlights a paradox within 
human security and liberal governance: that states which identify as liberal often employ illiberal 
migration policies that create human insecurity.  I offer the category of ontological security as a 
way of reconfiguring human security in order to move the concept away from state centric 
models, models based on citizenship, and models that are based upon liberal self governance 
understood as neo-imperialist globalization.      
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Others contend that the fact that human security is embedded in human rights signifies 
that it fails to add anything new, particularly to theoretical conceptions of human rights.  Barry 
Buzan argues that there is limited analytical difference between human rights and human 
security, and all that the concept of human security adds is ―the possibility of allowing human 
rights to be discussed in places where that term causes political difficulties‖ (Buzan 2004).  
Human security does provide that advantage in states where human rights norms are posed as 
politically problematic, such as environments opposed to the neoliberal political model. 
However, I suggest that human security can operate inversely, not disguising human rights and 
the neoliberal model of government, but interrogating the neoliberal model.  Human security, 
when shifted away from the state, can highlight the negative effects of neoliberal government on 
given populations and offer a decentered understanding of human security and insecurity that 
does not rely on the proliferation of global neoliberalism but is formed via a different set of goals 
and objectives that can be normatively determined by the individual.  In the cases discussed in 
this study, human rights are not a politically problematic concept.  Yet the implementation of 
human rights for certain collectives is not part of the dominant human rights discourse even in 
these advanced industrialized liberal democracies.  In these cases, one can observe the neoliberal 
model of government operating as a factor that prohibits access to human rights for some people, 
particularly those without state-based identities (Duffield 2007).  Thus, human security as a 
theoretical concept can shift our understanding of the locations and causes of human insecurity, 
critically interrogating the neoliberal global system. 
Heretofore, I have identified many issues with the human security paradigm as it 
currently stands.  Thus, one might ask why it is at all useful.  Human security as a concept is 
useful here for two main reasons: The ―fuzziness‖ or vagueness of the concept along with the 
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emphasis on ―human‖ means there is potential to use human security as a vehicle to decenter the 
study of security in international relations while still conversing with both the academic 
paradigms and with practitioners of human rights and development.  The emphasis on ―human‖ 
further calls for such a decentering.  The ―fuzziness‖ of the concept means that the academic 
dialogue is open to reinterpretation and subjective understandings as opposed to being limited by 
hard boundaries.  I offer an understanding of ontological security which, coupled with the focus 
on human, can give insight into individual subjectivities, and can expose the problematic power 
structure of the neoliberal economic system centered on the political unit of the nation state.  
Ontological security focuses on the security-of-being of the individual in question, shifting the 
agency to identify the most immediate needs for security to the insecure individual.  In the 
context of this study, ontological security provides scope to recognize and understand the 
boundaries constructed by the state that prevent realization of security for some people within 
secure states. 
Bertrand Ramcharan (2002) in his discussion of the utility of human security emphasizes 
that ―security is a secure condition or feeling.‖  The notion that it is a feeling or condition means 
that human security can be studied more easily than human rights as something a person 
possesses or does not, with focus on the individual as opposed to the juridical model or the 
relevant governing administration.  Therefore, human security has the potential to go beyond the 
absolute juridical standards of human rights and therefore to resolve the tension between human 
rights and the de facto structural inequalities that are entrenched by the commitment to the rule 
of law.  While human security can be broken into categories such as physical or economic 
security, a single incomplete category signals insecurity.  That is, all of the categories should be 
seen as necessary conditions for security.  Furthermore, as the focus is on a feeling of security, 
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one cannot equate individual security with state security.  An individual may feel insecure within 
a secure state if his or her security needs are not fulfilled.  Furthermore, it is problematic for 
states to be seen as the providers of security because this creates several levels of differentiation 
and potential exclusion as discussed in chapter two.  Human security again has the potential to 
work around the different levels of differentiation and exclusion if the concept of human is 
inclusive of non-state based identities.  Below I will analyze the human security paradigm, first 
examining the influences of human rights and human development then moving on to critical 
perspectives. 
 
Framework of human rights 
In this analysis, I posit that because human security is embedded in the international 
framework of human rights, the human security policy agenda is subject to impediments 
prohibiting its application, particularly when it comes to subjects of forced migration.  There is 
extensive academic debate about the value of human security as a concept from which to study 
human rights.  Proponents of human security believe that the paradigm contributes to human 
rights by providing a tool through which access to human rights can be given to those who lack it 
(Paris 2001, Hampson 2004).  Human rights grew out of classical liberal individualism and they 
comprise a set of duties states are obliged to observe.  Under the framework of international law 
there is no real forum for an individual to contest their treatment by a state, other than petitioning 
another state.  Hence, international human rights cannot function effectively at an individual 
level. 
 As stated by the United Nations Deputy Commissioner for Human Rights, Bertrand 
Ramcharan, ―international human rights norms define the meaning of human security [and] the 
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essence of human security is to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms that have 
been distilled and articulated by the international community‖ (Ramcharan 2002:1). In 
international relations as a discipline there is an overwhelming focus on the state and its capacity 
to grant or withhold human rights.  Human rights studies in international relations and in 
comparative politics tend to abstract the victims of human rights abuses.  In situations of forced 
migration this is a particular problem because the victims often have no recourse to a state 
willing to provide them with human rights.  There is a substantial inconsistency between state 
capabilities to uphold human rights and the individuals who are provided with access to human 
rights.  Even in cases where the level of analysis is the individual, the individual tends to be 
situated within a state or within a ―failed state,‖ which binds understandings of his or her human 
rights to the willingness or ability of the state body to uphold and protect human rights.  In 
studies that take an international legal approach this disconnect is still apparent.  States are the 
subjects of international law and the law binds these states to uphold human rights for their 
citizens.  However, advanced industrialized states who are proponents of human rights based on 
classical liberal conceptions of natural rights and equality also tend to be proponents of the rule 
of law as established for citizens, and do not adhere to human rights standards universally (Guild 
2005).  State interests are privileged and human rights are often conceived as a contract between 
the state and its citizens. In short, the positivist legalist conception of human rights that sees 
rights as legal entitlement codified in state law prevails.  Consequently individuals who are not 
subjects of a given state do not have access to the same rights as citizens.   
 Under international law there is no official hierarchy of human rights; all subjects are 
presented as equal and certain human rights are presented as inalienable and universal.  
However, when it comes to the application of human rights by states, a hierarchy becomes 
 
150 
 
apparent in terms of the understanding of what comprises rights and in the groups of individuals 
who can claim human rights from the state in question.  In the conception of rights, civil and 
political rights are prioritized in Western states over economic, social, and cultural rights.  
Collective rights and group rights are often not viewed as ―true‖ human rights, and are often 
debated as to the utility of understanding some human rights as culturally relative.  In terms of 
the individuals to whom the rights apply, non-citizens do not often qualify for the same rights as 
citizens; citizens have more rights than non-citizens, in part due to the predominance of civil and 
political rights; for example, only citizens have the right to vote or hold public office.  
Regardless of whether one agrees with this distinction, one can argue that this hierarchy 
precludes the notion that rights are equal and universal.  Furthermore, because states are the only 
subjects of international law, states can privilege their own interests over individuals.
15
  For 
instance, human rights are often substituted in favour of national security arguments.  In times of 
war it is common for human rights, in the form of civil liberties, to be withheld for the protection 
of national security.
16
  State security is given priority over individual rights, with the notion that 
individuals are secure if the state to which they belong is secure, and rights can be overlooked in 
favour of security. 
 The question of universalism itself provokes an issue with regard to theoretical debates 
pertaining to human rights.  The development of rights discourses has provoked a dialogue as to 
the nature of rights, between universalists, who claim objective absolute truth and universal 
                                                   
15 I make this claim as there is no forum for an individual to make a legal petition against a state outside of that 
state.  The International Court of Justice is a forum for states to interact.  The International Criminal Court deals 
with individuals who are in breach of international law but does not provide a forum for an individual to prosecute a 
state.  Other international courts are regional and so do not provide protection for individuals outside of state 
membership.   
16For example, in the United States post 9/11 there was a strong movement for the curtailment of civil rights in 
order to protect national security, resulting in the PATRIOT Act which allowed the breach of a number of formerly 
legally upheld civil liberties. 
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rights and values; and cultural relativists, who claim that human rights are culturally dependent 
(Strauss 1957, Donnelly 1984, Rao 1995, Perry 1997, Otto 1997, Donnelly 2007).  There are 
problems with both of these perspectives.  The notion of universal rights relies on a conception 
of objective truth, the rationalist assumption at the basis of modernist political theory, which is 
not essentially compatible with transcendental, pragmatist, or interpretivist epistemologies.  
Thus, the notion of the universal stems from the European tradition and Enlightenment liberal 
rejection of the transcendental.  The European Enlightenment tradition provides the ―standard‖ 
for contemporary human rights in international law and international organizations (Otto 
1997:8).  The cultural relativist position, while epistemologically compatible with non-rationalist 
schools of thought, can be a dangerous justification for maltreatment of certain populations.  For 
example, cultural justification for the subjugation of women is provided under the cultural 
relativist position (Rao 1995).  The consensus Otto recognizes between these positions sees a 
compromise in international human rights law: there are a set of fundamental human rights that 
are accepted as universal, and then there are the remaining rights that are at the discretion of state 
bodies and so are accepted as non-universal but culturally relevant.  However, there are two 
initial problems generated here relevant to the subject matter discussed in this text.  The first is 
the Western standard of universal is privileged and accepted.  If there are any universal rights, 
then relativists must concede the rationalist assumption of universal truth.  Thus, having 
fundamental human rights as the standard for all states requires tacit acceptance of objective 
truth.  Schools of thought that might not agree with the notion of universalism are then subsumed 
into this standard and lose their autonomy (Otto 1997:8).  The second is the perceivable realities 
that despite using the rhetoric of universal, Western states do not apply human rights universally.  
Human rights depend on legal citizenship status.  Therefore the tension within classical liberal 
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values is apparent.  Access to human rights is dictated via the rule of citizenship law.  Those who 
are not considered citizens do not have the same juridical recourse to human rights as citizens.  
Understood this way, within the logic of practical application, universal human rights are only 
for those individuals who are considered to be within the law.  Thus non-citizens or people with 
non-state-based identities who are considered to be without citizenship law become less than 
human. 
The conception of human rights as universal creates potential  inadequacy in the potential 
reach of current studies of human rights, as studies tend to focus on whether a state recognizes 
human rights rather than whether human rights are implemented on a universal basis.  This focus 
reifies the universality of human rights, treating human rights as an objective fact rather than a 
yet to be realized ideal. Analyses of whether human rights are present remain at the state level.  I 
contend that stateless people, asylum seekers, and refugees comprise a vast number of people 
who have no access to human rights and for whom current conceptions of human rights prove 
inadequate.
17
  Human security, due to its basis in human rights, experiences similar conceptual 
limitations; however, the individualistic focus, with revisions, has the potential to allow for a 
broader analysis away from the state level. 
 
Framework of development 
The concept of human security is embedded in human development, given that it arose 
from the 1994 United Nations Human Development Report.  Development addresses the 
                                                   
17The number of refugees in the world is currently estimated as16 million, with an estimated total of 42 million 
people ―uprooted‖ worldwide according to figures provided by the UNHCR (unhcr.org, last accessed June 2011).      
It is worthy of note that these figures do not include economic migrants as these people are considered illegal and 
may belong to a state.  Conceptions of human rights still uphold that it is not the role of the international community 
or advanced industrialized states to provide for economically motivated migrants. 
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―freedom from want‖ section of human security, with the objective being the eradication of 
global poverty (Easterlin 2000).  The human development agenda was largely inspired by 
Amartya Sen‘s ―capabilities approach‖ which moved away from conventional economic 
aggregate measures of development, in favour of returning to the human aspect; that is, the ―real 
purpose of development‖ being to improve human lives (Fukuda-Parr 2011).  This was 
complemented by Mahbub ul Haq‘s United Nations-sponsored initiative of the Human 
Development Reports, the 1994 edition of course launching human security.  Proponents of the 
human security paradigm recognize the flawed logic of measuring development based on state 
GDPs and aggregate measures of wealth (McGrew 2007).  Human development instead looks at 
the human experience, redefining security as a subjective experience (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 
2007).  Human development abandons the ―trickle down‖ logic that neoliberal understandings of 
development employ; however, human development projects tend to be committed to the same 
notion of ―betterment‖ as is at the heart of the industrializing model (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 
2007).  While economic growth continues to be instrumental to the human development project, 
the overarching goal is to enable humans to live enriching lives (Sen 1999, Fukuda-Parr 2011).  
The Millennium Development Goals grew out of the human development initiative and comprise 
a blueprint to operationalize human development objectives, pledged by United Nations member 
states (United Nations, accessed 2011).  These goals comprise eight people-centered objectives 
that are based on development indicators: end poverty and hunger, implement universal 
education, implement gender equality, improve child health, provide access to maternal health, 
combat HIV and AIDS, support environmental sustainability, and develop a global partnership 
for development (United Nations, accessed 2011). The Millennium Development Goals 
 
154 
 
demonstrate the movement away from aggregate economic indicators of development that tend 
to be used by economists, prioritizing human centered goals (Easterlin 2000).   
Human security is embedded within the human development project.  The Commission 
on Human Security suggests that human security offers a narrower set of goals that human 
development, in that human security is concerned with absolute need, rather than ongoing 
development (Human Security Commission, Sen 2003).  However, a suggested advantage of 
human security is that it allows for security to be redefined according to subjective experience 
(Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007).  Focusing only on populations in ―absolute need‖ removes the 
potential for an autonomous understanding of security that human security, by focusing on a 
―secure condition of feeling‖ can offer.  For example, the objective of human security becomes 
redefined as simply providing care for people in dire need. While it has been claimed that this 
narrower goal gives the term more analytical value (Thomas and Tow 2004), as an advocacy or 
praxis based analytical paradigm, the narrower focus undermines the potential of the broader 
goal of eradicating poverty as it does not address the causes, but only provides for the effects.     
Human security has alternatively been seen as a vehicle through which development 
goals become state policy priority.  Scholars point to the need to understand poverty as a form of 
human violence, in order to garner the same attention as that which goes to military policy 
(Dunne and Wheeler 2004).  This logic suggests that by reconfiguring development into a 
security issue, development goals will become prioritized by states.  State actors can justify 
spending on development, humanitarian intervention, and aid to their populations through the 
rhetoric of security.  However, this has been seen to reinforce the primacy of the state, an 
objective that theoretically human security intended to move away from (Leaning 2004, Thomas 
2004, Bellamy and McDonald 2004).  While the community aspect of human security is 
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emphasized with the premise that living in a community produces security (Thomas 2007, 
Linklater 2005), the continued prevalence of the state as the provider of security reinforces the 
notion of states as the legitimate power-holding community.  This consequently overlooks and 
makes insecure those individuals with non-state-based identities (Nuruzzaman 2006). 
A second debate suggests a concern that human security as a concept will broaden the 
notion of security.  The potential consequence is then that the security dialogues of states will 
lack a clear focus (Thomas 2004).  The lack of a clearly defined understanding of what is a 
security threat can potentially broaden the scope for humanitarian intervention and military 
action in the name of development and democratization (Kaldor 2007, Thomas 2007). Shani 
suggests that consequently human security can be seen as provoking a form of democratic 
imperialism spreading the goals of neoliberal Western economic and governmental organization 
(Shani 2007).     
The principle debates at the development core of human security rest on whether human 
security is understood as an analytical concept to further understand international development 
objectives, or whether it is understood as a policy objective to provide sustainable security for 
groups of insecure humans within insecure states.  The scholars that focus on the policy 
objectives look at the role of the state in the ability to provide human security, and individuals 
considered tend to be citizens of a state or people who can be incorporated as citizens of a state.  
The state remains a practical tool in international politics for the provision of goods and services 
to individuals, security being one of these goods.  The scholars that engage human security as a 
policy objective tend to remain within state based thought and rhetoric (Hampson 2004, 
Seidensticker 2002).  Theoretically, human security requires a shift from the state as the referent 
object of security to the human.  This offers potential as an emancipatory theoretical basis 
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(Thomas 2004, Leaning 2004, Dunne and Wheeler 2004, Nuruzzaman 2006, McDonald 2002).  
However, a distinction between citizens and humans in the provision of human security endures 
(Guild 2009).  This reflects debates regarding legitimate communities.  Clarity can be given to 
the concept of human security by separating the development based policy agenda from the 
theoretical concept. 
   
Decentering human security 
In order to usefully separate the human rights rhetoric, the development based policy 
agenda, and the utility of human security as a theoretical concept, it is necessary to decenter the 
concept of human security as an analytical tool, disconnecting it from state-based rhetoric and 
practice.  Both the human rights and human development paradigms have been subject to 
critique by poststructural and postcolonial voices in international relations theory and these 
critiques can be further applied to the human security paradigm. 
i) Economic organization, blame, and responsibility 
Development is related to the neoliberal organization of the world, therefore the 
implementation of human security goals must contend with this dominance.  Tayyab Mahmud 
(1999) suggests that the development project can be understood as epistemic violence, in that it 
―continually reduces poverty and degradation to failures of technological advancement.‖  
Furthermore, for Mahmud the development project can be understood as was he terms an  omni-
historical reality that does not interrogate or confront geopolitical power  and instead becomes 
―the primary mechanism through which particular parts of the world and particular subjects are 
produced and produce themselves, thus precluding other ways of imagining, seeing, and doing‖ 
(Mahmud 1999:26).  This allows the Western-dominated power status quo to be reproduced.  
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Development becomes an immutable fact and a value neutral process (Mahmud 1999).  The lack 
of critical engagement of the praxis of development based agendas means that development, 
neoliberal economics and goals of industrialization become the desirable endpoint where they are 
applied.  Lack of critical engagement means that this is not subject to questioning.  Postcolonial 
scholars of human rights and human development such as Mahmud suggest that this is part of a 
bigger dialogue, legitimizing the West or global North, while delegitimizing the global South 
(Mahmud 1999, Thomas 1999). 
Mahmud (1999) asserts that both the rhetoric of development and development projects 
reinforce a trajectory in which problems such as poverty and degradation are seen as simply 
failures of technological advancement that can be solved by the ―civilizing‖ effect of 
development.  This assumption is problematic for Mahmud as it does not challenge geopolitical 
power or the effects of the global economic structure.  Rather, poverty is understood as a failure 
on the part of the global South not as an effect of the global environment over time.  Thus, blame 
for ―underdevelopment‖ rests with the global South who have failed to implement efficient 
development projects and emulate the ways in which the global North achieves economic 
growth.    
Further to this, as discussed above, the principles of classical liberalism are embedded 
within human rights.  These principles endorse a commitment to formal legal equality and so 
neglect substantive and structural inequality.  The liberal economic order is reinforced by an 
illiberal colonial ideology, displayed within a set of attitudes attributed to non-Western lives that 
are deemed culturally inferior (Thomas 1999).  The endurance of this colonial ideology acts as a 
force that directs attention away from defects in the international order; that is, if these states do 
not do well in the international economy, it‘s because of some cultural defect, or some inferior 
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characteristic shared by the people.  The following table, borrowed from Chantal Thomas, 
summarizes the colonial ideology: 
 
 North South 
Geographical Here/centre There/periphery 
Cultural Civilized 
Modern 
Scientific 
Rational 
Industrious / ambitious 
―Rule of law‖ 
Barbaric 
Traditional 
Mystical 
Irrational 
Lazy / dishonest 
Lawless 
Racial White Non-white 
Economic Capitalist 
Efficient 
Growing 
Pre-capitalist 
Inefficient 
Stagnating 
 
(Thomas 1999: 6) 
Thus, this ideology reinforces the logic of global development in a paternalistic way.  The 
colonial ideology delegitimizes the local and privileges the characteristics associated with the 
North.  In doing so, the ideology removes potential for merging or dynamic outcomes between 
the local and what might be autonomously adopted from global discourses at local levels.  
Therefore, it removes the potential for autonomy and means that the value of the characteristics 
of the North is privileged and unquestioned. 
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ii) Human rights 
 Critiques of the human rights discourse identify power relationships that are reproduced 
by the framework of human rights and development.  As discussed above, human rights scholars 
are often conventionally divided into universalists and cultural relativists (Otto 1997-1998, Rao 
1995).  Dianne Otto demonstrates that the dialogue between universalists and cultural relativists 
reproduces the dominant standard whereby there are given rights that are understood as 
inalienable and uncontested, and remaining rights that are culturally relative and therefore 
conceded to be of lesser importance, as discussed above.  However, ontologically this relies on 
the assumption that there is objective truth that has been accessed by the Western standard of 
universal rights and therefore is not subject to critique.  The lack of critical interrogation 
maintains the status quo, not of Western dominance, but of the wealth disparity between elites 
and masses.  Otto demonstrates that the concessions towards the notion of universal human 
rights have been made not to provide human rights but to perpetuate the masculine dominated 
power dynamic and the economic interests of the powerful states.  For example, the 
incorporation of women into the workplace in many places has effectively provided cheap and 
exploitable labour, enhancing the globalization of capital (Otto 1997-8, Rao 1995). Furthermore, 
Otto suggests that the argument that human rights are not compatible with Asian values has an 
economic rather than a cultural motivation: a degree of authoritarianism in political economy has 
proved lucrative for Asian style capitalism.  Otto argues that the elites want to maintain their 
comfortable position (Otto 1997-8). Chantal Thomas (1999) demonstrates that the commitment 
to equality in law on the part of the neoliberal global system means that structural inequalities 
that were imposed by the colonial period have not and cannot be counteracted.  This provokes an 
apparent tension in international human rights law whereby the values that are inherent to human 
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rights within the rhetoric of liberal individualism are not manifested in the international legal 
system.   
iii) Managing peoples 
Mark Duffield (2007) advances a critique of the human security paradigm that sees it as a 
tool for the management of the population.  He suggests that sustainable development goals, that 
is, development that focuses on self-sufficiency within communities, can be seen as a mechanism 
of managing a surplus population.  Sustainable development keeps communities contained in a 
position where they can manage their own poverty according to liberal ideal.  They are the 
surplus population who, unmanaged, would threaten the global mass consumer economy. 
Migration then becomes threatening to security at the global level as it represents the seeping of 
the surplus population into mass consumer society.  Duffield distinguishes between insured 
peoples and uninsured peoples.  The global North has a system of social insurance while the 
global South has been developed according to classical liberal economic principles that 
emphasize a free economy but not social insurance (Duffield 2007).  Consequently, the world 
can be divided into insured peoples and uninsured peoples and this division endures across 
geographic borders.  For example, when people migrate from an uninsured state to an insured 
state, they keep their uninsured status unless they legally immigrate.  Given that eligibility to 
immigrate has contracted and immigration laws have tightened in recent years, the number of 
peoples who remain uninsured despite being present in insured states is rising. 
This is where the human security paradigm as a theoretical concept can offer insight.  
Primarily, through identifying insured and uninsured people, it becomes clear that human 
insecurity exists within ―secure‖ states and calls for the concept to be broadened in order to 
incorporate human insecurity that is not limited by geographic boundaries.  In order to 
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incorporate insecure or uninsured peoples present in secure states into the analysis, the concept 
must be decentered at the human level as well as the geographic, to include non-state-based 
identities, non-citizens, and people without immigration status.  By decentering the concept in 
this way, human security can provide a means of demonstrating the paradox of liberal 
governance that is coupled with an illiberal approach to global migration.   
Human security has conventionally applied to the developing world, or the populations in 
most immediate and dire need as a policy objective.  That is, human security has been applied in 
insecure states.  However, the analysis offered by Duffield calls for further investigation.  If the 
human security objective is the security of peoples, then it should apply indiscriminately to all 
peoples.  I argue that some of the greatest levels of insecurity can be seen among subaltern 
populations within secure states.  As is seen in the previous chapters, the state constructs these 
individuals as a threat to state security.  Human security as a theoretical concept can potentially 
contend with that, and expose the lack of human security provided by the sovereign state, which 
instead favours a discriminatory citizen security.  Below, I use the theory of ontological security 
to demonstrate how human security can be reformed to provide insight into the potential for 
security for humans.  Ontological security provides the theoretical basis to decenter human 
security, whereby individuals identify the needs most immediate to themselves as individuals. 
 
Ontological human security 
In order to identify human insecurity in a state where civil war, natural disaster, or 
poverty is not an immediate concern, I turn to an understanding of ontological security.  In 
ontological security I refer to the description of human security as a ―condition or feeling‖ cited 
above (Ramcharan 2002). Ontological security resides within the individual and is determined by 
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security in the individual‘s daily life and societal participation.  Because this notion of 
ontological security is individualistic and connected to individual experiences and identity, it 
allows for consideration of human insecurity within secure states. 
According to the Human Development Report, ―human security … means protection 
from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life –whether in homes, in jobs, or in 
communities‖ (Human Development Report 1994:23).  Here, the notion is that people should be 
protected from these disruptions.  The importance of this protection to the human security 
definition, as it was given by the drafters of the report themselves, suggests that continuity and 
stable expectations in daily life are a fundamental basis of human security.  This assertion can be 
complemented and engaged in greater complexity through the use of the conception of security 
employed in social action theory, with roots in sociology and Anthony Giddens‘ structuration 
theory (Giddens 1993, McSweeney 1999).   
As discussed in previous chapters, ontological security and structuration theory engages a 
sense of reflexivity, referring to ―the unconscious or taken-for-granted skill which all display of 
necessity, in drawing on and producing the routine which makes action comprehensible to 
oneself and to others‖ (McSweeney 1999:140).  Giddens considers this subconscious knowledge 
that configures social interaction and participation as comprising two analytically separable 
elements: these are ― ‗mutual knowledge‘, which refers to the interpretive schemes whereby 
actors constitute and understand social life as meaningful; … (and) ‗common sense‘, which can 
be seen as comprising a more-or-less articulated body of theoretical knowledge‖ (Giddens 
1993:21).  Both these elements are relevant to human security as they provide the foundation to 
Giddens‘ portrayal of ontological security.  Giddens asserts that ontological security is based 
upon ―human wants (that) are hierarchically ordered, involving a core ‗basic security system‘ 
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largely inaccessible to the consciousness of the actor‖ (Giddens 1993:124).  Individual security is 
dependent on subconscious knowledge of functioning in social life, which is inherent to an 
individual‘s identity.  One‘s identity is constituted from experiences founded in social 
interactions and incorporates the body of subconscious knowledge that makes these interactions 
possible.  When this knowledge is removed or made irrelevant through unexpected changes in 
quotidian life, an individual has no foundation on which to base expectations.      
McSweeney applies Gidden‘s conception of social knowledge to security studies in 
general.  He identifies the logic behind assuming a hierarchy of needs in order to give primacy to 
some conceptions of security over others, both for states as international actors, and for 
individuals as the referent subject of security in a critical conceptualization of security.  That is, 
the hierarchy of needs places the most urgent need at the top of the hierarchy.  The aspect of 
security an individual (or state, or collective) most critically lacks must be considered the most 
important to secure that individual (or state, or collective).  McSweeney emphasizes that the 
hierarchy reflects a normative judgment, not a ―universal league table‖ of needs that is generally 
applicable, underlining that the predominant need will be the thing that is lacking.  I argued in 
chapter two that prioritizing the state in conceptualizations of security puts an emphasis on 
negative security (freedom from) for state members, and allows the state to make a normative 
judgment as to what security is, who is in need of security, and who is deserving of security.   
At the individual level of analysis that is used here, McSweeney utilizes the concept of 
ontological security, taking the basis from Neitzsche, who ―made the link between knowledge 
and security,‖ and Garfinkel and Goffman, who ―have shown the centrality of such a link … to 
the maintenance of social life‖ (McSweeney 1999: 155).  McSweeney applies ontological 
security, noting that ―the basic sense in which we must understand the order of ‗the social order‘ 
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is one of pattern and regularity affording the confidence of being able to function, to go on, to get 
by, to make sense of our particular segments of activity‖ (McSweeney 1999:156).  The relevance 
of ontological security is that it emphasizes that an individual‘s intrinsic sense of security comes 
from knowledge of the pattern of daily life, which to some extent can be understood in the form 
of expectations; that is, an individual has a basic sense of what to expect in the functioning of 
quotidian life.  Arguably, knowledge of the social order is necessary to function in society.  This 
mirrors the Human Development Report‘s assertion that disruption to the pattern of daily life 
provokes human insecurity.   
In traditional understandings of human rights, the right to life is more than simply the 
right to being alive.  Life means potentiality, ―the pursuit of happiness.‖
18
  In the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the right to life appears as ―the right to life, liberty, and security of 
person.‖  This implies more than simply being medically alive, and ―security of person‖ can 
include ontological security, as well as physical security, which is dealt with more specifically in 
articles four and five.
19
  The fact that physical security is dealt with separately suggests that the 
use of ―person‖ applies not only to the genetic body but to the other elements that comprise an 
individual, such as the mind, freedom of choice, community, and personal life experiences.  
A key insight of ontological security that can be helpful in the case of asylum seekers is 
that of the structure and agency dynamic.  Rather than thinking of structure and agency as 
dichotomous concepts, ontological security examines how structure and agency combine and 
produce each other.  They are not analytically separable. Rather structure is the dynamic in 
which the autonomous agent manages his or her actions.  Thus, ―ordinary day-to-day social life 
                                                   
18The pursuit of happiness is listed alongside life and liberty and an inalienable right of man in the US Constitution. 
19Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is ―no one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery 
and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms‖; Article 5 says ―no one shall be subjected to torture, or to 
inhuman, cruel, or degrading treatment or punishment.‖  Available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html  
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… involves an ontological security founded on an autonomy of bodily control within predictable 
routines and encounters‖ (Giddens 1984:64).  Returning to McSweeney‘s analysis: ―we can only 
do security, or do identity, if there is a body of typified actions, mediated by structure, from 
which to draw in order to make sense‖ (McSweeney:166).  The asylum seeker can be seen as 
embedded within a structure that bounds their choices but does not determine them, limiting but 
not erasing agency. 
The structure – agency dynamic at the core of structuration theory and ontological 
security offers particular insight into categories of migration.  For example, Emma Haddad 
describes the analytical difference between a refugee and a migrant: refugees are forced to 
migrate whereas migrants choose to migrate.  However, asylum seekers fall somewhere in 
between.  They carry the burden of having to prove that their migration was forced.  This burden 
exists in the context of state discourses constructing asylum seekers as potential criminals, 
cheats, and generally undesirable persons.  In many cases they are treated as agents who have 
willingly engaged in criminal activity for which they must be held responsible.  Consequently 
asylum seekers are denied autonomy within their own existence before, during, and in many 
cases after their case is processed by the state to which they are seeking asylum. The 
understanding of the structure – agency dynamic offered by structuration theory and engaged by 
the theory of ontological security makes redundant the extant distinction between refugees who 
are victims of purely structural forces and ―illegal immigrants‖ who are rational agents seeking 
to better their lives. Structure does not completely negate agency, nor are agents freewheeling 
actors who face no structural constraints.   The theory of ontological human security forces 
reconsideration of migration processes and practices in terms of access to human rights and 
human security and categories of deservingness.    
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Ontological security can be considered the core human defence against existential 
anxieties (Giddens 1991).  Two categories of Giddens‘ fourfold categorization of existential 
questions are particularly salient for cases of migration: self-identity and the experience of 
others.  Giddens defines self-identity as ―the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms 
if his or her biography‖ (Giddens 1991:53).  Self-identity composes a core part of ontological 
security.  An asylum seeker‘s self- identity is then constituted within his or her biography, which 
of course incorporates the experience of migration.  The process of seeking asylum is part of the 
practice of self-identity.  The experience of others is the second category of existential anxiety 
that ontological security deflects against.  The experience of others includes interactions with 
others and faith in how others will receive you and act towards you (Giddens 1991:51).  This is 
of course applicable for asylum seekers who are appealing to a state for acceptance and being 
simultaneously generated as the ―other‖.   
I contend that the lack of knowledge for the asylum seeker or refugee regarding the 
quotidian functioning of life and the rupture to life patterns and expectations that leads to 
questions of self identity and problematic ―othering‖ interactions makes individual ontological 
security a necessary starting point in understanding the dominant needs in terms of establishing 
or re-establishing security for people with non-state-based identities and in this case asylum 
seekers.  To clarify, a migrant has already experienced disruption to his or her life pattern and 
expectations, through the action of leaving his or her home community.  In order to regain a 
sense of ontological security, the person must have the bodily autonomy to establish new 
patterns and expectations.  However, the possibility of doing this is constantly obstructed by 
immigration status, or lack of it.  The manoeuvrings of states in order to ―burden share,‖ which 
allows for persons seeking asylum to be removed to third countries, as well as state security 
 
167 
 
rhetoric that calls for protection against people termed ―economic migrants,‖ ―bogus asylum 
seekers‖ and ―illegal immigrants‖ further aggravates people in a position of ontological 
insecurity. Thus, receiving states counteract the possibility of gaining or regaining ontological 
security for migrants by instead establishing the constant potential for further disruption to the 
pattern of daily life for incoming migrants. 
The side of human security that focuses on development in order to prevent a disruption 
to daily life arguably overlooks individuals who have already experienced such a disruption, 
either one that has forced their migration to another state, or simply their migration to another 
state, which can be considered a disruption in itself.  Those asylum seekers who are situated in 
advanced industrialized states in particular are disregarded because these states are perceived as 
capable of establishing the immediate security of vulnerable persons.  However, the ontological 
security of these people has not been fulfilled as long as they are not provided with a framework 
for social participation, the autonomy to develop their own clear expectations of daily life, and 
the capability to fulfil them without obstructions.  Ontological security should be recognized as a 
need within understandings of human rights because it is directly linked to the right to life, 
understanding life as continuity rather than the physical state of being alive.  While an 
understanding of the social order to which the victims of forced migration are subjected or in 
which they are potential participants may be their primary need, studies have suggested that 
participation in social community must exist before a political voice can be gained.  
Consideration of the right to a political voice fits into more traditional conceptions of civil and 
political human rights (Moulin and Nyers 2007).  Social participation comprises functioning as a 
member of a community and developing a sense of identity within that community.  This 
participation can be thought of as the basis on which ontological security is built.  Social and 
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community based participation leads to a sense of security in quotidian life, the autonomy to 
develop personal social and political expectations, and the capability to autonomously fulfil these 
expectations.  Therefore, it can potentially provide a form of human security that is arguably 
what refugees and asylum seekers lack.    
Advanced industrialized states recognize the right to life.  However, both social 
participation and political participation are denied to victims of forced migration.  These 
individuals have already experienced a rupture in their daily life creating an ontological 
insecurity in which they have little or no autonomy to establish and realize expectations of daily 
existence.  The denial of social participation prevents the accumulation and re-institution of 
social knowledge and the bodily autonomy that would establish or re-establish ontological 
security.  Constantly changing immigration status and living circumstances over which the 
individual exercises no control remove autonomy in daily life.  Therefore, ontological insecurity 
remains.  The theory of human security could benefit from the incorporation of an understanding 
of ontological security in order to decenter the paradigm away from the state system to address 
the security needs of subaltern populations and people without state-based identities.   
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have deconstructed the human security paradigm and identified the 
problematic centering of the paradigm around the global neoliberal system, privileging state-
based authority and legitimacy.  I suggest the incorporation of ontological security in 
understandings of human security in order to decenter the concept and remove the emphasis that 
is currently placed upon the state.  Ontological security by definition places emphasis on the 
individual and allows for the individual to autonomously determine what provides security as a 
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secure feeling.  Situating ontological security within the human security paradigm allows 
interaction with international relations theories of human rights and human development.  It 
allows interaction with the rhetoric employed by policy makers and so gives the concept 
potential for realization.  The following chapter will examine the utility of the application of 
ontological security in an empirical study of the narratives of asylum seekers in Europe. 
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Ontological insecurity and asylum seeker identity 
 
Ontological human security 
Chapter five advanced the thesis that incorporating an understanding of ontological 
security into conceptualizations of human security could be helpful for analysing situations that 
create insecure individuals who are situated in secure states.  This chapter analyses narratives of 
asylum seekers in Europe with three main objectives.  The first is to understand ways in which 
individuals self-define as asylum seekers in order to understand the disconnect between state 
based asylum seeker definition and contemporary asylum seeker identities.  I then move to the 
question of ontological security and insecurity, as it appears in asylum seeker narratives.  I will 
analyze how narratives of asylum seekers can offer insight into the causes and provocations of 
ontological insecurity and the connection between instances of ontological insecurity and the 
disparity in asylum seeker definitions. 
 
Methodology 
I gathered narrative interviews in Greece and the UK.  I have been involved in some 
capacity with organizations that assist migrants and asylum seekers in different locations for over 
a decade, and with a view to this particular project I spent time in participant observation at 
several different organizations in order to establish a presence and observe the experiences of 
people seeking asylum in Europe.  In Greece I visited two asylum shelters and I regularly 
observed the work of Caritas Hellas, a Greek Catholic organization headquartered in Athens.  
Every day the organization distributes food to those people in Athens who are seeking asylum 
but have no shelter or work.  Hundred of asylum seekers queue outside the Caritas Hellas 
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building daily for the food distribution.  Caritas Hellas also operates a clothing store where 
asylum seekers can get second hand clothes.  There are two separate food distributions, one for 
women at 9am and one for men at 11am.  More men tend to turn up than women.  The male 
queue would begin to form at about 9am and grow steadily.  There was a single food distribution 
each day, the allocation normally consisting of two pots of yoghurt, a bag of chips and an apple.   
People were hungry and there was a struggle as the doors opened.  Everyone would push towards 
the front of the queue.  Some people would climb over the top of other people.  Arguments 
would often break out and occasionally become physical. I spent time queuing and chatting with 
the asylum seekers.  Generally people wanted to speak to me and sought me out to tell their 
stories.  They often expressed frustration at their position and made it clear that they wanted to 
bring public attention to the circumstances in which asylum seekers live in Greece.  
The second organization in Athens where I spend a considerable amount of time was in 
the Doctors of the World asylum shelter.  Doctors of the World is an organization that provides 
healthcare for marginalized populations in Athens.  Asylum seekers are one of the main groups 
Doctors of the World has worked with in recent years, given that they now form a large portion 
of the homeless population of Athens.  They run a health clinic for asylum seekers, migrants, and 
other vulnerable populations in Athens.  They have an asylum shelter that houses particular 
asylum seekers who have been identified as vulnerable.   I visited the shelter and spent time 
talking with the employees and the asylum seekers that lived there.  I spent time interviewing 
asylum seekers in the offices of Doctors of the World. 
In Newcastle I worked with two major organizations.  The first was Walking With, a 
small organization established in Wallsend, North Tyneside, which is a small town located in the 
greater industrial area of Newcastle.  This organization collects food donations from local 
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churches and runs a food store room where each week asylum seekers can receive a distribution 
of food items.  They also offer financial support that is generated by donations, and pay out 5 
pounds sterling per asylum seeker per week.  The money they give to asylum seekers is raised 
through charitable donations.  Walking With offer help with paperwork, legal advice, and 
emotional support.  I volunteered distributing food to asylum seekers and talking to them.  I 
participated in different events that the organization ran. 
The West End Refugee Service in Newcastle is the fourth organization where I observed a 
case worker and collected interviews.  This service assists with paperwork and offers some 
translation services, counselling, and befriending.  It also provides a store of clothes and 
household items for asylum seekers in the area.  WERS provides financial support of 35 pounds 
sterling per week for asylum seekers who are destitute and cannot seek support from the local 
authorities or from the Home Office.  Money for this organization is raised via charitable 
donations and grant funding.  
I interviewed a total of eighteen asylum seekers, some more forthcoming than others in 
terms of sharing their experiences.  I used a narrative participant-led style in which I did not ask 
direct questions but asked participants to talk about their experiences.  For example I asked ―tell 
me how you came to be in the UK,‖ rather than ―why did you come to the UK.‖  This meant that 
the participants would emphasize what was significant to them regarding the experiences that 
brought them from their home country, rather than answer a direct question.  The people I talked 
with had been in traumatic situations and might not have felt comfortable reliving their 
experiences so I wanted to minimize pressure to answer questions.  I also did not want encourage 
certain responses, preferring the feeling of an organic conversation in which themes that arose 
were things that occurred to the interview participants.  My intention is to analyse the narratives 
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as a whole rather than extracting particular items.  However, in this analysis I focus on asylum 
seeker identities and ontological insecurity where they appear in different narratives, and so 
some examples are taken from the complete stories although I contextualize them within the 
narrative as a whole.  I do not intend to offer psychoanalysis here; I do not pretend to be 
qualified to understand the psychological state of the people I interviewed. My understanding of 
the narratives is contextualized by my experience with the organization and exposure to the 
different issues that arise for asylum seekers.  Sitting in participant observation with two 
organizations in the North East of England, and two organizations in Athens allowed me to see 
the daily occurrences and issues that arise for individuals seeking asylum in Europe. My 
interpretation is of the narratives of asylum seekers rather than of the states of mind of asylum 
seekers.  
 
Asylum seeker definitions   
All the participants considered themselves to be asylum seekers and were either in the 
process of seeking asylum, had sought and received, had sought and been denied, or were 
intending to seek asylum at a point in future.  When I introduced myself and outlined my project 
to the interview participants I stated that I was looking for asylum seekers and refugees, thus by 
agreeing to be interviewed the participants identified themselves to be refugees or asylum 
seekers.  Within the narratives not all the participants directly referred to themselves as asylum 
seekers but it was often implied.  The following demonstrates some examples of individual 
narratives in which the individuals identify themselves to be asylum seekers.  In some of these 
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cases an asylum seeker identity would not be attributed to the individual according to the 
conventional state understanding of asylum seekers and refugees. 
20
  
 
 Jonny 
Jonny is from Ghana.  He is seeking asylum in Greece.  Jonny narrates the tale that led him 
to flee Ghana.  His narrative is chronological and he speaks about what generated his fear to 
remain in Ghana before he speaks of himself as an asylum seeker.  Thus his identity as an 
asylum seeker was generated out of fear to remain in his home country and subsequently fear to 
return to his home country.   
Jonny explains that he was the eldest son of his father‘s second wife and when his father died 
he did not inherit anything and he was living with his uncle.  However his uncle‘s house was 
burnt down and Jonny‘s uncle died in the fire.  Jonny describes the fire as arson that was 
politically motivated in which case his uncle died in a political dispute.  Jonny got into a fight at 
his uncle‘s funeral.   Over the course of the conflict which included several altercations and 
lasted a few days, fighting escalated:  
 
―So during the fight all of a sudden I also took a stick intentionally I hit one and he fell down.  
So what I heard is, and I struggle to run away.  So what I heard after the fight, they said they 
took him to hospital, I don‘t know, what I heard is that he died, he‘s dead.  So I‘m the cause 
of the death.  So you know that, I was panicked too.  I was panic.  And they said they had 
reported the case and I also ran away.‖ 
 
Jonny describes that he panicked when he learned that he might have killed someone, and he 
ran away. He crossed the border into Burkina Faso; however, he did not feel safe there:  ―So 
                                                   
20 All the names of the interview participants have been changed. I tried to be mindful of ethnic and cultural nuances 
in names to avoid ascribing identity in the names.  I chose to use pseudonyms rather than single letter abbreviations 
because I did not want to dehumanize the participants by referring to them only as a symbol. 
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when I entered Burkina Faso, still I was still panicking, I know I am not safe anywhere.  Maybe 
they might trace me wherever I am. So I try to run away.‖  Jonny explains that the journey was 
difficult and he aimed to get to Libya. While he was travelling he met other people and, in his 
words, ―what I could see is, I‘m there in Greece‖.  According to Jonny‘s description he fled 
because he was afraid of the consequences of the fight he was in.  He describes the dispute as 
politically motivated.  He does not describe aiming to travel to Greece or to Europe in particular.  
He panicked and fled.  Jonny met people while he was travelling and went to Greece with them.  
He claimed asylum when he arrived in Greece because he was seeking protection and was afraid 
to return to his home.  Jonny does not articulate a specific moment at which he began to identify 
himself as an asylum seeker, but he became an asylum seeker because he had left his home 
country and was afraid to return home.  Seeking asylum was the mechanism available to him.  
Jonny‘s story arguably fits the asylum seeker definition given that he was fleeing persecution by 
a group presumably outside of state control, for reasons of political opinion.  However, his status 
is complicated because he could be charged with a crime in Ghana.  Further, Ghana is not 
considered by Greece to be a country of origin of asylum seekers.  Greece generally accepts 
asylum seeker applications for processing from Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan (Interview 
with Greek Refugee Council, July 2010).  Other applications are likely to face expedited 
rejection.  When Jonny arrived he was urged by the people he travelled with to claim as a 
Somalian.  He says he did so because he was afraid of the repercussions if he did not – he 
described having seen the people he travelled with to Greece push another migrant into the water 
to drown because he refused to agree to orders.  Thus, this creates an additional complication in 
Jonny‘s asylum case as he could be considered to have defrauded the asylum authorities in 
Greece by claiming a false identity. 
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 Amir 
Amir is a Shiite Muslim from Afghanistan.  He has been in Britain for two years. He told his 
story spontaneously with very little prompting and few questions from me.  He tells it in a 
chronological order, and he described his intention to seek asylum in Britain specifically was 
generated from a radio broadcast he heard after having left Afghanistan.  Amir tells me that he 
left Afghanistan in 2007 because he had ―big problems‖.  He is a Shiite Muslim and the Taliban 
are Sunni.  Amir tells me that in Afghanistan under the Taliban Shiite Muslims are not permitted 
education, and he says he did not receive any education in his country.  Amir repeats several 
times that he had ―big problems‖ in his country and elaborates on his lack of access to education.  
However, he does not outline the nature of the problems, but simply explains that he had to 
leave.  The way he describes his departure suggests that he was forced to leave – he does not talk 
about the particular choices he made but talks about having to leave.  
 After leaving Afghanistan, Amir went to Iran. He lived in Iran for six months and found 
work packing boxes.  However, he says he was ―constantly in fear‖ because he did not have an 
ID card.  He was afraid he would be stopped and sent back to Afghanistan.  He describes that he 
heard on BBC Farsi that Britain was the best place for asylum seekers and he decided he had to 
go to Britain and ask for asylum.  He indicates here that he identified himself as an asylum 
seeker at that point in Iran.   He explains that he could not stay in Iran or Pakistan because he felt 
too close to Afghanistan and the same things that caused him problems in Afghanistan would 
continue to cause him problems in Iran or Pakistan.  Thus, Amir thought of himself as an asylum 
seeker.  He was forced to leave his country.  He travelled to the UK to seek asylum and 
continues to consider himself an asylum seeker.   
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Amir‘s journey fits the stereotypical portrayal of an ―illegal immigrant‖ according to UKBA, 
despite the fact that throughout the story he does not suggest that he has made choices, instead 
repeating that ―I had to leave Greece‖ or ―I had to get to Italy‖.  According to the way he 
describes his experiences, Amir was compelled to leave.  This contradicts the emphasis on 
agency that the UKBA attributes to ―illegal immigrants‖.  Rather than being characterized as a 
―criminal‖ illegal immigrant who is looking for an illegal way to break into Britain to take 
advantage of social security, Amir was compelled to leave his home country and was in a 
situation of constant fear in Iran.  Therefore, to alleviate that fear he decided to travel to Britain.   
I asked Amir how he travelled from Iran to the UK. he is frank in his description of working 
in Iran ―illegally‖ and replied to my question laughing as if it is obvious ―illegally, I go 
illegally.‖  Amir does not mention the rules regarding the different borders he crossed, or the 
rules and regulations regarding seeking asylum in the EU.  Amir went over land to Turkey and 
then crossed into Greece.  He does not elaborate about this part of the journey, although he tells 
me that it was arranged by an agent.  Amir does reflect at length on Greece.  He talks about 
Athens, saying that there were hundreds of people seeking asylum.  He describes people living 
several persons to a room and living on the streets and in the parks.  He says ―many many 
hundreds of people who are so hungry every day they go to one place, it‘s like a church, an 
organization like from the church and they queue to get food, only once a day and they are so 
hungry.‖
21
  Amir describes himself as lucky.  He had saved enough money working irregularly in 
Iran to stay in a hotel in Athens.  He did not claim asylum in Athens.  He simply says he ―had to 
leave.‖   Amir does not mention how this might reflect on his status as an asylum seeker.  His 
description of Greece suggests that the protection he sought was not available to him in Greece 
and so he left.   
                                                   
21 He is referring to the organization Caritas Hellas that distributes food to asylum seekers in Greece. 
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Amir went to the port of Patras. He tells me that is where people go to try and leave from 
Greece, illegally, ―no travel papers‖.  He stayed in Patras for four months.  He says he got very 
sick.  There was ―nowhere to wash, no water, no hygiene.‖  He had to go and wash in the sea.  
Amir tells me that he does not like the sea because he is from Afghanistan and there is no sea so 
he doesn‘t know how to swim.  He would go to the sea and wash but he wouldn‘t go right in 
because he was afraid.  He was sick and coughing up blood and he knew he couldn‘t stay there 
any longer.  The camp where Amir stayed is a camp notorious for being full of male irregular 
migrants or ―illegal immigrants‖ from Afghanistan.  The same camp was bulldozed in January 
2011 and the inhabitants were sent to different detention centres in Greece and given deportation 
documents.   
Amir left Greece ―illegally‖ by hiding under the chassis of a truck.  He was alone.  He 
describes the process as difficult and dangerous.  He was on the ship for three days and tried to 
cut through the binding of different trucks to hide inside so he could get off undetected.  He did 
not manage it and ended up curling up beneath the electrical cables that attach the brake lights to 
the cab.  He said he knew that the authorities would check underneath the trucks so he curled up 
beneath the cables to be undetectable.   
Amir describes reaching Italy, where he was eventually detected when the driver pulled over 
to unload.  Amir remembers very clearly the words the driver spoke to him, despite them being a 
language that he does not know.
22
  He managed to make his way from Italy to France via train 
and he comments that he was very afraid because he expected border checks, although he had 
not planned ahead regarding how to evade them.  He says once he made it to France he contacted 
Iranian friends for more money so that he could hire an agent to help him enter Britain.  The 
                                                   
22 The words were Greek and Amir recites them to me but does not know the meaning.  The translation is to the 
effect of ―get lost, asshole‖. 
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agent arranged for Amir to hide in the back of a truck that was delivering chocolate bars to 
Britain.  He was with seven other people and he says they were all very afraid.  They had a plan 
to hide behind the doors if it was opened for checks.  Although Amir‘s plan was to go to the UK 
to seek asylum, he wanted to enter without being discovered.  During the narration of his journey 
Amir expresses fear of being discovered by immigration authorities throughout the story.  One 
might assume that his fear of the same on entering Britain was not because he actively wanted to 
enter undetected and become an undocumented migrant.  Rather, he had lived with fear of 
detection for several months.  When Amir was discovered at Dover he claimed asylum 
immediately. 
 
 Ali and Sharif 
I interviewed two men in Athens, Sharif from Somalia and Ali from Sudan, who talked about 
wanting to seek asylum and the issues preventing them from doing so.  At the time of the 
interview they were both in Greece without documents.  The narrative they offered was not 
chronological but instead they made several forceful points throughout the conversation.  The 
points that Sharif and Ali emphasized focused on problematic nature of the Greek asylum 
system, the injustice and entrapment they felt, and their anger at the Greek asylum system.  They 
both think of themselves as asylum seekers but have not claimed asylum because of the difficulty 
of doing so in Greece, hence their frustration.  Ali tells me: 
 
―I go to the ‗Alagapo‘ immigration site.  They are pushing me one, two, three, and I stand 
there.  If I count the amount of people here in that‘s wanting to seek asylum they are 
more than a thousand.  But imagine, as the police came here I mean they will say ‗this is 
black, I am white‘ … and after then after now out of that one thousand they will choose 
just ten people that they think to give them the pink card.‖   
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Ali describes the experience at the immigration centre as time consuming given that the 
application process is very slow.  Asylum seekers are advised to go to the centre and claim 
asylum in order to get a pink card, which is the asylum seeker identity card.  The pink card 
provides a work permit, access to Greek language lessons, and minimal access to health care.  
However, the immigration centre only has the capacity to take a handful of applications every 
day.  Thousands of people queue and do not get seen.  Ali elaborates that police authorities at the 
immigration centre give preference to white people.  The difficulty in filing an asylum claim in 
Greece leads many people to attempt to travel elsewhere.  Sharif talks about his wish to return 
home.  However, without documents it becomes impossible to leave since Greece does not have 
the resources to enforce deportation and instead provides migrants with deportation orders 
instructing them to leave the country.  Sharif expresses a sense of entrapment. 
 
―I went to GCR to get to go back again. And told me to got to have pink card.  How do I 
have pink card when the people and they choose twenty people out of hundred.  I'm 
telling you.  Every Friday you go there and they … choose out of five thou, maybe five 
hundred, they choose sixteen or eighteen.‖  
 
Both Ali and Sharif have attempted to claim asylum.  They are seeking asylum but have not 
processed the paperwork, hence would not be considered asylum seekers by the state-given 
definition.  They remain understood as ―illegal immigrants‖ or ―undocumented migrants‖.  It 
appears futile to these migrants to attempt to process the necessary paperwork, yet attempting to 
leave is equally problematic: ―Now they will give you one month‘s paper.  To leave the country.  
Why you want to leave the country?  You go to the airport.  They will catch you, they will send 
you one month, two months in prison.‖  Each time undocumented migrants in Greece are caught 
attempting to leave the country, they are imprisoned.  On their release from prison they are given 
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the deportation order that instructs them to leave, but is not accepted as a travel document by the 
Greek authorities.  Sharif shows me he has five or six of these orders.   
The men understand themselves to be asylum seekers who intend to process the 
paperwork to seek asylum but have not yet managed to do so.  They both say they no longer go 
to the immigration centre but instead focus on trying to leave Greece. They both describe having 
fled their homes.  Sharif tells me his home was hit by a bomb in Somalia.  He says he doesn‘t 
know where the bomb came from, whether it was the peace keeping force or someone else.  He 
says ―I leave my wife for save my life.  You understand that?‖  However, according to the state-
definition he is an ―illegal immigrant‖ because he has not filed a claim for asylum and he has not 
fulfilled his deportation order.  Ali from Sudan is attempting to travel to France to meet up with 
his wife and daughter.  He describes sending his wife and daughter to France after facing 
violence in Sudan that he attributes to his wife being half Eritrean.  However, when Ali arrived 
in Thessaloniki he was given a deportation paper.  He managed to travel from there to claim 
asylum in Belgium.  However, when his case was processed he was returned to Greece because 
he had been fingerprinted in Greece.  Yet, Greece had given him a deportation order.  He 
describes:  
―Everybody send you here.  Greek and they tell you ―I don‘t care.‖  Because Greeks are 
saying before, they are looking for us, everything. ... Every time I ask, maybe I ask 
myself for more than a hundred times.  Why these people they are doing like that?  You 
know, I‘m telling.  Ismir to Mytilini maybe 30 minutes one hours.  By boat, okay.  But 
Mytilini to here maybe more than ten hours.  But they didn‘t like me.  Why they are 
sending me here?  Why they no turn me back?  Why?  I ask myself this more than any or 
one hundred times.  Why?  Why?‖ 
 
Ali expressed confusion as to why Greece would ask for him to be returned there, when they will 
not process his claim.  It is common for people who are returned to a ―safe third country‖ to be 
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told that the country has requested their return.  This is a way of appeasing the deportee 
(Interview with GRC, July 2010).  The irony here is that both Ali and Sharif would be eligible 
for a pink card if they filed an asylum claim because they are from states that are recognized by 
Greece as dangerous (Interview with GRC, July 2010).  However, the impediments to their 
obtaining the card, such as Ali‘s desire to reunite with his family, means that they are given 
deportation orders because they have not filed an asylum claim.  They become illegal immigrants 
not because of the characteristics detailed in the convention definition of a refugee but because 
they have not filed a claim.  This demonstrates a failing of the refugee and asylum processes and 
practices.  
 
 Ellie  
Ellie is from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  She narrates her story chronologically, 
responding to my questions although elaborating on a particular item that she is worried about.  
When she travelled to the UK she had been asked to bring children with her to reunite them with 
her parents. She was fleeing Ghana and was afraid.  She did not want the people who arranged 
her passage to Britain to take away the opportunity.  So when they told her she would be 
bringing children with her she complied.  In the interview she expresses a particular worry that 
her experience with the children will complicate her asylum claim which is still being processed.   
Ellie travelled to the UK on a fake passport, fleeing a conflict in which both her parents 
later died.  Her partner was in the military and he provided her with a passport for travel.    She 
says that when she arrived in Britain she intended to enter the country with the fake passport but 
she was stopped by customs officials:  ―the problem is that they check this and they asking me 
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say is this my passport, I say no no, it‘s no my passport.‖  Ellie claimed asylum when she was 
discovered with the fake passport; however, she has further complications in her asylum case:  
 
―What happened with the passport how also, it was the men they give me like a .. a three 
children.  I don‘t know because I didn‘t come they don‘t know they my children they my 
children say the parent live in the UK if I can bring the children in airport and the parent 
phone the children the parent need to pick the children in the airport in the air… in the 
airport.  I didn‘t know that.  I try to say the children, to say the children is mine.  Three 
three three children now, become a big problem now, because the Home Office ask well 
where is the, the children go?‖ 
 
When Ellie entered the UK she said the three children who were then travelling with her were 
her own children.  When she claimed asylum she presented the children as her dependents.  
However, since arriving in Britain the children were collected from her and now she is constantly 
afraid that she will be charged with an immigration crime.  She made her asylum claim with the 
three children as dependents and as a result she could be charged with human trafficking.  Unless 
she can prove that she was coerced into bringing the children to Britain and verify their 
whereabouts, she is liable to be charged with the crime of trafficking minors.  If the Home Office 
charges her with this, she will be considered a deportable foreign criminal rather than an asylum 
seeker, thus her self-definition as an asylum seeker is complicated by her actions.  However, 
Ellie expressed being compelled to take the children.  She did not actively seek to defraud the 
British system or intend to traffic children into the country. 
 
 Discussion 
The above narratives of asylum seekers demonstrate the context in which they might seek 
asylum, or that they might be considered ―illegal.‖  In order to enter Britain and Greece they 
have avoided inspection crossing borders, used agents, and used fraudulent documents.  While 
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they all consider themselves asylum seekers, they are not all accepted as asylum seekers by the 
state.  Further, the state understands some of the actions they have taken to be criminal acts, in 
which case the individuals would be considered foreign criminals before they are considered 
asylum seekers.  The self-definitions of these asylum seekers do not coincide with state-
definitions.  As a result, there are impediments to the reestablishment of a daily life that includes 
stable expectations.  This is one of the key components of human security.  Human security 
―means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in that patterns of daily life: whether in 
homes, in jobs, or in communities‖ (Human Development Report 1994:23).  The asylum seekers 
in question have already experienced the disruption, which can be understood as putting them in 
a position of insecurity.   
As discussed in chapter five, ontological security relies upon a core basic security system 
which is composed of the reflexive knowledge of daily life.  This reflexive knowledge can be 
divided into the categories of interpretive social interactions and the theoretical ―common sense‖ 
knowledge.  For asylum seekers these two categories have been disrupted.  The first refers to the 
―mutual knowledge‖, or the interpretive schemes through which actors constitute and understand 
social life as meaningful.  When there is a discontinuity in that mutual knowledge, in other words 
when knowledge is no longer mutual, there is a lack of ontological security.  The interview 
participants understand themselves to be asylum seekers.  They have travelled, often at great 
personal risk, to seek asylum in a particular state and then they find that their self-conception as 
asylum seekers is not shared by the state authorities.  Thus the knowledge of their identity is not 
―mutual‖; the immigration officials do not accept that they are asylum seekers.  Considering 
oneself an asylum seeker is not sufficient for the state.  Furthermore, the state holds the power in 
making determinations as to who can be considered an asylum seeker.  Thus, the agency of the 
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individual asylum seeker is removed and their identity is determined by the state, leaving the 
individual powerless. This conflict of identity creates a potential for ontological insecurity.   
Secondly, the body of theoretical knowledge, or ―common sense‖ that orders daily life 
needs to be rebuilt when daily life has been disrupted.  This type of common sense is disrupted 
whenever a person is in an unfamiliar environment.  However, being able to learn the common 
sense ordering of the local environment in which one finds oneself allows a sense of security to 
be regained.  When one is not in a familiar place, one has to rebuild both the theoretical and 
interpretive knowledge of daily life and reform one‘s expectations of quotidian life.  However, 
because there is a dispute in the conceptualization of identity for many of these individuals who 
are seeking asylum, they remain in a position of ontological insecurity.  They cannot reform 
expectations of daily life because their identity remains in flux and so their access to 
participation in daily life is hampered.  Thus, I assert that asylum seekers in Europe often are in a 
position of ontological insecurity and regaining that sense of security is debilitated.  In the 
following section I investigate the appearance of ontological insecurity in the narratives of 
asylum seekers. 
 
Ontological insecurity 
Many of the interview participants described their daily lives. I asked those who did not 
offer a description spontaneously to describe their experiences to me.  Rather than ask specific 
questions, I wanted them to describe the things that were important about life in Britain or 
Greece. Themes of ontological security were raised in different examples.  The themes that 
recurred in different interviews included the lack of agency, or of simply not knowing what 
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might happen; the lack of autonomy in questions of living space and location; and the fear or in 
some cases the reality of destitution. 
 Lack of control 
   Gervais from Burundi has been in Britain since 2002.  His narrative is not 
chronological and is fuelled by frustration.  In the interview he launched into speaking before I 
had asked any questions and he described in detail his frustration with the Home Office because 
he has been waiting so long for a determination on his asylum case.   
Gervais claimed asylum on arrival in the UK.  However, the Home Office did not and 
does not believe his story.  He was identified as deportable, but the Home Office thinks he is not 
in fact from Burundi.  As a result they cannot deport him.  He has been in Britain for nine years 
in a limbo status.  He has been detained several times and has been identified as deportable three 
times.  Given that the British government is unable to deport him to Burundi and is unwilling to 
give him legal status in the country, he remains in a state of limbo.  In our interview, he 
expresses his frustration: 
 
―My head is so confused right now.  I don‘t know what to do.  I been in this country nine 
and a a half years right now.  You know so all my friends you know, you know if you got 
your friends with you and they got their papers …  and you ain‘t got a paper so it‘s 
difficult because you.. you‘re facing the music in front of you like you don‘t know what‘s 
going to happen to you.  You know what I mean?‖   
 
A source of frustration to him is that every week he has to travel to the immigration office to sign 
a paper reporting his whereabouts.  However, he is not provided with a stipend for the 
transportation. 
 
―You see immigration so I told them last time I was so upset and I went there and I told 
them listen … unfortunately I‘m not gonna come back here again because this this this is 
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ridiculous you don‘t provide me with, with anything.  If I get caught in the Metro I have 
to pay for that fine.  So which … which..I I mean, I told them why don‘t I have sign at the 
police station next to my house, it‘s more better than to take the risk taking the metro 
from the from St. James to your place I‘m taking the risk because I‘m just jumping on the 
train.  I aint got the money to spend .. to get the ticket you know buying me the ticket 
how come every week if you don‘t … oh they went if you don‘t coming to sign you 
gonna get problem because we gonna send the immigration people to your house and 
collect you to put you in detention centre and I say well you can put me in detention 
centre right now if you want because I‘m not gonna suffer anymore like this.‖ 
 
The act of having to go and sign means that Gervais risks being fined for the petty crime of 
neglecting to buy a ticket for public transportation.  Moreover, he expresses a sense of injustice 
that he is expected to go and sign when he has been in the country for a long time and the 
immigration authorities have failed to either deport him or provide him with status.  The 
overwhelming sentiment that Gervais expresses is one of frustration at the lack of control he has. 
One of the common issues that arose in the interviews is expression of a lack of ability to 
be in control of one‘s own life.  In Britain in particular, the Home Office extensively regulates 
the whereabouts of asylum seekers and what resources they can access.  Most of the interview 
participants who were in Britain mentioned at some point during their interview the dispersal 
programme that had led them to Newcastle. 
 Dispersal 
Alexis is a refugee from Rwanda who entered the UK in 2002.  His case was approved 
very quickly and he now works as an immigration support worker in Newcastle, which has given 
him extensive experience of the asylum system and the experiences of people seeking asylum 
who go to him for assistance.  Alexis talked about the difficulties he faced as a result of the 
dispersal programme: ―I learn that I was going to be dispersed to Newcastle. Well, Newcastle, I 
try to learn about Newcastle and many people told me that it‘s a horrible place to be. There‘s a 
lot of racist people, in particular if you‘re a black person, it‘s really bad for you to be dispersed 
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there.‖  People he had met in London at the temporary hostel advised him to ask for a different 
location, but he did not because he was told being in Newcastle would facilitate access to 
specialist medical treatment at a facility in the city centre that he needed for injuries sustained in 
prison in Rwanda. 
 
―In 2002 I can say in Newcastle, it was very hard to see an African man in Newcastle, or 
any, any black minority people. Except Asian people. You can see Asian people but not 
African people. It was very very isolated if you African.  So when we are sent here, we 
could not speak English. So it was very hard to communicate with this, local people. So 
through that, we begin to get a lot of horrible things, racist, you know, you at home you 
just come back find horrible smell they throw eggs, things like that. So from that time, we 
begin to put ourself together, say we need to do something. Because anyone who was 
dispersed here, after getting better they decide to leave immediately.‖ 
 
Alexis talks about the struggles to build a community because so many asylum seekers who were 
dispersed to Newcastle decided to leave and move to more diverse cities as soon as their cases 
had been processed.  Liya From Eritrea has a similar story to Ali. She arrived and was dispersed 
to Wallsend.  She says that during her first few months in North Tyneside she was afraid to leave 
the house.  She felt stigmatized and self-conscious because she did not know any other black 
people.  Her health worker encouraged her to enroll in college and learn English but she kept 
dropping out because she did not feel comfortable.  She followed the advice of a health worker 
and started a community group.  She says the most important thing is to feel you are in a 
community.  Liya founded the North Tyneside African Group and for three years the group had 
only two members, she and one other asylum seeker, yet they continued to arrange activities and 
to try and encourage other people to participate.  She says this group helped her feel comfortable 
in North Tyneside; without the community she would have continued to feel isolated and self 
conscious.  Liya and Alexis both express the importance of community participation and their 
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descriptions of ontological insecurity regard their lack of community and their isolation when 
they first arrived in the North East of England. 
It was usual for the asylum seekers I met with in the UK to have moved several times 
during the time their claim was being processed.  Many of them talked about the uncertainty that 
this causes and the inability to feel rooted to a home.  The lack of control given to asylum 
seekers to determine where they live and when they move can be seen to prevent a person 
building a sense of continuity attached to place. It becomes more difficult to interact within a 
community and to build ongoing relationships. 
The dispersal programme arose spontaneously in a conversation as I chatted with Ana, an 
Armenian asylum seeker who is in Britain with her husband Ruban and two children who were 
both in their teens when they arrived.  Having grown up in a military family from Armenia but 
frequently posted abroad, she is accustomed to travelling and living in several different locations.  
However, the travelling and relocating that she has done as a result of her seeking asylum have 
been quite different.   Ana and her family are currently processing an appeal of their asylum 
decision.  They were denied asylum but it was ruled that deportation would contravene human 
rights. Ana‘s husband is Ukrainian and, while Armenia agreed to accept Ana and the two 
children, the country would not accept Ruban.  However, the Ukraine would not accept the rest 
of the family.  This means that in order to deport them Britain would have to divide a family.   
After their asylum claim was denied the family had all of their support withdrawn and 
they were ordered by the Home Office to move out of the accommodation that the state had 
provided them with during the processing of their asylum claim.  However, it was not possible to 
enforce the family‘s removal from Britain as Britain could not ignore the international norm that 
families remain together.  They relied on money raised via a local church as their sole source of 
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income for a year, before they were summoned to appear before a judge in London.  Ruban went 
to the hearing and was reinstated with the right to accommodation.  However, both the children 
had reached the age of eighteen while they were in the UK.  As a result, they were dispersed to 
separate accommodations and are currently no longer permitted to live with their parents.  If they 
do, their immigration case will be treated as abandoned, in other words the Home Office will 
disregard the case and they will be without immigration status and without leave to remain in 
Britain.   
This scenario has seen the family unable to plan for a secure future and uprooted several 
times over recent years.  Ana talks in detail about the insecurity caused by being forced to move 
over and over again and being given no warning.  The dispersal programme means that the 
Home Office decides where they live.  Each time a claim or an appeal was rejected the family 
was relocated.  Further, changes among the organizations that the Home Office and local 
councils contract to provide accommodation for asylum seekers provoked further insecurity.  A 
house might have been allocated to asylum seekers for a time but then removed from 
government programme.  Ana talks about being afraid to plant a garden because she says if she 
has to move it will not be worth it.  The thing that bothers her is that she has ―no say in it‖.  The 
Home Office does not take her preferences into account and despite the fact that one of the 
moves was just up the road, she had no power to lobby the home office to allow her to stay in the 
house she was already living in. 
 Lack of agency 
This lack of agency is not just caused by the dispersal programme, but is a symptom of 
the larger process of seeking asylum.  The same idea of a lack of agency in everyday life arose in 
an interview with Jonny from Ghana who was residing at an asylum shelter in Athens.  He 
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emphasizes how he feels that daily life in the hostel prevents him from being able to manage his 
own ability to survive: 
―This situation is very difficult because no work no nothing here.  And the food we eat 
here is managed here. In fact because I taking the meal in the afternoon, in the evening 
nothing.  Just in the morning and the afternoon.  And so in the evening maybe I have to 
pass by some friends you see if they are able to cook maybe I can join hands and 
sometimes before they cook you know, I better have no choice.  It‘s like when you visit a 
friend any time that he cooks that time is your survivement.  Because if you go and he 
doesn‘t cook then that means no food for you. But if he cooks then you are lucky.  Now 
sometimes you go and they go maybe by the time that he cooks maybe you are late at 
your hostel you need to rush and you need to eat and survive before you come to your 
hostel.‖    
 
He cannot buy food to eat because he cannot work.  He must comply with the mealtimes and the 
curfew at the asylum shelter.  He has no focus, stating that he just walks around.  His words 
suggest that he feels a lack of control in his own life, which leaves him unable to generate 
expectations of everyday life or build a sense of community and social participation.  The way 
that Jonny chooses to emphasize that he does nothing suggests that this is a big problem for him:  
 
―I don‘t work.  I don‘t do nothing.  I just walk about. I don‘t do nothing, nothing.  It‘s 
very difficult.  I don‘t do nothing.  I don‘t do nothing.  Nothing at all.  If maybe I could 
get a job maybe I can try to find one I can try to find out their contacts.  But nothing. ... 
All I know I just need a survivement. Wherever I will survive.‖ 
 
He is looking for ways to survive.  His choice of words suggests that he does not see his current 
existence as living a life.  He links his boredom and his lack of activity in life in Greece to his 
family.  He talks about missing his family and being unsure of what to do about the future.  He 
plans to return to Ghana at some point but he is too afraid of what will happen to him.  At the 
same time, he stresses his responsibility to take care of his family: ―I can‘t go empty because if I 
go empty how will they survive.  There is no one to take care of them.  I‘m like a father to them.  
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I have no family is taken care of.  My family my mother or my brothers or sisters. I‘m the one.‖  
He wants to take care of his family but he does not possess control over his ability to return and 
he feels like he cannot return without a means of support for his family.  Yet his impotence and 
inactivity in daily life mean that he cannot generate that means of support. 
 
 Discussion 
A sense of personal agency contributes to ontological security.  Gidden‘s definition of 
ontological security details a hierarchically ordered core basic security system that is largely 
inaccessible to the consciousness of the actor (Giddens 1993).  Without personal agency, a 
person does not have the capability to meet their own hierarchically ordered needs. Rather, 
someone else identifies the needs of the generalized population and determines how to meet 
them.  This is problematic for two reasons.  First of all the subconscious hierarchy that 
determines an individual sense of ontological security might differ per individual.  If the asylum 
system prevents individuals from identifying their needs and prevents them from accessing the 
capacity to meet those needs then ontological insecurity is produced and reproduced.  Secondly 
and perhaps more importantly, the system puts limitations on who is considered to be a 
―genuine‖ asylum seeker that reflects a definition of a refugee that was written in the 1950s and 
arguably does not correspond to the demographic of humanitarian or forced migrants today.  
Those who are instead ―illegal immigrants‖ or ―failed asylum seekers‖ have no right to even the 
security determined by the state and provided by the state for asylum seekers.  Thus, they do not 
have the right to attempt to regain a sense of ontological security. The narratives of asylum 
seekers suggest that the deterrence methods incorporated in policy, such as the dispersal 
programme, the vouchers programme, and the ban on employment effectively work to create 
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ontological insecurity for asylum seekers.  The following examines a sense of ontological 
insecurity that is inflicted upon those determined ―failed‖ asylum seekers. 
 
“Failed” asylum seekers and destitution 
 The main place one sees ontological insecurity among ―failed‖ asylum seekers is with 
regard to economic sustainability.  According to legislation, ―failed‖ asylum seekers are not 
eligible for support.  They must make arrangements to leave the country in the form of voluntary 
deportation.  However, there are many asylum seekers who cannot be deported from Britain, 
voluntarily or otherwise, because Britain does not have diplomatic relations with the state from 
which they have come.  Furthermore, those individuals who fear to return but whose cases have 
been ruled incredible by the Home Office similarly face destitution in Britain.  One such 
example is provided by Jamal, an asylum seeker from Somalia who regularly visited Walking 
With in Wallsend, North Tyneside.  When I met him, Jamal was eligible for a monetary stipend 
of five pounds sterling per week from Walking With, out of money raised through charitable 
donations.  He also used the food distribution service provided by the organization.  The first 
time Jamal came in he talked about a construction course specializing in electrician skills he was 
taking at Tyne Metropolitan College.  While his case was being processed by the Home Office 
he was eligible for some education funding.  However, he recently found out that his funding 
would end in September 2011 and he would be unable to complete his course. He was very 
disappointed about this because he wanted to finish and he would have to withdraw from the 
course and resume his studies if his asylum application was accepted.   
The next time Jamal came in to the centre that housed Walking With he was visibly upset.  
He went for a private conference with the resident health worker.  His last appeal for asylum in 
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Britain had been rejected.  His support was to be withdrawn.  However, because he was an 
asylum seeker from Somalia he could not be deported.  In the decision on his appeal both his 
support system in the UK and his chance of leaving the UK were taken from him. Jamal refused 
to take any food that day as he did not feel like eating.  He expressed disappointment and 
concern about the future.  He hugged everyone before he left. 
A week later Jamal returned to Walking With.  He says that during the course of the week 
he has been constantly worried that immigration officers will come for him and detain him.  He 
is unable to relax.  He knows that he no longer has support and it is only a matter of time before 
he will be evicted from his accommodation.  At his last meeting an immigration officer asked 
him to sign for voluntary deportation to Kenya.  He would not be allowed to enter Kenya, but 
would be escorted by Kenyan officers to Somalia.  He says he is afraid.  He says the area of 
Somalia where he is from has many conflicting tribes. If he gets handed to the wrong tribe by 
Kenyan officials his life would be in danger.  But he also says he is afraid in Britain.  He might 
be detained any day and he has no financial support or access to shelter or food other than the 
donations from Walking With.  As Jamal weighs up the options a volunteer at Walking With asks 
him ―but would you be safe?‖ (if he was returned to Kenya).  Jamal replies ―I am not safe here‖.  
He is left in a state of insecurity by the system he appealed to for protection.   
Salah is an asylum seeker from Sudan.  He does not tell me his age but he appears to be 
very young, possibly in his teens.  He has been in the UK for ten months and is homeless.  When 
a support worker asks where he lives he spreads open his arms and says ―just anywhere‖.  He 
travelled to the UK from Sudan via Greece, like many asylum seekers.  He says the journey itself 
took him two years.  He spent nine months in Greece before he was able to leave hidden in a 
truck to reach Italy.  He asks for support from Walking With and gives the support worker the 
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contact details of his lawyer.  However, the support worker cannot get in touch with his lawyer, 
which means that he cannot be given financial support.  He is homeless, so he cannot take food 
that needs to be cooked.  I ask him if he could cook at a friend‘s house and he says ―No, no 
friends.  Friends are no good‖.  We refer him to another service but he says he has visited the 
service already and the people there ignored him, ―all people like that‖.  Salah appears 
despondent – he cannot find people willing to help him and he seems to be alone in the UK.  He 
always seems reluctant to leave the centre.  Without access to a community and without access to 
shelter he is in a situation of insecurity.  Human security recognizes subsistence security, 
including access to food and shelter.  It also acknowledges the need to protect the patterns of 
daily life.  Salah is in a situation of insecurity without access to basic subsistence and without the 
capacity to build a daily life with secure expectations. 
 
 Discussion 
 The status of asylum seeker, whether self-defined or state defined, carries some 
connotation of insecurity. An individual who is seeking asylum is outside of his or her home 
country and has experienced a severe disruption in the pattern of daily life.  The asylum system 
is in place to offer protection.  While the convention definition of a refugee is a person seeking 
protection from persecution, it suggests a very individualistic understanding of the word.  The 
persecution has to be aimed with intention at a particular individual.  As a result structural causes 
are ruled out.  In the way the asylum system has developed, the individualism at its heart then 
shifts the assumption of agency to all people who claim asylum.  That is, structural causes that 
compel people to leave their home countries are not taken into account.  Rather, people are either 
asylum seekers who have been forced to leave by their persecutors who are also individual 
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agents choosing to persecute, or people who claim to be asylum seekers are actively trying to 
circumvent the law, to enter Europe clandestinely so that they can carry on criminal lifestyles, 
provoking a danger to state security within Europe.  The functioning of the asylum system 
attempts to deter people from doing this.  Thus, the restrictions within the asylum system ensure 
that the sense of security being sought is not offered until a person has been positively identified 
as a refugee by the state authorities.  The policies designed to deter those people who the state 
determines illegitimate, such as the dispersal programme, lack of the right to work, and lack of 
monetary support all contribute to ontological insecurity.  The result is that ontological insecurity 
is maintained within secure states. 
 The human security paradigm offers an alternative conception of security that does not 
have to depend on the state.  However, in its application it tends to belie the assertion that it 
offers a non-state based conception of security, as insecurity is generally identified via the 
international system of states (see chapter five).  Furthermore, the distinction between the 
―insured‖ and the ―uninsured‖ that Duffield identified (2007) is maintained across international 
borders.  In other words, human insecurity is identified in geographic locations.  Yet a person 
who travels across borders and regions carries with them their security or insecurity, depending 
on their status.  Asylum seekers become a subaltern uninsured population who are not offered 
access to security until they have been positively identified as a refugee.  Identification as a 
refugee represents a shift from being an irregular or ―illegal‖ migrant, to being conceptualized as 
having moved through ―legal‖ channels of migration.  However, the evident paradox is that 
many individuals do not conceive of their movement as ―illegal‖ yet the state does.  Crossing 
borders becomes a criminal activity, yet for asylum seekers it is often impossible to obtain travel 
documents.  Before asylum seekers are identified as having moved through legal channels, their 
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insecurity is maintained.  This demonstrates the discriminatory understanding of security at the 
human level as applied by states: not human security but citizen security.  The evidence of 
ontological insecurity amongst individuals who are seeking asylum exposes such a 
discriminatory offering of security.   
   The ontological insecurity in the narratives considered above demonstrates that the 
conceptualization of the immigration system as incorporating deterrents for ―illegal‖ immigrants 
creates and maintains ontological insecurity.  Furthermore, the functioning of the asylum system 
allows states to continue to dominate security concerns, given that states hold the power to 
discriminate between who is permitted security and who is not.  This contradicts the objectives 
of human security  because human security then remains subservient to state security. 
   
Conclusions 
 While the narratives detailed above do not solve the security paradox at the heart of 
immigration, they expose the contradiction at the heart of human security that was discussed in 
the previous chapter.  The assumption of individualism in the asylum and immigration system, 
along with the neglect of economic structural causes of migration in the asylum system, means 
that migrants are perceived as criminals regardless of criminal intention or personal knowledge 
of illegal behaviour.  The binary of structure and agency posits the refugee as a victim of 
structure and the illegitimate asylum seeker as an agent intent on exploiting the system.  The 
incorporation of ontological security as an important part of human security shifts the agent of 
security from the state, which is currently free to discriminate, to each individual.  Further to 
that, structure and agency are reconfigured as mutually constituted and dependent on each other 
(Giddens 1984, McSweeney 1999). In this way the asylum seeker such as Amir can be 
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understood as having made decisions that were available to him in his circumstances rather than 
an individual who exercised criminal agency.  Thus, rather than citizen security, ontological 
security can offer insight into a human security that is at least capable of incorporating all 
humans. 
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Conclusion 
 
Throughout this project I have sought to understand the paradox that asylum seekers – some 
of the most vulnerable peoples in the world – are constructed as a threat in advanced 
industrialized states.  I looked to Europe because increasing numbers of people seek asylum 
there because of the geographic proximity to areas that generate outward migrants.    
Furthermore, Europe has opened its borders to people migrating within the economic area but 
has simultaneously hardened the borders for those attempting to enter from outside the economic 
community.  My discourse analysis of Britain shows the importance of economics particularly in 
the tabloid discourse in terms of identifying who is genuinely in need of protection and who is 
not.  The analysis of Greece demonstrates the difficulties in acquiring political agency for 
migrants who are constructed as a collective that does not reflect how the people grouped into 
the collective perceive themselves.  I question the ―genuine‖ categories and the ―illegitimate‖ 
categories as constructions that are reproduced through a specific international understanding of 
forced migration that has been adopted by states.  The second part of this project then examined 
the paradigm of human security, considering first the efficacy of this paradigm to meet human 
needs and proposing a theoretical development of the paradigm to incorporate ontological 
security.  I then turn to the narratives of asylum seekers to offer insight into the disparity between 
self-identities of asylum seekers and the identities attributed to them by states.  This serves to 
demonstrate the power structure that relies on the state for security and access to rights at the 
expense of individuals without state based identities.  The narratives of asylum seekers can also 
highlight ways in which ontological security offers a more comprehensive understanding of 
human security that does not rely on the privilege of citizenship. 
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In this conclusion, I briefly reiterate my answers to the research questions I identified in the 
introduction.  I will then consider what questions I leave unanswered and identify directions for 
future research. 
 
Research questions and answers 
1. What are the mechanisms in place in international and domestic politics that lead asylum 
seekers to be constructed as a threat? 
In chapter one I considered a genealogy of the asylum seeker definition to understand the 
spatial, temporal and circumstantial constraints on how asylum seekers are understood in Europe.  
I identified the disparity between asylum seeker self-definitions and the limited definition of an 
asylum seeker as it is applied by European states.  The people who consider themselves to be 
asylum seekers but do not comply with the state definition are constructed as a threat to national 
security, national unity, economic prosperity, and general societal wellbeing.   
In chapter two I moved to examine this threat construction in more detail via critical security 
theory and post colonial theories of security and migration.  These two bodies of literature 
intersect in such a way as to offer insight into the construction of asylum seekers as a 
homogenous threatening unit.  A post colonial understanding of global politics demonstrates how 
identity and therefore political subjectivity is not accessible for specific groups, particularly 
groups of people who do not have a state based identity.  I apply the insight garnered from a post 
colonial understanding of global politics to the experiences of people seeking asylum in Europe 
and examine how the process of seeking asylum denies subjectivity, particularly when an 
individual is not considered an asylum seeker by the state in which he or she is present.  I argue 
that an asylum seeker must first define him or herself to be an asylum seeker before enacting the 
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process of seeking asylum.  During transit to the country where an individual intends to seek 
asylum he or she is not considered an asylum seeker.  If an asylum claim is denied by the state 
then the individual is no longer considered an asylum seeker.  However, in many cases the 
people who are not considered by the state to be asylum seekers still consider themselves to be 
asylum seekers.  Yet when an asylum seeker identity is denied to an individual by the state, he or 
she ceases to be recognized by that state as a political subject.  Simultaneously, extant power 
constructs asylum seekers as a homogenous unit that threatens the wellbeing of the receiving 
state.  This construction of asylum seekers as a homogenous threatening unit further denies 
individual subjectivity, instead taking all asylum seekers to share the same characteristics, which 
are usually portrayed as criminal or threatening.  Consequently more asylum seekers fall into the 
category of ―illegal immigrant‖.  This then provokes the state to further restrict asylum creating a 
hermeneutic process in which the number of ―illegal immigrants‖ rises because the criteria that 
establishes one as ―legal‖ is contracting. 
Chapter three breaks down the extant power that constructs asylum seekers as a threat in 
Britain.  Through this deconstruction it becomes apparent that the threats portrayed are multiple.  
Asylum seekers are seen as potential ―illegal immigrants‖ who are criminal individuals.  They 
are constructed via a threefold power discourse as people who want to take advantage of the 
economic prosperity of Britain.  Chapter four examines the lack of agency attributed to asylum 
seekers in Greece, which allows them to become seen as a homogenous group rather than as 
separate individuals.  Chapter four shows in detail how migrant identity in Greece interacts with 
national identity, both to reinforce national, social, and historical narratives, and to prevent a 
―cultural dilution‖ of Greek identity in the face of growing migrant visibility.  The two case 
studies that look at the construction of asylum seekers in state discourses find that asylum 
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seekers are understood as a homogenous unit.  This unit takes on threatening and criminal 
characteristics in Britain.  In Greece the unit is portrayed as ―illegal‖ and there is little 
consideration of individual migrant identities.  The collective identity often portrays migrants in 
Greece as lazy, criminal, and separate from Greeks.  The evident paradox is that migrants are 
denied political subjectivity but are portrayed as responsible agents who have committed 
criminal acts.  The mechanisms that lead migrants to be constructed as a threat are the legal 
frameworks that rely on state based identity and the discourses that establish migrants as a 
security issue. 
 
2. What are the characteristics of international human rights that lead migrants to be 
excluded? 
I primarily answer this question in chapters one, five and six.  Chapter one examines the 
establishment of the refugee definition in international law and how it has been interpreted in 
state law, given the failure of the attempt to draft an internationally shared asylum-seeker 
definition.  To reiterate, this understanding relies on the refugee convention definition of a 
refugee.  The convention definition was established in the climate of Europe immediately 
following World War II and reflects the political climate at the time and the needs of the 
European states at the time.  Further to that, a person is understood as an asylum seeker by a state 
after he or she has filed an application for asylum.  This disregards the period of time in which a 
person is forced to migrate from his or her home country, and the entire time spent in transit. 
Many migrants in transit identify themselves as asylum seekers but are not recognized as such by 
a state. Thus, the understanding of an asylum seeker in international and state law is limited.   
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Furthermore, the demographics of asylum seekers and the landscape of global politics 
have changed significantly since the refugee Convention was entered into force.  On the other 
hand, the definition itself has not changed.  Thus, I argue that the refugee definition does not 
meet the needs of contemporary forced migrants.  It was designed with the intention of providing 
refuge but has been consistently used to meet the needs of states in terms of limiting forced 
migration.   
In chapter five I look at the concept of human security, which synthesizes security and 
human rights to some extent.  Further to that, human security can offer valuable insight into the 
issues of forced migration.  International human rights do not incorporate poverty as a legitimate 
factor of forced migration.  Human security offers a consideration of human rights that was 
generated by development goals and so includes subsistence security and economic concerns.   
However, the application of human security in practice has been conventionally influenced by 
states and has focused on meeting the most immediate needs of those humans within states that 
are considered unable or unwilling to supply for basic needs Thomas 2004, Nuruzzaman 2006).  
There is little critical consideration of the way human security can break away from the 
understanding of global politics that focuses on the state as the central unit.  However, those 
efforts to critically understand human security demonstrate the possibility of shifting the focus to 
a human one.  Mark Duffield in particular demonstrates that the state centred power and the 
structural economic power that informs how security is understood and practiced maintains a 
Western neoliberal bias.  Individuals in the states that are considered insecure might be subject to 
development goals but these goals tend are based on the principles of neoliberal economics.  
Duffield identifies a significant difference between the developed Western states in the form of 
individualised security, or social insurance.  The principles of neoliberal economics do not 
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incorporate social insurance and Duffield offers an understanding of a world divided into insured 
and uninsured people (Duffield 2007). This can also be rephrased into secure and insecure 
humans.  The uninsured or insecure people retain their uninsured status when they cross a 
border.  Consequently, people who migrate from uninsured or insecure states remain insecure 
while in transit and until an application for leave to remain, or in the particular context of this 
project an application for asylum, has been processed and accepted.  In other words, human 
insecurity persists in secure states.  Migrants are excluded from human rights until they leave 
behind their status as a migrant and become an immigrant member of the receiving state.  
Chapter six offers empirical insight into the exclusion of migrants from human rights, via the 
narratives of people who consider themselves to be asylum seekers.  I look at how the 
individuals characterize themselves as asylum seekers and I consider how this fits with the 
dominant state discourses that refer to asylum seekers.  Many of the migrants are seeking human 
rights, yet they cannot access them because the state that they are petitioning does not concur 
with their asylum seeker identity.  In many cases individuals find themselves unable to seek 
rights because of structural impediments, such as the cyclical process that is evident in Greece.  
Migrants in Greece are often unable or unwilling to seek asylum there – interview participants 
has a variety of reasons such as the unfeasibility of having a claim processed or the desire to join 
family elsewhere.  However, if they do not file a claim they are attributed the identity of ―illegal 
immigrant.‖  Migrants who have not filed, if stopped by the police, are given a deportation 
document instructing that they leave the country.  However, this document is not a travel 
document.  Thus if they attempt to leave they are imprisoned for a period of time then given the 
same document again instructing that they leave.  In chapter five I propose the incorporation of 
ontological security into the theoretical paradigm of human security.  Ontological insecurity then 
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represents a lack of access to human rights and security.  According to the narratives of asylum 
seekers in chapter six, the major places in which ontological insecurity is present can be 
characterized by a lack of control or a lack of agency in everyday life.  Consequently, the 
discourses that construct asylum seekers as a homogenous unit combined with the process of 
seeking asylum that does not allow individual agency in quotidian life can be seen as a factor 
that impedes access to the realization of human rights for asylum seekers in Europe. 
 
3. In what ways is the concept of ontological security relevant for the individual rights-
seeker? 
The concept of ontological security focuses on an individual sense of security that is 
dependent on maintaining a core basic security system composed of mutual knowledge regarding 
the operation of the world around us, and common sense.  This security can be understood as 
part of the right to life in that the right to life carries more meaning than the medical state of 
being alive.  The right to life can incorporate more broadly things such as the mind, freedom of 
choice, community and personal life experiences as discussed in chapter five.  Individual 
migrants seeking human rights can be seen as having had their core basic security system 
ruptured in several different ways.  The initial rupture is through movement away from the 
familiar surroundings.  This disrupts the regular expectation of the functioning of daily life.  
Further, one can assume that an event took place that generated the initial need or desire for 
movement.  Again, that event would represent a further rupture to the functioning of daily life 
that removes the core sense of security. 
Ontological security can be particularly important for the individual rights-seeker, especially 
in cases of forced migration.  Migration removes a sense of ontological security as it puts the 
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individual into an unfamiliar situation.  Furthermore, many people remain in that situation of flux 
for several months or years as they seek the ability to develop familiarity in a given location 
without the fear of another rupture in the form of being forced to move once again.  Examining 
the experiences of individuals seeking asylum in Europe demonstrates that there are many people 
in prolonged situations of uncertainty.  Their identity as asylum seekers is disputed as is their 
right to remain in the state where they have sought protection.  Prolonged ontological insecurity 
is maintained by the uncertainty and by the lack of an ability to build an existence that could 
potentially cultivate a renewed sense of security. 
An important contribution of ontological security theory for migration studies is the shifted 
understanding of the structure-agency dynamic.  The differentiation between legitimate refugees 
and those considered ―illegitimate‖ or ―illegal‖ is the attribution of agency.  Refugees are 
understood as forced migrants.  As Emma Haddad identifies, refugees are seen as being forced to 
migrate while other migrants make a choice.  Refugees want to rebuild what they have lost, 
while other migrants want to build a better life (Haddad 2008).  However, asylum seekers who 
move for a variety of reasons then are faced with proving that they were forced to migrate and 
that the compulsion is based on one of the refugee criteria.  The migrant is an agent who has 
freely chosen a particular path.  If that path includes activities that states determine as illegal then 
the migrant bears the responsibility for illegal behaviour. Ontological security provides 
movement away from structure and agency as dual concepts to a dynamic in which is 
constituting the other.  This is an essential difference in understanding migrants as agents who 
operate within structural constraints, making choices and taking action as a result of those 
structural constraints.  Applying ontological security theory to asylum seeker definitions permits 
the criteria that determine forced migration to become more reliant on individual circumstances 
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and less static and absolute.  The agency to normatively rank security concerns moves from the 
state to the individual migrant.    
     
4. How can human rights be reconceived in order to empower the individual rights-seeker? 
Human rights currently privilege citizen rights.  In cases of forced migration the individual 
rights seeker is not recognized as a citizen.  A decentered conception of human rights and human 
security that moves away from the privileges of citizenship and the privileges of the neoliberal 
economic system is needed to empower the individual rights seeker.  Currently, forced migrants 
do not have the political agency to establish and practice their identities as asylum seekers.  The 
determination of asylum seeker relies upon the state.  Moreover, asylum seekers who states do 
not recognize are often labeled as illegal immigrants or criminals. Their identity is being 
reconfigured by states and that does not comply with how they see themselves, which further 
ruptures ontological security.  I ultimately conclude that ontological security theory can expose 
the state based and security based biases in international human rights.  Considering the 
ontological security of the individual rights-seeker recognizes the importance of bodily 
autonomy and thereby permits the migrant the agency to determine his or her own identity along 
with the agency to identify the needs most immediate to him or her in a way that could allow the 
rights-seeker the ability to reacquire a sense of ontological security.  
 
Directions for future research: 
This project exposes failings in the international system of protection for asylum seekers, 
in particular with regard to how it functions in Europe.  Moreover, it demonstrates to the lack of 
individual agency to determine identity and acquire security for asylum seekers.  Paradoxically, 
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this lack of individual agency is juxtaposed with an attribution of agency whereby ―failed‖ 
asylum seekers or ―illegal immigrants‖ are held responsible for any activity that states 
understand as unlawful or criminal. Ontological security theory offers insight into the limitations 
of the asylum system because ontological security focuses on a sense of security that is intrinsic 
to each individual.  Ontological security then requires a decentered understanding of security, 
which cannot be generated by a culture of care that impedes political agency and social 
participation.   
Due to time and space constraints I have looked at only two European countries to 
understand the experiences of asylum seekers in those areas.  A more detailed look at the journey 
of asylum seekers towards and through Europe will provide understanding of the maintained 
insecurity that is present during the journey and is often a result of European security policies.  
The concept of agency for asylum seekers is dealt with briefly in this project and requires further 
investigation.  There are cases within Europe where asylum seekers have asserted individual 
agency and have consequently asserted their presence as global political actors.  The notable case 
that comes to mind is that of hunger strikers in Greece.  While this case was to some extent 
suppressed in Greek discourse, it gained international attention.  This along with other cases that 
have been researched in IR show the spontaneous assertion of agency, yet this tends to be in 
conflict with the prevailing authorities.  The most extreme cases have developed into riots and 
violence such as recent events in Australia.  If power can move away from the rigid state-
determined conceptualization that is extant in global politics and attribute political agency to 
individuals that is not dependent on membership to a territorial unit there is reason to believe a 
dialogue could be generated that precedes and negates conflict situations between migrant groups 
and states.  Thus, spaces in which asylum seekers who are without rights yet have generated 
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political participation for themselves is a fertile direction for future research.  Research in this 
area has already outlined asylum seekers gaining an international political voice (Moulin and 
Nyers 2007, Budz 2009).  The interaction with the nation state and the role of national politics in 
the contemporary global system remains an interesting space for further study. 
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Appendix 
Key 
Tables show the numerical frequency of code appearance in data.  Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 refer to 
data from Chapter 3; Table 4.1 refers to data from Chapter 4. 
Spe. = party platform speeches 
P1-10 = Parliament Standard Notes 
Deb. = parliamentary debate 
SOCA 1 = Serious Organized Crime Agency briefing on immigration crime 
SOCA 2 = Serious Organized Crime Agency Lorry Crime Prevention Booklet 
UKBA1 = UK Border Agency Annual Report 2008-09 
UKBA2 = UK Border Agency Annual Report 2009-10 
UKBA3 = UK Border Agency Annual Report 2010-11 
Media = UK Tabloid Media 
Ta Nea = Greek newspaper 
Eleutherotypia = Greek newspaper 
 
Table 3.1: Political discourse 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Code  Spe. P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 Deb. Totals 
               
Bogus/Suspicious  1 2 5 29 2 6 1 12 3 7 2 1 81 
Cheats   1 1 1    2  1   6 
Destitution    1 2   9 14 1 2   29 
Illegal / criminal  1 3 9 25 12 15  1 4 6 5 1 86 
Irregular / 
undocumented 
      2       2 
Limiting Access   7 3 13  2  4 1 2   32 
Responsibility / 
earning 
citizenship 
  1 14 3  1 2 5  5   31 
Separation /  
Difference 
  1 1 2   2 4  1   11 
State security  1 2  14 13 1   1   4 41 
Terrorism  1  1 1 6 1      2 17 
Threat  7 10 15 14 2 4 1 1 3 1 1 7 61 
 Econ 5 7 11 3  3 1 1 3 1  5 35 
 Phys   2 3 1    2    8 
 Soc  5 3 3  2   2  1  16 
Totals  20 39 66 119 36 37 16 44 20 26 9 20  
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Table 3.2: Security professionals 
 
Code  SOCA1 SOCA2 UKBA1 UKBA2 UKBA3 Totals 
        
Bogus/Suspicious  4 3 5 5 1 18 
Cheats        
Destitution      1 1 
Illegal / criminal  4 3 10 10 12 39 
Irregular / 
undocumented 
  3 2   5 
Limiting Access    10 3 12 25 
Responsibility / 
earning 
citizenship 
       
Separation /  
Difference 
   3   3 
State security    6 7 14 27 
Terrorism    2 1 2 3 
Threat   1 2 5 2 10 
 Econ    1  1 
 Phys   1 1  2 
 Soc    1  1 
Totals  8 10 39 34 44  
 
Table 3.3: Tabloid media 
Code  Media 
   
Malcontents  6 
Bogus/Suspicious  42 
Cheats  7 
Destitution  5 
Illegal / criminal  51 
Irregular / undocumented   
Limiting Access  7 
Responsibility / earning 
citizenship 
 1 
Separation /  
Difference 
 1 
State security  39 
Terrorism  16 
Threat  65 
 Econ 42 
 Phys 10 
 Soc 4 
   
Totals  269 
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Table 4.1: The Greek Media 
 
 
 
 
Code  Ta Nea Eleutherotypia Code total 
     
Advocacy  18 36 54 
Crime / criminal 
association 
 20 19 39 
Description of 
migrant situation 
 69 44 113 
 From migrant 16 6 22 
 From other 15 4 19 
Health   14 14 
Identity  8 12 20 
Legal / illegal  55 42 97 
Migrant opinion / 
story 
 33 8 41 
 From migrant 17 5 22 
 From other 9  9 
Migrant motivation: 
poverty / 
unemployment 
 13 16 29 
Migrant political 
action 
 42 92 134 
Migrant / Greek 
relations 
 53 43 96 
Politicians / 
immigration 
professionals 
 110 61 171 
Racism / 
discrimination 
 24 31 55 
Residence temporary/ 
permanent 
 11 1 12 
Security  18 15 33 
Separation btw. 
Greeks and migrants 
 19 16 35 
Systemic Failure  1 9 10 
Vulnerability  13 30 43 
Rights 
 
 14 34 48 
Totals  578 538  
